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Toward a Poetics of Animality: Hofmannsthal, Rilke, Pirandello, Kafka 
Kári Driscoll 
 
Toward a Poetics of Animality is a study of the place and function of animals in the 
works of four major modernist authors: Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Rainer Maria Ril-
ke, Luigi Pirandello, and Franz Kafka. Through a series of close readings of canonical 
as well as lesser-known texts, I show how the so-called “Sprachkrise”—the crisis of 
language and representation that dominated European literature around 1900—was 
inextricably bound up with an attendant crisis of anthropocentrism and of man’s rela-
tionship to the animal. Since antiquity, man has been defined as the animal that has 
language; hence a crisis of language necessarily called into question the assumption 
of human superiority and the strict division between humans and animals on the ba-
sis of language. Furthermore, in response to author and critic John Berger’s provoca-
tive suggestion that “the first metaphor was animal,” I explore the essential and 
constantly reaffirmed link between animals and metaphorical language. The implica-
tion is that the poetic imagination and the problem of representation have always on 
some level been bound up with the figure of the animal. Thus, the ‘poetics of animal-
ity’ I identify in the authors under examination gestures toward the origin of poetry 
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The first subject matter for painting was animal. Probably the 
first paint was animal blood. Prior to that, it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that the first metaphor was animal. 
—John Berger, “Why Look at Animals” 
Introduction 
I. “Neue Dichtung vom Tiere” 
Sometime around 1900, a fundamental shift occurred in the way animals were rep-
resented in works of Western literature, art, and philosophy. Authors began to write 
about animals in a way that was unheard-of or even unimaginable in previous 
epochs. Traditionally, animals had fulfilled a symbolic, allegorical, or satirical func-
tion. But in the period around the turn of the twentieth century these animals begin, 
as it were, to “misbehave” or to “resist” the metaphorical values attributed to them. 
There is a conspicuous abundance of animals in the literature of this period, and this 
animal presence is frequently characterised by a profound and troubling ambiguity, 
which is often more or less explicitly linked to the problem of writing, representation, 
and language—specifically poetic or metaphorical language. 
In 1918, the Austrian literary scholar Oskar Walzel published an article enti-
tled “Neue Dichtung vom Tiere” in which he too noted “eine nicht unbeträchtliche 
Verschiebung” in recent literary depictions of animals. “Uralte Gewohnheit der Fabel 
ist, vom Tiere zu reden und den Menschen zu meinen,” Walzel wrote, citing as an 
example G. E. Lessing’s treatise Von dem Gebrauch der Tiere in der Fabel (1759), which 
argued that animals serve as a sort of symbolic shorthand, since the “allgemein be-





lesson of the fable far easier to grasp than the infinitely more varied and ambiguous 
characters of men. “In neuerer Zeit,” Walzel continued, “wird das Tier um seiner 
selbst willen dichterisch erfaßt. Es soll nicht länger nur als bequemes Mittel dienen, 
in abgekürzter Form den Menschen zu versinnlichen. Es will sein eigenes Recht 
finden. Es möchte seine eigenen Leiden und Freuden zum Ausdruck gelangen las-
sen” (53). Walzel’s diagnosis is limited to the symptoms of this seismic shift in the 
literary representation of animals. He cites numerous examples of works by contem-
porary French, German, and Scandinavian authors, but says little to nothing about 
what might account for this development. So what had changed? 
Six years later, in 1924, Virginia Woolf famously asserted that “on or around 
December 1910, human character changed” (38). The somewhat hyperbolic precision 
of this assertion is a deliberately facetious comment on the inherent arbitrariness of 
any such strict periodisation. “I am not saying that one went out, as one might into a 
garden, and there saw that a rose had flowered, or that a hen had laid an egg,” she 
wrote. “The change was not sudden and definite like that. But a change there was, 
nevertheless.” 
All human relations have shifted—those between masters and servants, 
husbands and wives, parents and children. And when human relations 
change there is at the same time a change in religion, politics and literature. 
Let us agree to place one of these changes in 1910. (38) 
I would argue for placing it a decade earlier, and I would like to add a relationship to 
the list: humans and animals (including the putative hen in the hypothetical garden). 
In this dissertation I will examine the paradigm shift in the representation of animals 





of animals in the works of four modernist authors: Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Rainer 
Maria Rilke, Luigi Pirandello, and Franz Kafka. I locate these texts within a tradition 
of what I refer to as the poetics of animality—a tradition that, I argue, underwent a 
profound transformation in this period, which represents a turning point in man-
kind’s relationship to animals in a number of different yet interconnected ways. 
The industrialisation and mass urbanisation of European society that had oc-
curred over the previous century meant that humans were now suddenly divorced 
from animal life in their everyday existence like never before. The establishment of 
the modern zoological garden and the rise in popularity of domestic pet-keeping may 
be seen as attempts to compensate for this, even as they serve as indicators of radical-
ly new parameters for human–animal interaction. At the same time, developments in 
the natural sciences—most importantly Darwin’s formulation of the theory of evolu-
tion—coupled with Nietzsche’s thoroughgoing critique of metaphysical anthropocen-
trism and Freud’s mapping of the human subconscious, had given rise to a newly 
animalised conception of the human. This growing awareness of man’s own animal 
nature did not, for the most part, bring man closer to other animals, however. On the 
contrary, paradoxical as it may seem, it frequently led to a greater perceived distance 
to the rest of the animal world. To be sure, there were those who enthusiastically em-
braced this new proximity to nature, such as the outspoken Austrian modernist 
Hermann Bahr, who, in 1909, published an exuberant essay in the Neue Rundschau 






Der Mensch, bisher der Natur gegenüber, als ihr Zuschauer und ihr Herr, 
vor dem und für den das ganze Spiel der Welt geschieht, sah sich nun 
plötzlich in die Natur gerissen, mitten in sie hinein; er hatte gar nichts 
mehr für sich allein, und die Tiere, die Blumen, die Steine sollten nun seine 
Brüder und Schwestern sein. (Bahr 128; cf. Renner) 
But once this euphoria had died down, it was replaced by a more melancholic aware-
ness of an irreducible gap between man and his newfound siblings. Much like the 
moats separating the spectators from the animals on display in the enclosures at Carl 
Hagenbeck’s new Tierpark outside Hamburg, the barrier between human and animal 
was now harder to perceive, but no less insurmountable for all that. 
There are numerous ways in which this boundary continued to be upheld even 
as it was apparently being dismantled on all fronts. Man’s sense of supremacy in the 
world had been irrevocably damaged by the three blows (“Kränkungen”) to mankind’s 
species narcissism famously laid out by Freud in his 1917 essay “Eine Schwierigkeit 
der Psychoanalyse”: the first, cosmological blow was the Copernican revolution, 
which ousted mankind from its position at the centre of the universe; then came the 
biological blow in the shape of the theory of evolution—“Der Mensch ist nichts ande-
res und nichts Besseres als die Tiere, er ist selbst aus der Tierreihe hervorgegangen” 
(xii: 8). And, with the advent of the psychoanalytic understanding of unconscious 
drives and neuroses, man was no longer even “Herr […] in seinem eigenen Haus” 
(xii: 11). The economy of the human Self was in disarray once it had been discovered 
that there was a bloodthirsty, sex-crazed animal in the basement, secretly running the 
show. The libido is conceived as the primal, blindly instinctual, animal side of man, 





scious may certainly be said to have troubled the humanist ideal of man as rational 
and self-determining, but this again is quickly transformed into a marker of human 
exceptionalism. Although the human unconscious is coded as animal, the animal it-
self, because it lacks language and self-consciousness, is not granted an unconscious. 
Thus neurosis becomes man’s “Vorrecht vor den Tieren,” (xi: 429), a unique capaci-
ty, even, that sets him over and against other animals.1 
Ultimately, this discovery of man’s animal nature was nothing but a rediscov-
ery, or an enforced reinterpretation of the Aristotelian definition of man as the ζῷον 
λόγον ἔχον,2 the animal possessing language (λόγος), which in turn implies reason, 
the capacity for abstract thought, self-consciousness, the ability to make and use tools, 
subjectivity, historicity, an awareness of death, and all the heart-ache, and the thou-
                                                   
1 “Es ist ohne weiteres ersichtlich, daß dies auch die Bedinungen der großen Fortschritte sind, die der 
Mensch über seine Gemeinschaft mit den Tieren hinaus gemacht hat, so daß seine Fähigkeit zur 
Neurose nur die Kehrseite seiner sonstigen Begabung wäre” (Freud xi: 429). 
2 This exact formulation is not, as far as I am aware, to be found anywhere in Aristotle, but is rather a 
paraphrase of the following sentences from Book I of the Politics, where, immediately after having 
characterised man as the political animal, he continues: “And why man is a political animal in a great-
er measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing 
without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech [λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν 
ζῴων]” (1253a). 
The pithier formulation is used most prominently by Heidegger, e.g. in Sein und Zeit §6: “Das 
Dasein, d. h. das Sein des Menschen ist in der vulgären ebenso wie in der philosophischen ‘Definition’ 
umgrenzt als ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, das Lebende, dessen Sein wesenhaft durch das Redenkönnen bestimmt 
ist” (HGA 2: 34). Even though Heidegger always insisted that Dasein was not to be equated with 
Mensch, it is nevertheless, as the above quote clearly shows, defined as “das Sein des Menschen.” An 
animal, by Heidegger’s definition, can never be or have Dasein, because, as he elaborates in his lec-
tures on Parmenides, it is τὸ ζῷον ἄ-λόγον: the animal “dem das Wort versagt ist.” (It is not clear who 
exactly is pronouncing this denial or interdiction, but, in view of the fact that man is the only animal 
that has “the word,” it stands to reason that it is he who withholds it from the animal.) It is also in this 
context that Heidegger states—contra Rilke’s eighth Duino Elegy, which begins: “Mit allen Augen sieht 
die Kreatur das Offene”—that “[d]er Mensch, und er allein, ist das Seiende, das, weil es das Wort hat, 
in das Offene hineinsieht und das Offene im Sinne des ἀληθές sieht. Das Tier dagegen sieht das Offe-
ne gerade nicht und nie und mit keinem einzigen aller seiner Augen” (HGA 54: 231). I discuss Rilke’s 





sand natural shocks that flesh is heir to. “Jetzt war der Mensch auch ein Tier gewor-
den,” but he was still the only animal that had language, and his inability to com-
municate with his fellow creatures weighed heavily upon him. The insurmountable 
gap between man and animal was language. It is significant that the paradigm shift 
in representations of animals around 1900 coincided with the so-called 
“Sprachkrise,” the pervasive crisis of faith in the ability of language to describe reality. 
In the absence of the metaphysical certainties at the base of anthropocentrism, lan-
guage and self-consciousness suddenly seemed more like a liability than a privilege—
the bars of the animals’ cages might have disappeared from view, but they were still 
there; and now they were around man, while the animals roamed free out in the 
Open. 
It was around this time that writers began looking to non-human, non-
linguistic modes of perceiving the world. A particularly salient characteristic of the 
new animal poets, Walzel writes, “ist das eifrige Streben, sich ins Tier einzufühlen 
und seine Seelenvorgänge ihm abzulauschen” (53). But this was by no means limited 
to the literature of the period. 1909 saw the publication of Jakob von Uexküll’s Um-
welt und Innenwelt der Tiere, for instance, which posited that each living being had its 
own specific “Umwelt” that defined its unique perspective on the world. Rarely before 
had biological science shown such an interest in the subjective experience of nonhu-
man animals.3 Meanwhile, the Blaue Reiter artist Franz Marc was proclaiming the 
“animalisation” of art. In a letter to Reinhard Piper dated 30 April 1910, Marc wrote: 
                                                   
3 On the importance of Uexküll’s work for modern authors, including Rainer Maria Rilke, see especial-





Ich suche mein Empfinden für den organischen Rhythmus aller Dinge zu 
steigern, suche mich pantheistisch einzufühlen in das Zittern und Rinnen 
des Blutes in der Natur, in den Bäumen, in den Tieren, in der Luft [...]. Ich 
sehe kein glücklicheres Mittel zur “Animalisierung der Kunst” als das Tier-
bild. Darum greife ich danach. [...] Bei einem van Gogh oder einem Signac 
ist alles animalisch geworden, die Luft, selbst der Kahn, der auf dem Was-
ser ruht, und vor allem die Malerei selbst. (Marc 98) 
In a fragment written the following year, Marc asks: “Gibt es für Künstler eine ge-
heimnisvollere Idee als die […], wie sich wohl die Natur in dem Auge eines Tieres 
spiegelt? Wie sieht ein Pferd die Welt oder ein Adler, ein Reh oder ein Hund?” He 
goes on to deplore what he regards as the squalid and soulless convention of placing 
an animal in a landscape as it is seen by human eyes, “statt uns in die Seele des Tie-
res zu versenken, […] um dessen Bilderkreis zu erraten” (99). These are not idle ru-
minations on Marc’s part: “Diese Betrachtung soll keine müßige causerie sein, 
sondern uns zu den Quellen der Kunst führen” (99). The ultimate goal of the “ani-
malisation” of art is to rediscover the roots of art itself, and the way to achieve this lies 
via the animal. Indeed, as the discovery of Palaeolithic cave paintings, such as those 
at Font-de-Gaume (discovered in 1901) and at Altamira (discovered in 1879 but not 
generally accepted as authentic until 1902) had only recently revealed, the prehistoric 
roots of painting lay precisely in the representation of animals (and not humans). 
Marc’s question regarding the “mysterious idea” of the other’s perspective on the 
world can be seen as the essential question behind all artistic expression.4 
                                                                                                                                                       
Gilles Deleuze, see Brett Buchanan’s Onto-Ethologies. 
4 George Steiner writes that “[i]t is a commonplace of ethnography that early, ‘primitive’ art forms were 
meant to tempt towards domesticity, towards familiarity, the animal presences in the great dark of the 
outside world. Cave paintings are talismanic and propitiatory rites performed to make of the encounter 





More so than any other “other,” the figure of the animal holds a particular 
significance for the human precisely because the human is also an animal. The ani-
mal is, by definition, the “other” of the human insofar as the latter is conceived as the 
only animal that has language. Thus, the essential difference between “man” and “an-
imal” derives from language, and it is also essentially linguistic: “The animal,” writes 
Jacques Derrida in his monumental L’animal que donc je suis, “is a word, it is an ap-
pellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and 
the authority to give to the living other” (Animal, 23). And this authority derives from 
language—from the very fact that man, and man alone, has λόγος.5 In order to draw 
attention to the questionable legitimacy of the nominative singular “The Animal” as a 
monolithic designation for all living beings except man, Derrida coins the term “ani-
mot,” a combination of the words “animal” and “mot” (word), which, although singu-
lar, sounds like the plural animaux, and thus serves at once as a reminder of the var-
iegated multiplicity hidden behind this single word, and at the same time to draw 
attention to the fact that the very categories of “man” and “animal” are artefacts of 
language. Nevertheless, says Derrida, it would be trop bête to believe that one could 
                                                                                                                                                       
benefit. The marvels of the penetrative mimesis on the bison-walls at Lascaux are solicitations: they 
would draw the opaque and brute force of the ‘thereness’ of the non-human into the luminous am-
bush of representation and understanding. All representations, even the most abstract, infer a rendez-
vous with intelligibility or, at the least, with a strangeness attenuated, qualified by observance and 
willed form. Apprehension (the meeting with the other) signifies both fear and perception. The con-
tinuum between both, the modulation from one to the other, lie at the source of poetry and the arts” 
(138–39). 
5 Qualifications of this definition, such as Giorgio Agamben’s early suggestion that in fact “man is not 
the ‘animal possessing language’, but instead the animal deprived of language and obliged, therefore, 
to receive it from outside himself” (Infancy and History, 57) do nothing to change the basic structure of 





simply ignore or abolish the abyssal rupture that divides “man” from “animal.” Ra-
ther than questioning whether or not there is a limit at all, one should attempt to 
think “what a limit becomes once it is abyssal, once the frontier no longer forms a 
single indivisible line but more than one internally divided line; once, as a result, it 
can no longer be traced, objectified, or counted as single and indivisible” (30–31). In 
other words, it may be futile or naïve to think that one might simply decide to sus-
pend or eradicate the discontinuity between “man” and “animal”—by fiat, as it 
were—but it is equally foolish to assume that these two words describe two discrete, 
natural categories that are fundamentally stable and mutually exclusive. 
The dividing line separating “man” from “animal” is thus not of the order of a 
differentiation between species—since there is no species called simply “animal”—
but rather runs through man himself. Hence, while ostensibly describing separate en-
tities, the terms in fact mask a multiplicity whose boundaries are porous and open to 
resignification. A central tension within the discourse on the human–animal rela-
tionship stems from the inherent ambiguity and instability of the terms themselves. 
Throughout this dissertation, I deliberately use the now-antequated “man” as the op-
posite of the no-less-problematic “animal” as a reminder of the arbitrary and prejudi-
cial assumptions at the base of both terms. As I will show, the concepts of “the 
animal” and of “animality” as employed by the writers and thinkers under discussion 
are in fact informed by a largely unacknowledged internal heterogeneneity and are 
hence in need of differentiation.6 
                                                   
6 In the interests of readability, I have chosen not to place the terms in “scare quotes,” but I invite 





An interrogation of “this plural and repeatedly folded frontier” (Derrida Ani-
mal, 30) calls for a different kind of thinking about “the animal” than that which the 
Western philosophical tradition—at least since Aristotle, and certainly since Des-
cartes—has typically allowed. “For thinking concerning the animal [la pensée de 
l’animal], if there is such a thing, derives from poetry [revient à la poesie]. There you 
have a thesis: it is what philosophy has, essentially [par essence], had to deprive itself 
of. It is the difference between philosophical knowledge and poetic thinking” (7). The 
phrase “la pensée de l’animal” here involves a deliberately ambiguous subjec-
tive/objective genitive: it is both thoughts about animals and the thoughts of animals 
(animal cognition). It is the latter, above all, that the Western philosophical tradition 
has had to do without (or perhaps even more strongly: do away with), “par essence,” 
that is to say, not only “essentially” but by, and for the sake of, its very essence. The fun-
damental tenets of anthropocentrism demand that thought remain the privileged site 
of human superiority—the radical separation of the animal body from the rational 
human mind is the very raison-d’être of the Cartesian cogito. Thus, if there is such a 
thing as animal thought (in the dual, reciprocal sense), it derives from, and comes 
back to, poetry (revient à la poésie). 
There are, Derrida says, fundamentally “only two types of discourse, two posi-
tions of knowledge, two grand forms of theoretical or philosophical treatise regarding 
the animal,” each predicated on a different experience of the animal gaze, and, more 
importantly, a different response to the implications of that gaze. 
In the first place, there are texts signed by people who have no doubt seen, 
observed, reflected on the animal, but have never seen themselves being seen 





intersected with that of an animal directed at them […]. If, indeed, they did 
happen to see themselves being seen furtively by the animal one day, they 
took no (thematic, theoretical, or philosophical) account of it. They either 
could not or would not draw any systematic consequence from the fact that 
an animal could, facing them, look at them, clothed or naked, and in a 
word, without a word, address them. (13, transl. corrected) 
The others, those who have not only acknowledged the ability of the gaze of the ani-
mal other to address them but attempted to draw “systematic” consequences, to allow 
this acknowledgement to flow back into their discourse on the animal, are, of course, 
the poets. And we would include Franz Marc in this group, as his question, “Wie 
sieht ein Pferd die Welt?” is, in this sense, a fundamentally poetic question, in that it 
acknowledges not only that a particular animal has a distinct perspective on the 
world, but also that this perspective is interesting in and of itself, and, conversely, that 
the answer or answers to this question, that the very act of posing the question in the 
first place, can have a significant effect on how we humans see and interpret and rep-
resent the world around us. Marc’s “Animalisierung der Kunst” would thus likewise 
be a fundamentally poetic—or, more specifically, a zoopoetic—endeavour. 
The “allgemein bekannten und unveränderlichen Charaktere der Tiere,” 
which Lessing identified as the precondition for the symbolic function of animals in 
fables, are in turn dependent on a familiar, universal taxonomy, in which these essen-
tial characteristics of each animal are codified. Structurally, there is little difference 
between fables and medieval bestiaries, which arranged the animals according to 
their symbolic or allegorical meaning, and Carl von Linné’s Systema Naturae. The lat-
ter appears to us more objective and scientifically rigorous, given its emphasis on 





apparently less arbitrary than those of the Physiologus.7 Any taxonomy is always at 
base an attempt to impose order on nature by means of interpretation, by ascribing a 
specific significance to it. As such they are all reiterations of Adam’s naming of the 
animals in the Book of Genesis. In the Summa Theologica (1265–74), St. Thomas 
Aquinas states that although “in a state of innocence man would not have had any 
bodily need of animals […] man needed animals in order to have experimental 
knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to 
man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures” (1:919). 
The primary use, in other words, that man had of animals was intellectual, not bodily, 
in that it was his ability to identify and correctly label the animals which set him apart 
from them, even as it was this parade of animals which in turn enabled him to estab-
lish this difference. Man needs “experimental knowledge of their natures,” in order to 
be secure in his own. This is what makes Derrida’s suggestion of “a taxonomy of the 
point of view of animals” (13) so radical: as an institution, taxonomy itself is founded on 
man’s dominion over nature. 
When the animals in the literature around 1900 begin to “misbehave” or “re-
sist” the metaphorical significances with which they have been burdened, it creates a 
particularly disquieting effect in the reader, perhaps because we generally expect the 
symbolic meaning of literary animals to be easy to determine. Traditionally, we read 
                                                   
7 Tom Tyler’s essay “Four Hands Good, Two Hands Bad” offers an excellent and provocative overview 
of some of the debates and controversies regarding Linnaean taxonomy, specifically with regard to the 
place of Homo Sapiens in relation to other primates. (The essay is ostensibly about Franz Kafka’s “Ein 
Bericht für eine Akademie,” and was even reprinted in the collection Kafka’s Creatures, but the story 
barely features in Tyler’s analysis, and his claim that Rotpeter grants “temporal priority” [181] to the 





them as symbols or metaphors, and it is an unsettling experience when we are unable 
to say exactly what these symbols and metaphors stand for—it troubles the most fun-
damental assumptions of humanism and anthropocentrism. And if this “new” liter-
ary animal emerges at the turn of the twentieth century, it is in large part because the 
“Sprachkrise” had revealed that one of the pillars of anthropocentrism was built on 
shifting sands. As I have already emphasised, from the very beginning, language has 
been seen as the defining characteristic of man, as that which set him apart from oth-
er animals. Man is the animal that has language: language is the dividing principle, it 
is that which precipitated the division of the world into Self and Other. By 1900, this 
division had become an insurmountable problem for European writers and thinkers. 
The transcendental unity of the “I” was being dismantled on all fronts—“Je est un 
autre” (Rimbaud); “Das Ich ist unrettbar” (Mach); “das Ich ist nicht Herr in seinem 
eigenen Haus” (Freud) etc.—and with it the sense of order and harmony guaranteed 
by the institution of metaphysical anthropocentrism. “Wenn ein Thier ich sagen 
könnte,” Immanuel Kant had written over a century earlier in his lectures on philo-
sophical anthropology, “so wäre es mein Camerad. Das Ich giebt einem jeden den 
Vorzug, sich zum Mittelpunckt der Welt zu machen” (207). Man is the only animal 
that can say “I”—but now “I” was another. The crisis of language is a crisis of an-
thropocentrism. Which means it was also a crisis of a certain way of thinking about 
animality. In fact, I would like to suggest that the crisis of language and representa-
tion is inextricably linked to an attendant ‘crisis of the animal’, which may be seen as 
the result of the profound social transformation of human–animal relations that had 





the intimate and constantly reaffirmed link between the animal and the origin of lan-
guage, poetry, art, and figurative representation as such. In other words, a re-
evaluation of the nature of language and poetic or figurative expression necessarily 
carried with it a re-appraisal of the figure of the animal. And it is at the intersection of 
these two questions—the question of language and the question of the animal—that I 
locate what I refer to as the poetics of animality, or zoopoetics. 
II. What Is Zoopoetics? 
Paul Valéry once defined poetics as “a name for everything that bears on the creation 
or composition of works having language at once as their substance and as their in-
strument” (qtd. in Todorov 7). Taking this useful definition as a starting point, we 
might posit that zoopoetics is concerned with the interplay between animality and 
language in the creation or composition of such works. That is to say, while poetics in 
general is concerned with objects whose “substance” and “instrument” is language—
treating language as both the medium and the message, in other words—zoopoetics 
is concerned not only with the constitution of the animal in and through language, 
but also the constitution of language in relation and in opposition to the figure of the 
animal. Zoopoetics thus also always involves the question of zoopoiesis, of the crea-
tion of the animal as much as the creation by means of the animal. In a sense, zoopo-
etics may be regarded as the most fundamental form of poetics, in that it incorporates 
the primary distinction between human and animal on the basis of language. By in-





its the “abyssal rupture” between human and animal, and reveals how that dividing 
line is fragmented, unstable, and internally incoherent. 
One should distinguish between two separate yet related forms of zoopoetics 
as it relates to the study of animals in literature, or to literary animal studies: on the 
one hand, zoopoetics is an object of study in and of itself, an attribute of literary and 
theoretical works that in one way or another deal centrally with the figure of the ani-
mal in relation to language, writing, and thought. The works by Hugo von Hof-
mannsthal, Rainer Maria Rilke, Luigi Pirandello, and Franz Kafka under 
consideration in this dissertation are all chosen because of the particular ways they 
are informed by zoopoetics. Some, such as Hofmannsthal’s Gespräch über Gedichte 
(1904), may be regarded as “zoopoetic manifestos” because of the bold and radical 
statements they make about the place and function of animals and animality in lan-
guage and representation. Hofmannsthal stresses the essential link between animali-
ty and poetic language by positing the moment of animal sacrifice as the origin of all 
symbolism. Others are more subtle, such as Pirandello’s 1915 novel Si gira…, which 
mobilises a vast array of clichés and tropes, overloading the tiger at the centre of the 
narrative with metaphorical and symbolic significances until they all come crashing 
down in the end in a “tropical ‘malfunction’” (Moses 10) that short-circuits the exces-
sively convoluted narrative structure. What all of these texts have in common is a 
preoccupation with the transgression of the boundaries between human and animal 
through language. 
On the other hand, zoopoetics presents a disciplinary and methodological 





versa? While animal studies may undoubtedly be able to tell us something about an-
imals and their place in human history and society, I would also like to think that lit-
erary animal studies can also tell us something about literature, and moreover 
something to which conventional literary studies might otherwise be blind, particu-
larly as it has been marked by the tendency to disregard the ubiquitous animal pres-
ence in literary texts, or else a single-minded determination to read animals 
exclusively as metaphors and symbols for something else. That is to say, insofar as 
literary studies has paid any attention to animals in literature, it has almost invariably 
taken the form of an investigation of “animal imagery” in a given text or œuvre. As 
Margot Norris writes in her groundbreaking study, Beasts of the Modern Imagination, 
“Imagery presupposes the use of the concrete to express the abstract, and indeed, it 
seem[s] that nowhere in literature [are] animals to be allowed to be themselves, to re-
fer to Nature and to their own animality without being pressed into symbolic service 
as metaphors, or as figures in fable or allegory (invariably of some aspect of the hu-
man)” (Norris 17). This concern for the animal’s autonomy within the literary text 
mirrors Oskar Walzel’s distinction between animal narratives in the fable tradition, 
which spoke of the animal while meaning the human, and more recent works (i.e. 
from around 1900), in which “das Tier um seiner selbst willen dichterisch erfaßt 
[wird]” (Walzel 53). And, indeed, the straightforward metaphorical conception of the 
literary animal had become all but untenable by the turn of the twentieth century, not 
only because of the emergent crisis of the anthropocentric assumptions that compel 
us to view any nonhuman presence in terms of its significance for the human, but 





There seems to be a fundamental link between animality and metaphoricity 
within language, a “fantastic transversality,” as Akira Lippit puts it. Lippit has pro-
posed the term “animetaphor” to describe the irreducible tension between the animal 
and the metaphor, particularly literary or rhetorical language: 
The animal brings to language something that is not part of language and 
remains within language as a foreign presence. That is, because the animal 
is said to lack the capacity for language, its function in language can only 
appear as an other expression, as a metaphor that originates elsewhere, is 
transferred from elsewhere. (Electric Animal, 165–6) 
The animal’s presence within language and discourse is hence always at base meta-
phorical. This originary metaphoricity, in turn, has the capacity to destabilise whatev-
er metaphorical valences subsequently become attributed to an animal figure within a 
text. The “animetaphor” is thus both a metaphor and not a metaphor, an antimeta-
phor, even; occupying both positions at once, it stands for the simultaneous produc-
tion and dissolution of meaning. Like Derrida’s animot, the animetaphor constitutes 
an intractable presence within language, resisting the pre-established strictures of 
syntax and grammar and remaining resolutely unassimilable to meaning. As such, it 
is a key figure of zoopoetics. 
Recent scholarship within animal studies nevertheless exhibits a pervasive un-
easiness regarding the metaphorical conception of the animal in literature and cul-
ture. On the one hand, this may be attributed to a rather narrow conception of 
metaphor as a mode of signification where one thing (the ‘figure’ or ‘vehicle’) stands 
for something else (the ‘ground’ or ‘tenor’), which is the actual or intended meaning, 





ly has been the dominant mode of reading animals in literary texts (and elsewhere), 
which never stand for themselves but only ever for something else. They are always 
the ‘instrument,’ never the ‘substance,’ to use Valéry’s terms. The specificity of the 
animal, either as a being or as a figure, is thus systematically denied. 
This wariness of a metaphorical conception of the animal in turn speaks to a 
more general suspicion, by no means unjustified, that such a conception serves ulti-
mately to assimilate the animal to a fundamentally logocentric discourse and hence to 
reduce “animal problems to a principle that functions within the legibility of the ani-
mal: from animal to ani-word,” as Jonathan Burt writes in response to Derrida’s an-
imot (“Morbidity and Vitalism,” 166). The question of the animal thus turns out to 
have been the question of language all along. Conversely, however, from a literary 
and philosophical standpoint, we might also posit that the question of language has 
itself also always been the question of the animal. What would it mean for literary 
studies if we were to take the implications of this involution seriously? Obviously, we 
cannot be content to look for animal imagery, or to interpret the animal out of the text 
by ‘discovering’ the true significance behind the animal figure, which is thus ren-
dered entirely instrumental and substitutable. Rather, a zoopoetic approach to litera-
ture must first and foremost be attentive to the specific way animals operate in literary 
texts as “functions of their literariness” (McHugh “Animal Agents,” 490). In other 
words, the figure of the animal is not merely one trope in an author’s poetic arsenal 
that could easily be replaced by any other, but rather presents a specific problem to 
and for language and representation. Why, after all, have animals always served as 





gins of painting, music, poetry, (and more recently, film), of the origin of language 
itself, does the animal always play such a prominent role, when it is precisely these 
things which are held up as proof of the inherent difference between man and ani-
mal? Is it not, as John Berger suggested in his seminal essay, “Why Look at Ani-
mals?” because “the first metaphor was animal”? And is this idea not in and of itself a 
fundamentally zoopoetic idea? In many ways, this dissertation may be seen as a re-
sponse to this suggestion. I will therefore now turn to Berger’s essay, in order to ex-
plore some of the implications of imputing this primary metaphoricity to the animal. 
Why Look at Animals? 
Berger’s essay in fact comprises three separate essays originally published in the 
journal New Society in 1977, respectively entitled “Animals as Metaphor,” “Vanishing 
Animals,” and “Why Zoos Disappoint.” The latter two are chiefly concerned with an-
imals as images and spectacle, but for the purposes of my argument here, I will pri-
marily be focusing on the first, which deals with the relationship between animals 
and language. At the beginning of the text, Berger posits a radical shift in the place of 
animals in Western society, “by which every tradition which has previously mediated 
between man and nature was broken” (3). Whereas before this watershed—which is 
to say: before the rise of capitalism and the bourgeoisie—animals had been “at the 
centre of [man’s] world,” now they have been “rendered absolutely marginal” (24). 
There is an undeniable note of idealised nostalgia in Berger’s text for a more ‘authen-
tic’ human–animal relationship in the pre-industrialised world, but nevertheless it is 





and animal have always scrutinised each other across what he calls “a narrow abyss of 
non-comprehension” (5). It is this mutual non-comprehending gaze, and above all 
the experience of “being seen by the animal” (Berger’s italics), which is to say, the 
awareness of being seen “as [man’s] surroundings are seen by him,” which leads man 
to attribute power to the animal. The look of the animal is “familiar”—i.e. man rec-
ognises this look as similar to his own—but never identical with it. “The animal,” 
Berger insists, “has secrets which, unlike the secrets of caves, mountains, seas, are 
specifically addressed to man” (5). As this statement makes clear, we are dealing here 
first and foremost with a subjective, anthropocentric perspective: the question in Ber-
ger’s title, “Why Look at Animals?”, is likewise specifically addressed to man: why 
should we, humans, look at animals? The urgency of Berger’s question stems from 
his sense that the pervasive and accelerating disappearance of animals from the eve-
ryday reality of human existence will soon render it impossible really to look at ani-
mals in a meaningful way at all—which is to say in such a way that the animal can 
look back. The very possibility of seeing oneself being seen [se voir vu] by an animal, 
in Derrida’s terms, is thus disappearing in a culture in which “animals are always the 
observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance. They are the ob-
jects of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know about them is an index of our 
power, and thus an index of what separates us from them. The more we know, the 
further away they are” (Berger 16). 
In his close reading of the essay, Jonathan Burt summarises the rupture posit-
ed by Berger as follows: “the linguistic animal is replaced by the visual animal. It is 





if you like, that the companionship has broken down” (“Close Reading,” 208).8 Ber-
ger notes that nowhere in the zoo can a spectator meet the gaze of an animal (28). 
This may be so, but what is it that we hope to find in the gaze of an animal? Why do 
animals see “through” us, as Rilke writes, and into “the Open”? The gaze of the ani-
mal does not “confirm” man, according to Berger, which is to say, it does not recog-
nise him as human in the same way another human being does. This lack of 
recognition is profoundly unsettling, because man recognises himself in his animal 
others (giving rise to anthropomorphism), but their failure to reciprocate this recog-
nition renders the encounter strange, disturbing, asymmetrical. This is also the 
source of what Berger refers to as the “inherently metaphorical” nature of the hu-
man–animal relationship: the recognition of similarity engenders an awareness of 
difference. This is the “narrow abyss of incomprehension” that separates man from 
animal. 
In principle, this narrow abyss is identical to that separating the self from any 
Other, but, says Berger, the abyss separating two humans is at least potentially 
bridgeable by language—even if the encounter is silent or the two do not share a 
                                                   
8 Burt writes that the “disappearance” of the animal posited by Berger is really the disappearance of 
animal death (i.e. slaughter), and its replacement with the spectacle of the zoo and nature films. This 
“disappearance” is furthermore marked by a shift from a linguistic conception (animals as metaphor) 
to a visual conception (animals as images/spectacle). So perhaps one could say that the visibility of 
animal death was a constitutive element of a pre-industrial, un-alienated, metaphorical conception of 
the animal—or rather, that the fetishisation of animal death, and the ritual moment of sacrifice in par-
ticular, bespeaks a yearning for a more “authentic” relationship between man and the natural world. 
This is worth pondering particularly in relation to the texts by Hofmannsthal and Pirandello discussed 
in chapters 1 and 3, respectively, which revolve around the figure of animal death, and, specifically for 
Hofmannsthal, of animal sacrifice, which, as Burt has written elsewhere, involves “formative, ritual, 
and, above all, visible elements” that serve to reinforce “social and cultural identities, as well as linkag-
es of living beings and victims to divinities and mythologies” and which therefore “have no place in the 





common tongue, “the existence of language allows that at least one of them, if not 
both mutually, is confirmed by the other. Language allows men to reckon with each 
other as with themselves” (5, original italics). That is to say, language is that which 
unites humans—indeed it is what constitutes them as human—even as it sets them 
apart from other animals. 
Berger’s qualification that language allows “at least one” of the men, “if not 
both mutually” to be confirmed by the other is intriguing. What are the implications 
of this asymmetry? And how is it different from the lack of confirmation which man 
receives from the animal? In order to understand this somewhat puzzling remark, I 
would like to take a quick detour via Alexandre Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of 
Hegel, specifically the first section dealing with self-consciousness and the distinction 
between human and animal desire. This preliminary excursus will allow us to ap-
proach the second passage in Berger’s essay which I wish to focus on, namely his 
claim that “the first metaphor was animal” and that the human-animal relationship is 
at heart a metaphorical one. The two problems that I am extracting from Berger’s es-
say—the constitution of the (human) subject and the nature of metaphor—are relat-
ed, and moreover undergo radical changes around 1900, changes which, as I argue, 
are closely linked to the shift in the conception and representation of the animal that 
occurred at the same time. 
The distinction between animal and human desire which Kojève advances at 
the beginning of his commentary on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit has to do with 
the constitution of the human subject as self-identical and self-sustaining, identical 





I” (4). What Kojève calls ‘animal desire’ is the desire for an object, which the subject 
wishes to appropriate for itself. All ‘desire’ must be satisfied through an act of nega-
tion: so for example an animal senses a desire for food, and can only satisfy that de-
sire by devouring the food object. The “I of Desire” thus marks an absence, “an 
emptiness” which can be filled positively only through the negation and “assimila-
tion” of the desired non-I. As a result, “the positive content of the I, constituted by 
negation, is a function of the positive content of the negated non-I. […] The I created 
by the active satisfaction of […] a Desire will have the same nature as the things to-
ward which that Desire is directed.” In the case of animal desire, which is the desire 
for an object, the resulting I will be “an animal I” and such an I will never attain self-
consciousness (4–5). (Let us note here the circularity of this argument: the animal’s I 
is constituted as animal because the desire that gives rise to it is already animal in na-
ture.) 
In order for self-consciousness to arise, in order for the I to be a human I, in 
other words, its desire must be directed not towards an object, but towards another 
desire. This desire for another desire is self-reflexive, and self-conscious, because it 
presupposes the recognition of another desire as a desire like one’s own, and thus 
this ‘human desire’ is in fact the desire to be recognised in return. But, says Kojève, 
“the man who wants to be recognized by another in no sense wants to recognize him 
in turn. If he succeeds, then, the recognition will not be mutual and reciprocal: he 
will be recognized but will not recognize the one who recognizes him” (10). A fun-
damental characteristic of human desire, therefore, is the disavowal of the initial 





foremost to be the desire to be human and to be recognised as such, without having to 
recognise the humanity, which is to say the subjectivity and right to say ‘I’, of the oth-
er. This, I would argue, is the reason for Berger’s suggestion that “at least one of [the 
men], if not both mutually, is confirmed by the other.” 
And yet Berger’s and Kojève–Hegel’s accounts of the birth of self-
consciousness and human subjectivity are not entirely commensurate. Both proceed 
from the distinction between man and animal, but for Kojève the primordial, “an-
thropogenetic” encounter that gives rise to self-consciousness takes place between 
two men, or rather, “between two beings that claim to be men” (11), whereas for Ber-
ger the “first” encounter is between man and animal. If “no animal confirms man” 
(read: recognises man as such) it is because no animal believes itself to be a human 
being.9 An animal looks at man the same way it looks at other species, Berger says, 
but it “does not reserve a special look for man. But by no other species except man 
will the animal’s look be recognised as familiar. Other animals are held by the look. 
Man becomes aware of himself returning the look” (5). Here, self-consciousness aris-
                                                   
9 Pets do, which is why Berger does not regard them as true animals: “The pet completes [its owner], 
offering responses to aspects of his character which would otherwise remain unconfirmed” (14). The 
owner, in return, is not a real man, because of his dependence on his pet for recognition. Berger ob-
serves that “the autonomy of both parties has been lost,” which means that the “parallelism of their 
separate lives has been destroyed” (15). Berger is quite adamant that the life of an animal is “never to 
be confused with a man’s” (6). The misrecognition of an animal as a human being threatens our own 
humanity. 
Pets are similarly scorned by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who regard them as “senti-
mental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history,” and flatly declare that “anyone who likes cats 
or dogs is a fool” (A Thousand Plateaus 240)—not even indulging in the obvious pun here, incidentally, 
i.e. of describing such people as “bêtes” (the original French reads, “tous ceux qui aiment les chats, les 
chiens, sont des cons[!]”), perhaps because describing cat-lovers as “bête” would have held open the 
possibility that a pet might serve as a vehicle for becoming-animal, which is explicitly reserved for 





es through the recognition of the animal’s gaze as familiar, as fundamentally similar 
to man’s own gaze. Berger’s account is grounded in human exceptionalism, just as 
Hegel’s is, but it is a melancholy and limited exceptionalism, focused on “the loneli-
ness of man as a species” (6), a loneliness that stems from a sense of exceptionality 
that no other species appears to recognise. For Berger, man’s desire for recognition 
extends to his animal others, whereas in the Hegelian model such a constellation is 
fundamentally uninteresting, because, presumably, it does not lead to the “fight for 
pure prestige carried on for the sake of ‘recognition’ by the adversary” (Kojève 11) and 
is thus useless in explaining the origin of the master/slave dialectic which structures 
human reality. And yet ultimately this dialectic is useful when seeking to conceptual-
ise or understand the relationship between man and animal: Essentially, man does 
not want to recognise the animal as his equal, even as he desires for it to identify him 
as its master. But the animal does not play along. Because it lacks human language, 
because it does not and cannot say “I” in a way that man will understand, it cannot 
assert itself and complete the dialectical action. One reaction to this reticence or ina-
bility is simply to assert, unilaterally, man’s superiority and dominion over animals 
and all of nature. 
There is, however, another reaction: a feeling of unease in man. A sense of en-
vy, almost, that animals do not have to participate in this eternal dialectical struggle. 
They neither reap nor sow. This is the essence of the beginning of Nietzsche’s second 
untimely mediation, Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben, which de-
scribes man as proud of his achievements and his self-consciousness and subjectivity, 





Menschen hart ein, weil er seines Menschenthums sich vor dem Thiere brüstet und 
doch nach seinem Glücke eifersüchtig hinblickt—denn das will er allein, gleich dem 
Thiere weder überdrüssig noch unter Schmerzen leben, und will es doch vergebens, 
weil er es nicht will wie das Thier” (KSA I: 248). He doesn’t want it—desire it—the 
way the animal does. 
The First Metaphor 
Berger describes man as a lonely species, forever excluded from the world of animals, 
with whom he senses a certain kinship, but who must forever remain distinct from 
him. Animals are “both like and unlike man” (6)—this is what leads Berger to regard 
the structure of the human–animal relationship as inherently metaphorical, in the 
sense that the similarities reveal the differences. This parallelism, as he calls it, “al-
lowed animals to provoke some of the first questions and offer answers.” He then 
makes three fundamental statements about the role of animals in the development of 
language and representation: 
The first subject matter for painting was animal. Probably the first paint was 
animal blood. Prior to that, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the first 
metaphor was animal. (7) 
Berger is being very tentative here, of course, and with good reason: although it is 
true that the earliest cave paintings are of animals, there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that the first paint was animal blood. In fact the earliest cave paintings yet 
discovered, e.g. at Chauvet and Lascaux, were made with mineral pigments. This does 
not rule out the possibility that early humans may have used the blood of slain ani-





discovered, or more likely have simply not survived. But this can never amount to 
more than pure conjecture. If this statement is nevertheless worth holding on to, it is 
not because it tells us anything concrete about prehistoric attitudes toward animals 
and their role in the development of human culture, but rather because of how it re-
lates to more modern concerns regarding the place of animals in human society and 
conversely the relationship of man to the natural world. As Berger himself emphasis-
es, “[a]ll theories of ultimate origin are only ways of better defining what followed. […] 
What we are trying to define, because the experience is almost lost, is the universal 
use of animal-signs for charting the experience of the world” (8). If it is “not unrea-
sonable to suppose that the first metaphor was animal,” this is because everywhere 
you look animals play not only a central role in human artistic expression but actually 
a foundational role in conceptions of the development of human society and culture. 
Particularly in classical accounts of the origin of language, music, painting, etc., ani-
mals feature prominently at the origin of the very things from which they will subse-
quently be excluded. Ultimately, the same is of course true of the origin of man. 
Berger’s three propositions are given in reverse chronological order: “The first 
subject matter for painting was animal,” but before there could be painting, an ani-
mal had to be sacrificed so that its blood might serve as paint. What makes this a 
statement about zoopoetics is the way in which the animal figures as both the subject 
as well as the medium of representation, or in Valéry’s terms: both the substance and 
the instrument. But more than that, the sacrifice of the animal is the condition of 
possibility for the emergence of any such representation in the first place. In general 





not only to sacrifice the animal but also to represent it, to transform it into a repre-
sentation of itself, as the first metaphor.10 
The idea that “the first metaphor was animal” has a dual significance: on the 
one hand, the animal was the first ‘other’ and the first man’s encounter with the an-
imal, his recognition in the animal of a fellow creature, produced in him the aware-
ness of what Berger describes as the “narrow abyss” which separated them and set in 
motion the metaphorical oscillation between similarity and difference, self and other, 
through which the human subject is constituted. Or to put it differently, the primary 
consequence of this encounter was the creation of the human. At the same time, it 
also resulted in the creation of the animal. Thus, we might equally read the statement 
as saying that the first metaphor was quite literally “animal”—i.e. the very word or the 
idea of the animal (the “animot,” in other words), having from this point onward little 
to do with any actual animals, being rather a cipher, a site of negativity against which 
the human may be defined. 
The conception of the human as the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, projects the human into 
a relation of supplementarity vis-à-vis the animal, as “animal + x”; the essence of the 
human is one of excess, which compensates for a lack that was there before but 
which the animal, in its pure, inviolate animality, defined as radical immanence, 
wholeness and presence, is felt not to have. Thus man comes to be seen as ein 
                                                   
10 Here we might also quote Georges Bataille, who in 1953 had the following to say about the Paleolith-
ic cave paintings discovered at Lascaux thirteen years previously: “What these admirable frescoes pro-
claim with a youthful vigor is not only that the man who painted them ceased being an animal by 
painting them but that he stopped being an animal by giving the animal, and not himself, a poetic im-
age” (Cradle of Humanity, 60). The transformation of the animal into a poetic image marks the transi-
tion from animal to human. (On Bataille’s writings on Lascaux and the human–animal relationship, 





Mängelwesen: a deficient creature, a being defined by a lack or insufficiency, which 
must be supplemented by means of language.11 In the end, man is almost invariably 
defined as the animal that is not an animal.12 This paradox is one of the fundamental 
tensions at the heart of the western tradition of metaphysical anthropocentrism, 
which continually seeks to maintain a rigid boundary between the mutually deter-
mining and delimiting categories of man and animal. At the same time, as Derrida 
observes, this “supplementarity makes possible all that constitutes the property of 
man” even though it “is nothing, neither a presence nor an absence, […] neither a sub-
stance nor an essence of man. […] Man calls himself man only by drawing limits ex-
cluding his other from the play of supplementarity: the purity of nature, of animality, 
primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity. The approach to these limits is at once 
feared as a threat of death, and desired as access to a life without difference” (Of 
Grammatology, 244). The animal “is on the side of death,” (196), which means that it 
                                                   
11 The term was coined by Arnold Gehlen in his seminal work of philosophical anthropology, Der 
Mensch (1940). Gehlen takes his cue from Johann Gottfried Herder, who, in his treatise on the origin 
of language offers a negative definition of man, who, born without language or instincts, consists at 
first of nothing but “Mängel und Lücken” (Herder 39; Gehlen 91–92). Perhaps inevitably, Gehlen 
came under fire for defining man not only in terms of his inadequacies but specifically for defining 
him as an animal—and a poor one at that! In the preface to the fourth edition (1950), Gehlen cites 
conservative sociologist and philosopher Hans Freyer, who had accused Gehlen of positing “den Men-
schen fiktiv als Tier, um dann zu finden, daß er als solches höchst unvollkommen und sogar unmög-
lich ist” (16–17, emphasis added). Evidently, to Freyer’s mind, viewing man as an animal is nothing 
but a fiction, an irresponsible and disingenuous rhetorical manoeuvre employed to further a particular 
philosophical point but with no basis in reality. Gehlen responds to this allegation by saying that the 
purpose of the term is in fact precisely to highlight the paradoxical position of man in the natural 
world, not to offer a definitive definition of the essence of the human being. 
12 Perhaps the pithiest formulation belongs to Herder, who in the first sentence of his treatise on the 
origin of language declares: “Schon als Thier, hat der Mensch Sprache” (3), which, to all intents and 
purposes means that even in a state of animality, man was already a man. Similarly, for Hegel, man is 
that animal which, precisely because he knows himself to be an animal, ceases to be one: “…gerade, 





is, or at least it is held to be, “outside the text.” But such characterisations ignore the 
fact that “the animal” is itself a construct of language. It is a word used, among many 
things, to designate that which is outside language, outside the “play of supplementa-
rity.” Animality is next to divinity (we will see this in Lord Chandos’s description of 
his moments of ineffable transcendence as at once “göttlicher” and “tierischer” than 
any ordinary experience, and in the proximity of the animals to the angels in Rilke’s 
conception of the Open). If zoopoetics is anything, it is a way of looking at, and think-
ing about, how animality functions within language, especially within poetic or meta-
phorical language. From Derrida’s chain of non-supplementarity it appears as if the 
‘excluded others’ are all interchangeable; but, at least judging from Berger’s (and, as 
we shall see in Chapter 1, Bataille’s) thinking concerning the animal, there is never-
theless a primacy of the sort of pure, unbroken alterity that the animal represents. 
Certainly, Hofmannsthal (and he is not alone) feels that children see the world as it 
really is, as do poets, but only because they are more like animals than other people—
they will never be in the world in the same way as we like to imagine animals are, 
which is to say “outside language.” 
The process whereby the category of the human is produced and maintained 
by means of an “inclusionary exclusion” of the animal is the sole function of what 
Giorgio Agamben in his book The Open: Man and Animal has termed the “anthropo-
logical machine” (37). The concept of the animal as such may indeed be regarded as a 
by-product of this machine: Zoopoeisis is a necessary precondition for anthropopoe-
isis (and vice versa). One of the chief consequences of this process is that man con-





difference from other animals. Agamben observes that in the first nine editions of 
Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae, the genus “Homo” was not followed by the species de-
nomination “sapiens” but rather by the imperative: Nosce te ipsum (know thyself). It 
follows that the knowledge imputed to man through the species name “sapiens” is in 
fact self-knowledge. The human, therefore, represents an anomaly within Linnaean 
taxonomy in that its name does not denote a specific characteristic but rather a par-
ticular faculty, namely “the ability to recognize himself” (Open, 26). Moreover, the 
classification of the genus homo as belonging to the order of anthropomorpha, or 
“man-like” animals, not only makes it necessary for the human to recognise himself 
as human in order to be human, he must also recognise himself in his animal others 
in order to constitute himself as different from them. “Homo sapiens,” writes Agam-
ben, “is neither a clearly defined species nor a substance; it is, rather, a machine or 
device for producing the recognition of the human” (26). The knowledge attributed to 
man in his Linnaean name thus derives from his response to the imperative to “know 
thyself”—a response which proceeds via the animal. Thus, we may venture a prelim-
inary and partial answer to the question posed in Berger’s title, “Why Look at Ani-
mals?” namely that looking at animals is a prerequisite for looking at ourselves. 
III. Chapter Outlines 
This dissertation is divided into four chapters, each focusing on a different author 
and each dealing with a different facet of zoopoetics. The chapters can be read in iso-
lation, but together they follow a trajectory of progressive “animalisation” of the text 





Rilke’s more melancholic ruminations, to Pirandello’s construction and deconstruc-
tion of multiple frames, literal and metaphorical, none of which can contain the wild 
animal at their centre, and finally to Kafka, where language itself may be said to have 
become animal, threatening to evict the narrator from his textual edifice. 
The first chapter, entitled “The Root of All Poetry: Animal Sacrifice and the 
Crisis of Representation,” explores the connection between the “Sprachkrise” and the 
crisis of anthropocentrism by means of a close reading of two texts by Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, the “Chandos-Brief” (1902) and the “Gespräch über Gedichte” 
(1904). In the latter, animal sacrifice is cast as the origin of poetry. The fact that the 
animal can be sacrificed instead of the man is presented as the original symbolico-
metaphorical substitution: just as in John Berger’s aetiology, metaphor is born from 
the blood of the animal. In both cases, the animal serves not only as the subject of rep-
resentation, but also as the medium through which representation can take place. 
Hofmannsthal’s zoopoetics is thus grounded in animal sacrifice, which holds the 
promise of allowing the poet to “flow over” into what Georges Bataille calls the “im-
manent immensity” of animality. 
The second chapter, entitled “A Lick and a Promise: Rilke’s Anthropocynic 
Encounters,” continues to explore the topos of the animal’s radical immanence with 
specific reference to the works of Rainer Maria Rilke. If the Aristotelian ζῷον λόγον 
ἔχον was central to the previous chapter, here it is Nietzsche’s reformulation of that 
definition whereby man is “das Tier, das versprechen darf.” The crisis of language 





Truth. The promise serves first and foremost as a guarantee of its own truth-value, 
and, by extension, of the capacity of language to be true at all. For Rilke, the preroga-
tive to make promises is forever tempered by his sense that the promise of language 
is inherently untenable, which prompts him to look to animals for a form of expres-
sion that might still be “true to life.” The chapter begins with a discussion of Rilke’s 
letters on Cézanne, in which he compares the painter to a dog that looks in the mir-
ror and thinks “da ist noch ein Hund.” To Rilke, this non-reflexive, canine gaze pre-
sents a model of artistic production that can overcome the inherent limitations of 
language and human self-consciousness. Dogs occupy a special place in all of Rilke’s 
writings because unlike the other animals, which are wholly other and whose worlds 
are hermetically sealed, dogs have “eine verwandte Welt” to ours. As such they come 
closest to bridging the gap between our “gedeutete Welt” and the Open.13 The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of a little-known short prose text of Rilke’s, entitled “Eine 
Begegnung” (written in 1907, the same year as the poem “Der Hund” and the letters 
on Cézanne), which presents a melancholy reflection on the animal’s silence and ab-
                                                   
13 Dogs fulfil a similar function in the works of W. G. Sebald, incidentally, as messengers from another 
place and, above all, another time. Thus, commenting on a painting by Johann Peter Tripp, Sebald 
notes: “Der Hund, der Geheimnisträger, der mit Leichtigkeit über die Abgründe der Zeit läuft, weil es 
für ihn keinen Unterschied gibt zwischen dem 15. und dem 20. Jahrhundert, weiß manches genauer 
als wir” (Logis, 188.) Likewise, in Austerlitz, the protagonist’s rediscovery of his childhood home is her-
alded by a bas-relief of a dog carrying a branch in its mouth “den er, wie ich, bis in die Haarwurzeln 
erschauernd, erahnte, herbeigebracht hatte aus meiner Vergangenheit” (Austerlitz, 217). The dog’s a-
historicity allows it to inhabit all time periods simultaneously. As for Rilke (particularly in Malte Lau-
rids Brigge), dogs come to be associated with memory, which in turn is linked to their ability to see the 
world as it truly is. Sebald expresses the link between a-historicity and Openness clearly in his short 
poem “Im Abseits”: “Im Abseits | sieht das Auge | des Hundes alles | noch so wie es | von Anbeginn 





dication of subjecthood and historicity, and the loneliness of man as the animal al-
lowed to make promises.  
The third chapter, entitled “Fearful Symmetries: Pirandello’s Tiger and the 
Resistance to Metaphor,” explores how the crisis of anthropocentrism was mediated 
through the figure of the animal beyond the immediate context of the predominantly 
Austro-Hungarian “Sprachkrise,” through a reading of Luigi Pirandello’s novel Si gi-
ra… (1915, republished in 1925 as Quaderni di Serafino Gubbio operatore). The novel is 
best known for its vivid depiction of the world of early cinema and because Walter 
Benjamin cites it as one of the first meditations on alienation and the disappearance 
of the aura in the age of mechanical reproducibility. The fact that the entire text re-
volves around the figure of a tiger has received scant attention from scholars. In de-
parting from the German-speaking context of the other chapters, this chapter aims to 
show how the question of the animal was central to reflections on language, repre-
sentation, and identity throughout Europe during this period. I explore the ways in 
which this tiger disrupts or destabilises the representational framework in which it is 
placed. Essentially, the novel enacts the disjuncture between what the tiger is and 
what the tiger means. As Akira Lippit asserts, “animals resist metaphorization”: the 
animality of the metaphor is fundamentally at odds with the animality of the animal. 
What emerges is an image of the animal as fundamentally unreadable but for that 
very reason infinitely writable and re-writable. 
The final chapter, entitled “The Enemy Within: Kafka’s Zoopoetics,” focuses 
on the prose fragment, “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn” (1914) in order to explore 





poetics. Tracing a path from the “Kaldabahn” fragment to “Der Bau” (1923), I explore 
Kafka’s repeated attempts to “inhabit” or “domesticate” the text, a process which is 
frequently conceived as an incursion into another creature’s territory. There are two 
strategies involved in such “domestication,” representing forms of writing: the first is 
“horizontal” and involves following or constructing tracks across the surface (the Kal-
da railway), the second is “vertical” and involves burrowing through the ground. Both 
strategies are consistently thwarted by an indomitable animal presence within the text 
itself. In order to account for this “animality” of the text, I again draw on Akira Lip-
pit’s conception of ‘animetaphor’ as the embodiment and at the same time antithesis 
of the metaphor, the site of an irresoluble yet productive tension between animal be-
ing and figurative language. Animetaphor is an apt description of the function and 
status of animal figures in Kafka’s writing, in that it describes precisely the simulta-
neous construction and dissolution of meaning that characterises the disruptive pres-
ence of the “kleine Volk” that inhabits the textual ground which Kafka’s narrators try 






Die Sprache hat die Menschheit aus dem Paradies vertrieben. 
Hätte die Menschheit aber die Sprache lieber den Affen oder 
den Läusen geschenkt, so hätten die Affen oder die Läuse 
daran zu tragen, und wir wären nicht allein krank, vergiftet, 
entwurzelt in der ungeheuren sprachlosen Natur. 
—Fritz Mauthner, Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache 
Chapter I 
The Root of All Poetry 
Animal Sacrifice and the Crisis of Representation 
I. “Die Gewalt der Worte” 
The true province of a poet, wrote Hugo von Hofmannsthal, is the relationship be-
tween spirit and body, idea and expression, man and animal.1 This statement, written 
in 1900, stems from Hofmannsthal’s notes for an unfinished drama based on the 
myth of Jupiter and Semele. In the classical myth, Semele, the mother of Dionysus, 
is tricked by the jealous Hera to ask Jupiter to reveal himself to her in all his divine 
glory. This he does, reluctantly, and she dies as a result. In Hofmannsthal’s version, 
the setting moves to Italy at the turn of the seventeenth century, and the two protag-
onists are a young lexicographer-cum-poet and his lover, whom he murders one 
night after she asks him to show her the essence of his work as a poet and he goes 
mad from the abyssal implications contained in the words “Ich” and “Du.” 
This is the plot as Hofmannsthal recounted it two years later in a letter to 
Fritz Mauthner. The Bohemian writer, feuilletonist, and prominent Sprachkritiker 
had written to Hofmannsthal in late October, 1902, expressing the excitement he had 
                                                   
1 “Des Dichters eigentliches Gebiet: das Verhältniss von Geist zu Körper, Idee zum Ausdruck, Mensch 





felt upon reading the latter’s “Brief des Lord Chandos,” which had appeared in two 
instalments in the Berlin daily Der Tag on the 18th and 19th of that month. “Ich habe 
ihn so gelesen,” Mauthner wrote, “als wäre er das erste dichterische Echo nach mei-
ner ‘Kritik der Sprache’. […] Ich glaubte das Beste zu erleben, was ich geträumt hatte: 
Wirkung auf die Besten” (Stern 33). In his response, Hofmannsthal is reticent about 
granting Mauthner’s claim to having provided the inspiration for the Chandos Letter, 
insisting that while there are undeniably striking parallels between it and some of the 
arguments advanced by Mauthner’s Beiträge zur Kritik der Sprache, in fact his own 
thoughts “sind früh ähnliche Wege gegangen, vom Metaphorischen der Sprache 
manchmal mehr entzückt, manchmal mehr beängstigt” (33). He mentions Novalis’s 
“merkwürdige ‘Monolog’” as well as a few of his own earlier works as precursors to 
the Chandos Letter and as further repudiation of Mauthner’s influence.2 There is evi-
dence to suggest that Hofmannsthal is being somewhat disingenuous here and that 
his engagement with Mauthner’s critique of language was in fact more intensive 
than he is letting on, but it is certainly also true that Hofmannsthal had long been 
preoccupied with the problem of language and metaphor, as early essays such as 
“Philosophie des Metaphorischen” (1894) and “Eine Monographie” (1895) show. 
Hofmannsthal, like Mauthner and many of his contemporaries, was profoundly 
influenced by the works of Ernst Mach and Friedrich Nietzsche, whose essay “Ueber 
                                                   
2 Just as Hofmannsthal’s Chandos-Brief has come to be regarded as the manifesto of the crisis of lan-
guage around 1900, Novalis’s Monolog, written just over 100 years earlier, has been described as “eine 
Art Manifest der romantischen Sprachphilosophie überhaupt” (di Cesare 149). On the intertextual 





Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne” (1873, first published 1896) also 
presents significant parallels to the Chandos-Brief.3 
But what exactly are the parallels between Hofmannsthal’s Semele-fragment 
and the Chandos letter? Both texts deal centrally with language and each of the pro-
tagonists appears to suffer a ‘linguistic crisis’ of sorts, but other than that the link 
seems tenuous at best. Both also take place around 1600—Chandos’s letter is dated 
1603; the Jovian poet is held captive “bei den Mönchen bei denen der Tasso starb” 
(SW XVIII: 155)—although Hofmannsthal does not mention this in the brief synop-
sis he gives to Mauthner. Nor does he mention another salient and disturbing paral-
lel: the central role of animals, specifically of the death of an animal by poison and its 
piercing, silent gaze in the face of death. Hofmannsthal’s notes for the drama consist 
of five prose fragments, the first of which, entitled “Die Gewalt der Worte” and writ-
ten in the first person, reads as follows: 
Ich bin Jupiter. Sie war Semele. Eines Abends kam ich nachhaus und da er-
eignete sich der Tod des Hundes. Sie erzählte mir alles, ich schaffte den 
Hund weg: da reizte sie mich durch die Frage nach dem Grund, dass Gott 
den Hund stumm sein lasse. 
Die Worte bei denen die Katastrophe erfolgt, sind Ich und Du (155) 
In the second fragment, we read that it was Semele’s brother, an officer in the army, 
who poisoned the dog, although we do not learn why. The dog “richtet sich Nachts 
                                                   
3 Opinion has long been divided on whether Hofmannsthal knew Nietzsche’s essay, and the common 
misconception that it remained unpublished until 1903 (rather than the actual 1896) seemed to rule 
out any direct influence, but as Mario Zanucchi has recently argued, critics have also tended to down-
play Nietzsche’s influence in order to cast Hofmannsthal as a more independent and original thinker. 
Zanucchi offers a largely compelling case for viewing Nietzsche’s essay as a source for the Chandos-
Brief, but ultimately his claims seem somewhat exaggerated. Or, to quote Hofmannsthal’s letter to 
Mauthner: “Es besteht eben beides: Übereinstimmung und gewiß eine Verstärkung dieser Gedanken 





mit brechendem Blick vor dem Bett der Liebenden auf” (155); and, in the final frag-
ment (N5), “bevor der Hund mit brechenden Augen ans Bett gekommen ist, hat sie 
gebeten: er möge sich ihr ganz hingeben, so wie sie sich ihm giebt” (157). As Hof-
mannsthal’s ideas for the lyrical drama continue to develop, the sequence of events 
changes, but the two key elements remain the same: on the one hand, the young 
woman who asks her lover to give himself over to her completely, even though she 
knows this will mean her death; and on the other the dying dog with the 
‘brechendem Blick’. In his letter to Mauthner, Hofmannsthal mentions only the sto-
ry of the two lovers, and yet the death of the dog seems to be of equal or even greater 
importance: It is practically the first thing the narrator of the first fragment men-
tions, and it recurs in all the subsequent fragments. In the second, we read that “es 
müssen Thiere vorkommen, zu denen er ein sehr starkes Verhältniss hat” (155). How 
does this “Verhältniss” relate to the three fundamental “Verhältnisse” mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter and which this same fragment describes as “Des Dich-
ters eigentliches Gebiet”? And how, finally, do these “Verhältnisse” relate to the 
overwhelming, limitless magic (“grenzenlosen Zauber”) of the words “Ich” and 
“Du”—i.e. to the vertiginous and irreducible difference between Self and Other? 
The key to approaching these questions lies in the repeated insistence on the 
dog’s silence in the face of death. In the first fragment, Semele wants to know why 
“Gott den Hund stumm sein lasse.” “Der Hund, der stumm verendet, ist die stum-
me Creatur” (157) we read in the last. In the third, we read: 
sein Gedankengang: sie sagte: ich bin für Dich nicht mehr als ein stummes 





gen; im Wort ist immer die Sache und der Traum von der Sache zusam-
men 
diese Thierheit diese Stummheit Unlöslichkeit ist das Leben, das Reden ist 
die Verflüchtigung, Vergeistigung, Vernichtung (156) 
Life—“das Leben”—is the centre of gravity around which all of Hofmannsthal’s early 
works revolve. Life, for Hofmannsthal, stands for wholeness, plenitude, presence, 
immediacy, harmony and flux. Here, it is being equated with animality, muteness, 
and indissolubility. The animal is silent because it partakes fully of life—indeed, it is 
life—it is not divorced from life through language. Language, or speech, is not for 
the living; language has a deadening, volatilising, spiritualising effect. The word is al-
ways split between the thing itself (die Sache) and the dream of the thing (der Traum 
von der Sache). It is never whole and can never grasp the totality of life, because its 
function is to differentiate and distinguish between things, to divide the world up in-
to discontinuous entities.4 But life is indivisible, indissoluble (unlöslich), and there-
fore silent (stumm).5 “Die Worte bei denen die Katastrophe erfolgt, sind Ich und 
Du”—the poet goes mad pondering the implications of these two words, but the “Ka-
tastrophe” does not refer (exclusively, at least) to the ensuing murder of his lover, but 
                                                   
4 In an early diary entry (1891), the seventeen-year-old Hofmannsthal emphasised both the principle of 
division and separation underlying all conceptual language as well as the ‘arbitrariness of the sign’: 
“Die Sprache (sowohl die gesprochene als die gedachte, denn wir denken heute schon fast mehr in 
Worten und algebraischen Formeln als in Bildern und Empfindungen) lehrt uns, aus der Alleinheit 
der Erscheinungen einzelnes herauszuheben, zu sondern; durch diese willkürlichen Trennungen ent-
steht in uns der Begriff wirklicher Verschiedenheit und es kostet uns Mühe, zur Verwischung dieser 
Klassifikationen zurückzufinden und uns zu erinnern, daß gut und böse, Licht und Dunkel, Tier und 
Pflanze nichts von der Natur Gegebenes, sondern etwas willkürlich Herausgeschiedenes sind” (GW X 
324). 
5 “Das ‘Leben’ als das ἕν χαὶ πᾶν [die Natur als Ganzes] [...] lässt sich nicht zerstückeln. In ihm ist die 
Sprache überflüssig und unmöglich. [...] Stummheit gründet zutiefst im Wesen des ‘Lebens’” 
(Pestalozzi 31). Compare Mauthner’s assertion that “die Natur ist vollends sprachlos. Sprachlos würde 





rather to the original calamity of signification, of the division of the world into Self 
and Other, which wrenches man out of his Edenic, ‘oceanic’ state—out of ‘life’ in 
other words—and into the dead, spiritualised, human world of language. 
The awareness that language, far from being an exalted, divinely endowed 
medium for the apprehension of the truth of the universe, in fact erects a barrier to 
reality, blocking our access to the world as it truly is—that is the very essence of the 
Sprachkrise. “Die Sprache hat die Menschheit aus dem Paradies vertrieben,” writes 
Fritz Mauthner. The critique of language, therefore, is on the one hand “alles zer-
malmende Skepsis,” but at the same time it is “eine Sehnsucht nach Einheit” (Athe-
ismus, 4:447)—a quasi-mystical attempt to reclaim the lost sense of unity with the 
cosmos. For Hofmannsthal too such ‘unity’ is the ultimate truth and the true goal for 
any artist.6 “Ich glaube, daß der Begriff des Ganzen in der Kunst überhaupt verlo-
rengegangen ist,” he writes in the 1896 lecture “Poesie und Leben” (GW VIII: 15). 
That same year, in a review of Peter Altenberg’s Wie ich es sehe, he declares that only 
artists and children see life “wie es ist”: “Sie sind die einzigen, die das Leben als Gan-
zes zu fassen vermögen. Sie sind die einzigen, die über den Tod, den Preis des Le-
bens, etwas sagen dürfen. Sie geben den Dingen ihre Namen und den Worten ihren 
Inhalt” (GW VIII: 228, emphasis added). And in his diaries, he repeatedly emphasis-
es the need to overcome dualisms in order to perceive the “Zusammenhang aller 
Dinge.”7  
                                                   
6 “Die ‘Einheit’ des Lebens ist für Hofmannsthal die höchste Idee und auch die einzige Wirklichkeit” 
(Fick 347). 
7 E.g.: “Mir wird die innere Verwandtschaft der drei großen oratorischen Geister des Jahrhunderts, 





Whereas mundane, everyday language—and abstract, conceptual language in 
particular—relies on binary oppositions and reinforces a dualistic conception of the 
world, poetic language is possessed of magical power that can cut through the dual-
ism and glimpse the ‘immanent immensity’ of ‘life’ in its indivisible unity. Thus 
when Hofmannsthal writes that the poet’s “eigentliches Gebiet” is at the intersection 
between spirit and body, idea and expression, man and animal, it is because, through 
his “Wortgewalt” or “Sprachmagie” he is able to render those distinctions temporari-
ly inoperative. It is this power which the Semele character senses in her lover, and 
which she begs him to reveal to her. “Du strömst in ein anderes Medium, als ich bin, 
Zeugungskraft aus,” she says. “Immer dich ganz zu besitzen, wäre zu viel: aber ein-
mal gieb dich mir ganz” (SW XVIII: 156). She feels that even as they are intimate to-
gether in bed, he is not fully there, and that “Anderswo thust Du etwas das noch 
wirklicher ist […]. Etwas was Verschmelzung bedeutet, während Du an mir bloss 
hinstreichelst” (156). The key words here are strömen, verschmelzen, fließen, auflösen—
images of flux, dissolution, surrender, loss of self. This dissolution or flowing over is 
a form of death—where all dualities are suspended, and the symbolic violence of the 
“I” is undone.8 In order to attain this state of mystical oneness of death-like imma-
                                                                                                                                                      
Freiheit, Glück, Menschheit und lieben die starken, unvermittelten Kontraste. Allen dreien fehlt das 
Verständnis für den Zusammenhang aller Dinge, sie stellen Gott der Welt, dem Menschen die Natur 
als Gegensätze gegenüber” (GW X: 325). 
8 In his interpretation of his own works, written between 1916 and 1929, and published under the title 
Ad me ipsum, Hofmannsthal refers to this state as “Praeexistenz,” a “Glorreicher, aber gefährlicher 
Zustand” characterised by early wisdom, exclusivity, and intellectual sovereignty: “Das Ich als Univer-
sum.” Those who exist in this pre-existent state belong to “einer höchsten Welt” and generally try 
“diesen erhöhten Zustand zu wahren durch Supposition des quasi-Gestorbenseins.” (GW X: 599; cf. 





nence, however, it seems an actual death is necessary. But because we cannot directly 
experience our own death—for death is the limit of experience, of language and con-
sciousness, and thus the threshold separating the individual from infinity—he who 
would experience this radical immanence and dissolution must find a way of partici-
pating in the death of another: the boundaries of self and other are cancelled out, but 
always at the other’s expense, through an act of poetic sacrifice. 
The animals that populate Hofmannsthal’s works, particularly in the period 
around 1900 when he was most deeply imbedded in the so-called Sprachkrise, are 
almost invariably poisoned, diseased, or otherwise on the verge of death—even as 
they embody unbridled life and élan vital. Hofmannsthal’s early works (up to and in-
cluding the Andreas fragment) show a frequent preoccupation with animal death, and 
especially with the infliction of cruelty and torture on animals (cf. Robertson). And 
nowhere is this preoccupation more closely tied to the problem of language and poet-
ic expression than in the Chandos-Brief (1902) and in the Gespräch über Gedichte 
(1904), where the act of sacrificing a ram is presented as the origin of poetry and 
symbolism as such. 
Now, a recent trend in Hofmannsthal scholarship seems to involve disavow-
ing the importance of the Sprachkrise for the Chandos-Brief, and of animal sacrifice 
for the Gespräch über Gedichte. David Wellbery, for instance, considers “die soge-
nannte ‘Sprachkrise’” to play “eine relativ nebensächliche Rolle im Chandos-Brief” 
(282), a sentiment supported by Hans-Jürgen Schings, who writes that “Trotz der 
fulminanten Rezeptionsgeschichte von Chandos’ Sprachkrise ist doch nicht von der 





(“Lyrik des Hauchs,” 335). In the same essay, Schings seeks to disabuse readers and 
scholars of what he views as the long-standing misapprehension that the Gespräch 
presents animal sacrifice as the root of poetic symbolism. In fact, he claims, the 
sacrificial scene serves only to illustrate the dissolution of the self which characterises 
the symbol for Hofmannsthal, not as an aetiology of all symbolism and poetry as 
such. Schings’s argument rests on the conviction, by no means unfounded, that what 
Hofmannsthal is really attempting to describe here is the poet’s ecstatic loss of self 
for the duration of a single breath: this “Lyrik des Hauchs,” as he calls it, is the true 
key to Hofmannsthal’s poetics, Schings insists, not the act or the moment of animal 
sacrifice itself. But Schings is far too quick to dismiss the significance of animal 
sacrifice for Hofmannsthal’s poetics. Surely it is relevant that Gabriel should choose 
to illustrate this phenomenon in terms of animal sacrifice and not some other “oce-
anic” moment, just as Chandos chooses the experience with the rats to illustrate the 
ineffable, “empty fullness” of his post-critical existence. Certainly, with respect to the 
Brief as well as the Gespräch, Schings would be correct in observing that the examples 
given are merely indicators of the larger, deeper truth or circumstance, which the 
narrator is at pains to put into words. But it would be rash to dismiss the examples as 
simply arbitrary and inconsequential. The sacrificial rite, just as the plight of the rats 
in Chandos’ cellar, are deliberately chosen, analogous examples of this specific type 
of mystical, ecstatic experience. At the risk of being unfashionable, then, I would like 
in this chapter to insist not only that the Sprachkrise in fact does play a central role in 
the Chandos Letter but also that the sacrificial scene that Gabriel conjures up in the 





arbitrary example, as Schings would have us believe, of the experience of self-
dissolution, where Hofmannsthal might just as well have chosen something else. No: 
the fact that Hofmannsthal chose to illustrate his conception of the poetic symbol by 
means of an act of animal sacrifice is an indication of an essential link between the 
question of language and poetry and the question of the animal. It is the goal of this 
chapter to show how and why animal sacrifice occupied such a central place in Hof-
mannsthal’s poetics. 
Referring to Chandos’s reminiscences of how, in the period before his crisis, 
he used to drink the warm foaming milk from the udder of a beautiful gentle-eyed 
cow, Wellbery suggests that the first part of the Chandos-Brief is informed by what he 
terms a “Laktopoetik—eine Poetik des Milchstroms” (291), which comes to an end 
when Chandos becomes a witness to the death of the family of rats in his milk cellar. 
This ‘lactopoetics’ could be juxtaposed to what one might call ‘haematopoetics’—a 
poetics of blood—encapsulated in the warm blood gushing from the ram’s throat at 
the sacrificial moment in the Gespräch über Gedichte. What unites these two forms of 
poetics is their more or less overt eroticism or jouissance and their dependence on the 
image of flux, of overflowing and of flowing over (Hinüberfließen)—of the unob-
structed flow of liquids that, each in their own way, are life-giving and life-sustaining. 
They also both fundamentally concerned with animals and the poet’s relationship to 
animal life (and death). Indeed, one could argue that lactopoetics and haematopoetics 
are in fact both examples of what I would more broadly call Hofmannsthal’s zoopo-
etics. The same goes for the “Lyrik des Hauchs” that Schings ascribes to Hofmanns-





attempts to demonstrate that the pneumopoetics of the Gespräch is equivalent to 
Chandos’s ‘rheopoetics’—the recurrent metaphors of flowing and overflowing em-
ployed to describe the ‘oceanic’ experience of continuity.9 This is undoubtedly the 
case, but neither “Hauch” nor “Flut” as master metaphor is able to account for the 
preponderance of animal figures, sacrifice and death in Hofmannsthal’s poetics. But 
even if one were to grant Schings his fixation on the “Hauch,” to what, ultimately, 
does this Hauch refer if not the primal animating breath of life—the very animus that 
forms the root of the word animal? 
II. “Like Water in Water” (Immanence Is the New Transcendence) 
Traditionally, the animal is said to lack language, reason, self-consciousness, and all 
the other characteristics supposedly unique to humans. This used to be an indication 
of human superiority, but with the crisis of the anthropocentric worldview beginning 
in the Enlightenment and reaching its peak around 1900, it came increasingly to be 
seen as a sign of human inadequacy. The animal world, or the state of animality as 
such, became coded as a world without difference, as a state of radical immanence. 
Thus the animal, in Georges Bataille’s striking formulation, is seen to be “in the 
world like water in water” (Religion, 19). Such a radical state of immanence is impos-
sible for humans to attain, for it would mean the eradication of the abyss between 
self and other, the abyss that is bridgeable only through language, but which persists 
                                                   
9 “Das Widerspiel von Hinüber- und Herüberfließen des ‘Fluidums’ entspricht dem Ein- und Ausat-
men des Hauchs. [...] Denn der ‘Hauch’ ist nicht nur wie die ‘Flut’ und das ‘Fluidum’ die Metapher 
des Einheitsgefühls mit der Welt, er ist zugleich, und darin liegt seine besondere Gunst, die geborene 





precisely because of language. On the far side of that abyss, outside language, lies 
what Bataille refers to as “the immanent immensity”—the undiscovered country of 
immediacy, plenitude, and continuity. The desire to reach that far side is, for Bataille, 
the ultimate source of religious ritual, particularly the ritual of sacrifice, and of poet-
ry, both of which are for him forms of eroticism (érotisme). “Poetry,” he writes else-
where, “leads to the same place as all forms of eroticism—to the blending and fusion 
of separate objects. It leads us to eternity, it leads us to death, and through death to 
continuity” (Erotism, 25). 
The idea of “continuity” for Bataille holds roughly the same status as “Einheit” 
or “Zusammenhang” does for Hofmannsthal.10 Individuals, you and I, are “discon-
tinuous beings,” and our discontinuity is most apparent in the fact that “If you die, it 
is not my death” (Erotism, 12). Although we are discontinuous beings, we long for a 
lost continuity, and death represents “continuity of being” (13). Animals, in their state 
of radical immanence, participate in this continuity of being—which is another way 
of saying that the animal “is on the side of death” (Derrida Of Grammatology, 196). 
Animality, therefore, is ultimately another word for continuity, and to yearn for con-
tinuity thus means to yearn for the experience of animality. In his Theory of Religion, 
Bataille is careful to specify that by regarding animality as purely equivalent to “im-
                                                   
10 The consonance of Hofmannsthal’s and Bataille’s ideas about the dissolving power of ritual violence 
has been emphasised by Lorna Martens: “Es lohnt sich, Georges Batailles Analyse des Todes und der 
Erotik in L’érotisme heranzuziehen, um Hofmannsthals Verbindung von Tod, Liebe und der 
Auflösung des Individuums in die Welt zu erklären, besonders da Batailles Formulierung mit Hof-
mannsthals vereinzelt auftretenden und elliptisch formulierten Theoretisierungen vollkommen in 
Einklang zu sein scheint” (157–58). Martens goes on to show how the similarities in Hofmannsthal’s 
and Bataille’s ideas about the relationship between sacrifice, art, and continuity may be traced back to 





mediacy or immanence” he is considering it only “from a narrow viewpoint” which 
he finds “questionable” but which has a certain utility for his larger analysis (Religion, 
17). Again, in other words, this has very little to do with actual animals, but this con-
ception of animality does map very closely onto what Hofmannsthal refers to as ‘das 
Leben’ and of which the animal is likewise the paradigmatic embodiment. The rec-
lamation of the lost state of animality, says Bataille, is the ultimate driving force be-
hind the development of religion, and ritual sacrifice in particular. Sacrifice thus 
fulfils the same function as Sprachkritik does for Fritz Mauthner and poetry does for 
Hofmannsthal: the search for continuity and oneness. 
“Nothing,” Bataille insists, “is more closed to us than this animal life from 
which we are descended”11 and to try to imagine the world through the eyes of a non-
human consciousness is to indulge in the “poetic fallacy of animality.” Whereas for 
Berger the narrow abyss between two humans is bridgeable through language, the 
abyss separating man from animal requires, indeed invites, what Bataille refers to as 
a “poetic leap” (21). 
The animal opens before me a depth that attracts me and is familiar to me. 
In a sense, I know this depth: it is my own. It is also that which is farthest 
removed from me, that which deserves the name depth, which means pre-
cisely that which is unfathomable to me. But this too is poetry… (22, original 
italics) 
We might go so far as to say that this depth or narrow abyss between human and an-
imal is in fact fundamentally the space of poetry, and thus the space inhabited by zo-
                                                   
11 We may note here in passing that Kafka’s Rotpeter makes a near-identical claim in his report to the 
academy: “Ihr Affentum, meine Herren, sofern Sie etwas Derartiges hinter sich haben, kann Ihnen 





opoetics. But this poetry also leads to sacrifice—indeed, for Bataille, “poetry is 
sacrifice” in which “the words are victims,”12 by which he means that once words are 
introduced into a poetic context, they are stripped of their utility, of their function as 
mere means of communication, and deliver us over to the unknown and unknowa-
ble. Furthermore, this ability of ours to separate words from their mere utility, frees 
us from being entirely subservient to such ends. We “sacrifice” words through poetry 
in order to escape from the world of commerce, utility, and labour which we have 
created. But such a sacrifice is in and of itself a transaction, based on certain underly-
ing rules: this is what makes it a ritual, rather than mere anarchy. The same is of 
course true of animal sacrifice: “When the offered animal enters the circle in which 
the priest will immolate it,” Bataille writes, “it passes from the world of things which 
are closed to man and are nothing to him, which he knows from the outside—to the 
world that is immanent to it, intimate, known as the wife is known in sexual con-
sum[ma]tion.” 
This assumes that it has ceased to be separated from its own intimacy, as 
it is in the subordination of labor. The sacrificer’s prior separation from the 
world of things is necessary for the return to intimacy, of immanence be-
tween man and the world, between the subject and the object. The 
sacrificer needs the sacrifice in order to separate himself from the world of 
things and the victim could not be separated from it in turn if the sacrificer 
was not already separated in advance. The sacrificer declares: “[…] I with-
draw you, victim, from the world in which you were and could only be re-
duced to the condition of a thing, having a meaning that was foreign to 
your intimate nature. I call you back to the intimacy of the divine world, of 
the profound immanence of all that is.” (Religion, 43–44) 
                                                   
12 Bataille Inner Experience, 136. To adapt this definition, zoopoetics would then be the form of sacrifice 





The purpose of the sacrificial act is thus to reconnect the sacrificer with the “imma-
nent immensity” of the divine, i.e. non-objective world. In order to achieve this, the 
animal to be sacrificed must be removed from the “world of utility,” stripped of its 
“thingness,” and encountered as a fellow subject—only in this way can the alienation 
of the human from the immanent world be temporarily suspended. At the same 
time, however, the very object-character of the world, man’s very alienation from and 
subjugation of nature is due to a primordial sacrifice of his own animality. The ritual 
act of sacrifice thus temporarily unites the human and the animal, but ultimately 
reinscribes the separation wrought by that primary sacrificial economy. As we shall 
see, this holds true of Hofmannsthal’s zoopoetics as well. It remains to be seen 
whether a non-sacrificial zoopoetics is possible. 
III. Metaphor and Anthropocentrism 
The idea that the first metaphor was animal is only intelligible within a modern con-
ception of the nature of metaphor. The classical Aristotelian definition of metaphor 
as merely an improper use of words, deviating from their literal meaning, is useless 
here. Instead, we must adopt the post-Kantian conception of metaphor as a primary 
form of expression, which views all language as inherently and originally metaphori-
cal in nature.13 Only in this way can the primary significance of the animal be under-
stood. This understanding of metaphor as a primary form of expression is one of the 
chief motivating factors behind the Sprachkrise. Undoubtedly the most iconic docu-
ment of this crisis, alongside the Chandos-Brief, is Friedrich Nietzsche’s treatise 
                                                   





Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne (1873). In it, Nietzsche argues 
that language is nothing but an unreliable set of arbitrary signs with no essential or 
necessary link to ‘reality’—all words, and abstract concepts such as a truth in particu-
lar, are simply metaphors that have become so worn down by overuse, that that we 
have forgotten that they are metaphors. “Wir glauben etwas von den Dingen selbst 
zu wissen,” writes Nietzsche, “wenn wir von Bäumen, Farben, Schnee und Blumen 
reden und besitzen doch nichts als Metaphern der Dinge, die den ursprünglichen 
Wesenheiten ganz und gar nicht entsprechen” (KSA I: 880). Nietzsche’s critique of 
language, like Mauthner’s, is in many respects a continuation of Kant’s critique of 
knowledge, in that it presupposes the existence of a “Ding an sich” from which lan-
guage, as inherently metaphorical, deviates.14 When we talk about Truth, we in fact 
mobilise “Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphis-
men,” (KSA I: 880) in other words a series of constructs created by man in order to 
subjugate the world to his own point of view. According to this anthropocentric 
worldview, man is the measure of all things. The crisis of language is at once the cri-
sis of anthropocentrism, and of the assurance that the point of view of the human 
was the only point of view worth having. 
Because all language is inherently metaphorical, Nietzsche argues, it is not 
science but poetry that has a privileged relationship to reality: the scientists ignore or 
                                                   
14 “Der Wahrheitsbegriff, den Nietzsche hier zugrundelegt, ist […] korrespondenztheoretisch und zwar 
in einer sehr strengen, essentialistischen Interpretation, die das jeweilige Wesen eines Dings als Ge-
genstand eines Begriffs ansetzt. Er könnte ja nicht von Begriffen als Metaphern, d.h. als Abweichun-
gen sprechen, wenn sie nicht von etwas abweichen würden, das er implizit voraussetzt. Dieses Etwas 





deny the constructedness of all human experience and all our concepts and profess to 
offer an objective view of the world.15 Poets, by contrast, because they traffic first and 
foremost in metaphor and subjective experience, are in fact far closer to the truth 
about reality—the truth that there is no truth, in other words—than are the scientists 
who try to step outside their subjectivity and to think in abstract concepts rather than 
poetic metaphors and images. Returning for a moment to Bataille’s Theory of Reli-
gion, we may note that his discussion of the unfathomability of the animal is framed 
in terms of man’s futile efforts to strip away the filter of his own consciousness and 
perceive the world as it ‘really’ is. “There is only one difference between the absurdity 
of things envisaged without man’s gaze and that of things among which the animal 
is present,” he writes, explaining that “it is that the former absurdity immediately 
suggests to us the apparent reduction of the exact sciences, whereas the latter hands 
us over to the sticky temptation of poetry” (22). One of the chief consequences of the 
prevailing crisis of anthropocentrism was a desperate search for a way out of the 
“prison-house of language” and into the “Open,” which in turn meant a stark in-
crease in the number of writers and artists yielding to that “sticky temptation.” The 
originary metaphoricity of language, coupled with the primary animality of the meta-
phor, meant that any attempt to escape the boundaries of linguistic consciousness 
must proceed via the animal, which exists on the boundary of language and mean-
                                                   
15 It bears mentioning that Nietzsche is being more than a little reductive here in his characterisation 
of science as myopically positivist and fundamentally uninterested in metaphor. The problem of lan-
guage in scientific description was a serious issue at the time, debated, for example, by Ernst Mach, 
unquestionably one of the most prominent and influential scientists of the time. Mach wrote exten-
sively on the importance of “Gedankenexperimente” and “Ähnlichkeit und Analogie als Leitmotive der 





ing, forever eluding conceptualisation, slipping toward the ineffable. If zoopoetics 
becomes a hallmark of the literature of this period, in the works of authors such as 
Rilke, Kafka, Pirandello, and Hofmannsthal, it is because they are each in their own 
way concerned with the limits of representation and meaning. 
Nietzsche’s critique of language, like Mauthner’s, is fundamentally pessimis-
tic, in that it denounces all language and human knowledge as essentially anthropo-
centric, but is also critical of metaphysical notions of truth and transcendence, which 
means that it is effectively impossible to escape this anthropocentrism. By contrast, 
Alfred Biese, of whose Philosophie des Metaphorischen Hofmannsthal published a re-
view in 1894, embraced anthropocentrism as the key to understanding the universe, 
and in particular by means of metaphor as the essence of the anthropological princi-
ple as such: man has no way of perceiving the noumenal world, and must therefore 
apprehend the world by analogy to himself. This means that symbols and metaphors 
are the building blocks of all knowledge, they are our “primäre Anschauungsform” 
(Biese 15), and the analogical principle, which leads man everywhere to perceive him-
self, ‘proves’, by a logic of reciprocity, that the universe is ordered according to the 
same principle. Like Nietzsche and Mauthner—and Hofmannsthal—Biese regards 
symbol and metaphor as primary forms of perceiving and representing the world—
“Die Sprache ist durch und durch symbolisch;” “Die Sprache ist durch und durch 
metaphorisch,” (22)—and it is a mistake to regard metaphoricity as a secondary, im-
proper use of language—“Es ist grundverkehrt, der eigentlichen Bedeutung die un-
eigentliche als bildliche gegenüberzustellen” (23)—rather, metaphoricity is the 





tical with regard to the advantages of the anthropocentric worldview, but they are 
likewise sceptical of our ability to transcend or abolish it. So why focus on metaphor? 
Because, essentially, metaphor is language, and language is the defining feature of 
the human. “Das Metaphorische ist die Ursprache, die Urpoesie,” (86) writes 
Biese—which is why poetics, and even more so: zoopoetics, is concerned with the 
constitution of the human, specifically in relation and in opposition to the animal. 
Hofmannsthal’s Zoopoetics 
Hofmannsthal’s review of Biese is generally positive, and says that the sorts of people 
who are inclined to appreciate the work of art contained in an idea and the lyric poem 
implied by a metaphor “werden unglaublich viel darin finden” (GW VIII 191)—the 
sorts of people, in other words, who are already convinced of Biese’s premise that 
metaphor is by no means an arbitrarily chosen ornament of speech but rather “eine 
primäre Anschauung” and “die wahre Wurzel alles Denkens und Redens” (190). 
Biese, in other words, is preaching to the choir, and Hofmannsthal confesses that he 
had been expecting something different: 
Ich erwartete eine Philosophie der subjektiven Metaphorik; eine Betrach-
tung des metaphernbildenden Triebes in uns und der unheimlichen Herr-
schaft, die die von uns erzeugten Metaphern rückwirkend auf unser 
Denken ausüben, – andererseits der unsäglichen Lust, die wir durch meta-
phorische Beseelung aus toten Dingen saugen. Eine hellsichtige Darstel-
lung des seltsam vibrierenden Zustandes, in welchem die Metapher zu uns 
kommt, über uns kommt in Schauer, Blitz und Sturm: dieser plötzlichen 
blitzartigen Erleuchtung, in der wir einen Augenblick lang den großen 
Weltzusammenhang ahnen, schauernd die Gegenwart der Idee spüren, 
dieses ganzen mystischen Vorganges, der uns die Metapher leuchtend und 
real hinterläßt, wie Götter in den Häusern der Sterblichen funkelnde Ge-





Clearly Hofmannsthal thus not only supports Biese’s anthropocentrism, he actually 
feels Biese isn’t being subjective and anthropocentric enough! In this passage we 
have many of the core notions of Hofmannsthal’s ‘metaphorology’ (cf. Riedel 26–
29), starting with the ambivalent status of the metaphor as at once an artificial con-
struct that exerts tyrannical control over our thoughts and actions while at the same 
time having the power to transport us in a flash out of our narrow, human, linguistic 
consciousness and into the mystical experience of oneness and continuity. For Hof-
mannsthal, the language of metaphor is the language of ‘life’, the world speaks to us 
in metaphors and symbols, and only metaphors and symbols have the power to re-
veal its true essence. His reference to man’s “metaphernbildenden Trieb” recalls Nie-
tzsche, who in his treatise on truth and lying (which Hofmannsthal could not at the 
time have read), also refers to a “Trieb zur Metapherbildung,” which he describes as 
“jener Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen, den man keinen Augenblick wegrechnen 
kann, weil man damit den Menschen selbst wegrechnen würde” (KSA I: 887). For 
Nietzsche, the concepts out of which man has constructed the rigid and symmetrical 
fortress that hold him imprisoned are also the products of this fundamental meta-
phorical drive, and for that very reason he is “in Wahrheit nicht bezwungen und 
kaum gebändigt”: the way out of his prison lies in through art and poetry, in other 
words through the untrammelled expression of his primal urge to construct meta-
phors for his experience. This is very close to Hofmannsthal’s dual, ‘pharmakologi-
cal’ conception of language as both the poison and the cure. 
At the end of his review, Hofmannsthal announces his intention of writing a 





in the form of a dialogue between “zwei oder drei recht moderne[n] junge[n] Men-
schen” (GW VIII: 192) for whom words are “lebendige Wesen” and who flee from 
concepts (Begriffen) “wie vor großen schwarzen Hunden” (193). The Gespräch über 
Gedichte, which appeared ten years later in the February 1904 issue of the Neue 
Rundschau, may be regarded as the realisation of this project, and stands as the clos-
est Hofmannsthal ever came to formulating a comprehensive theory of metaphor. At 
the same time, it is unequivocally the most sustained expression of Hofmannsthal’s 
zoopoetics—indeed, as I have said, it is something of a zoopoetic manifesto. The text 
takes the form of a dialogue between two rather modern young men, Clemens and 
Gabriel. At first, these two take turns reading poems from Stefan George’s Jahr der 
Seele, and discussing their poetic and metaphorical merits. Later, Gabriel reads aloud 
a poem by Christian Friedrich Hebbel (“Sie sehn sich nicht wieder”), which describes 
two swans swimming on troubled waters. Clemens asks: “Und diese Schwäne? Sie 
sind ein Symbol? Sie bedeuten—” but Gabriel interrupts him, saying that “Ja, sie be-
deuten, aber sprich es nicht aus, was sie bedeuten: was immer du sagen wolltest, es 
wäre unrichtig.” 
Sie bedeuten hier nichts als sich selber: Schwäne. Schwäne, aber freilich 
gesehen mit den Augen der Poesie, die jedes Ding jedesmal zum erstenmal 
sieht, die jedes Ding mit allen Wundern seines Daseins umgibt: […] Gese-
hen mit diesen Augen sind die Tiere die eigentlichen Hieroglyphen, sind sie 
lebendige geheimnisvolle Chiffern, mit denen Gott unaussprechliche Dinge 
in die Welt geschrieben hat. Glücklich der Dichter, daß auch er diese göttli-
chen Chiffern in seine Schrift verweben darf (SW XXXI: 79–80) 
The poet’s prerogative is his ability to make use of these symbols or hieroglyphs in 





Hebbel’s poems do not signify anything that can be expressed in words, which is to 
say through a set of human relations; they hold the key to the secret, universal truth 
of the world—“das Weltgeheimnis.” This is the first component of Hofmannsthal’s 
zoopoetics. Gabriel is horrified by Clemens’s suggestion that the symbolic essence of 
poetry lies in the way it “setzt eine Sache für die andere” (77). It does no such thing, 
Gabriel insists: On the contrary, “es ist gerade die Poesie, welche fieberhaft bestrebt 
ist, die Sache selbst zu setzten.” In other words, these swans are not metaphors or 
symbols in the ordinary sense, because they do not stand for anything else. Their 
meaning can neither be reduced nor translated into something else. They are, as Ga-
briel puts it, “Chiffern, welche aufzulösen die Sprache ohnmächtig ist.” The swans 
mean “nichts als sich selber” and thus cannot be ‘resolved’ (aufgelöst) by human lan-
guage into an abstract concept. 
“Alles, was den Menschen gegen das Thier abhebt,” according to Nietzsche, 
“hängt von [der] Fähigkeit ab, die anschaulichen Metaphern zu einem Schema zu 
verflüchtigen,16 also ein Bild in einen Begriff aufzulösen” (KSA I: 881, emphasis added). 
It is this ability, he explains, which gives rise to a “eine neue Welt von Gesetzen, Pri-
vilegien, Unterordnungen, Gränzbestimmungen, die nun der anderen anschauli-
chen Welt der ersten Eindrücke gegenübertritt, als das Festere, Allgemeinere, 
Bekanntere, Menschlichere und daher als das Regulirende und Imperativische” (KSA 
I: 881–82). And it is this ability which has reached crisis point in the Chandos-Brief, 
                                                   
16 It is interesting to note that “Verflüchtigung” is also one of the three capital vices of language (along 
with “Vergeistigung” and “Vernichtung”) mentioned by the lexicographer-poet in Hofmannsthal’s 





which Hofmannsthal wrote in 1902. The letter, dated 22 August 1603, is from one 
Philipp Lord Chandos to the great scientist and philosopher Francis Bacon. Chandos 
is writing to apologise for his recent silence and to explain why he has been forced to 
abandon his life as a writer. Chandos explains that he has lately undergone a funda-
mental linguistic crisis, whereby he has completely lost the capacity “über irgend et-
was zusammenhängend zu denken oder zu sprechen” (SW XXXI: 48). Despite this 
claim, it quickly becomes apparent that far from having lost the ability to say anything 
at all by linguistic means—in which case the finely wrought prose of his letter would 
constitute a performative contradiction of epic proportions—Chandos has in fact lost 
only his capacity for abstraction and hence his ability to make rational judgements 
based on abstract concepts. He explains how he began to experience “ein unerklärli-
ches Unbehagen, die Worte ‘Geist’, ‘Seele’ oder ‘Körper’ nur auszusprechen”—such 
abstract terms “zerfielen mir im Munde wie modrige Pilze” (48–9). He is overcome 
with desperate anxiety while trying to explain to his four-year-old daughter why it is 
important to tell the truth: “die mir im Munde zuströmenden Begriffe [nahmen] 
plötzlich eine solche schillernde Färbung [an] und [flossen] so ineinander [über],” 
that he was forced to rush outside and “mich erst zu Pferde, auf der einsamen Hut-
weide einen guten Galopp nehmend, wieder einigermaßen herstellte” (49). We may 
note here in passing that the only way to regain control of his faculties is through a 
demonstration of his mastery over nature, by vigorously riding his horse across the 
lonely pasture. But gradually his attacks of anguish grow more pervasive and una-
voidable, until he is unable to participate even in idle chatter about the moral and 





“so unbeweisbar, so lügenhaft, so löcherig wie nur möglich,” and finally, he writes, 
everything “zerfiel mir […] in Teile, diese Teile wieder in Teile, und nichts mehr ließ 
sich mit einem Begriff umspannen” (49). 
Before his crisis, Chandos writes, he conceived the whole of existence “als ei-
ne große Einheit”: 
geistige und körperliche Welt schien mir keinen Gegensatz zu bilden, 
ebensowenig höfisches und tierisches Wesen, Kunst und Unkunst, Ein-
samkeit und Gesellschaft; in allem fühlte ich Natur, [...] und in aller Natur 
fühlte ich mich selber; wenn ich auf meiner Jagdhütte die schäumende laue 
Milch in mich hineintrank, die ein struppiges Mensch einer schönen sanf-
täugigen Kuh aus dem strotzenden Euter in einen Holzeimer niedermolk, 
so war mir das nichts anderes, als wenn ich, in der dem Fenster eingebau-
ten Bank meines studio sitzend, aus einem Folianten süße und schäumen-
de Nahrung des Geistes in mich sog. Das eine war wie das andere; keines 
gab dem andern weder an traumhafter überirdischer Natur, noch an leibli-
cher Gewalt nach, und so ging’s fort durch die ganze Breite des Lebens, 
rechter und linker Hand; überall war ich mitten drinnen, wurde nie ein 
Scheinhaftes gewahr: Oder es ahnte mir, alles wäre Gleichnis und jede Krea-
tur ein Schlüssel der anderen, und ich fühlte mich wohl den, der im Stande 
wäre, eine nach der andern bei der Krone zu packen und mit ihr so viele der 
andern aufzusperren, als sie aufsperren könnte. Soweit erklärt sich der Ti-
tel, den ich jenem enzyklopädischen Buch zu geben gedachte. (47–8, em-
phasis added) 
The book to which he is referring is an ambitious collection of apophthegms he had 
planned to write, which, tellingly, was to have been entitled Nosce te ipsum. The sense 
of harmonious oneness with the universe may seem at first glance to be indicative of 
a certain mysticism, but in fact it is the very epitome of the rational anthropocentric 
worldview, whereby man is at the centre of the cosmos and perceives only himself 
wherever he looks. This goes hand in hand with the allegorical interpretation of the 





menal reality hidden behind the phenomenal world and which, moreover, man (and 
man alone) has the capacity to uncover.17 
It is precisely such a worldview which Hofmannsthal dismisses in a short 
piece entitled “Bildlicher Ausdruck” published in 1897 in Stefan George’s Blätter für 
die Kunst. Hofmannsthal takes issue with the way in which a given work of literature 
is frequently said to be “reich an Bildern,” as if such images and metaphors were 
mere ornaments superimposed on the essential poetic material of the work, whereas 
in fact it is the “uneigentliche, bildliche Ausdruck” which is the “Kern und Wesen 
aller Poesie.” And what the poet expresses in metaphors and analogies can never be 
expressed in any other way. “Die Leute suchen gern hinter einem Gedicht, was sie 
den ‘eigentlichen Sinn’ nennen’,” Hofmannsthal scathingly writes, comparing such 
people to “Affen, die auch immer mit den Händen hinter einen Spiegel fahren, als 
müsse dort ein Körper zu fassen sein” (GW VIII: 234). This position on the irreduci-
bility of poetic meaning is an indication of Hofmannsthal’s mounting rejection of 
symbolism in favour of a more starkly modernist conception of the poetic image—
                                                   
17 This worldview, moreover, appears to be a quintessentially European or ‘Western’ trait. In the 
summer of 1902, immediately before writing the Chandos-Brief, Hofmannsthal wrote a number of 
sketches for a dialogue between a young European and a Japanese nobleman. In one of the fragments, 
the European remarks that “es ist etwas hinter allem. ich möchte es mit Namen nennen können” (SW 
XXXI: 43). The Japanese nobleman describes European culture as terrifyingly decrepit, decadent, 
fragmented; and the Europeans as slaves to their own culture, worshipping their vampiric words and 
concepts: “Diese Götter sind Begriffe: sie saugen Euch das Blut aus” (42); “Ihr seid das Spiegelbild das 
einer ansieht, während ein Räuber ihn würgt. Die Worte in denen ihr Euch formuliert, haben die 
größte Gewalt über Euch.” Japanese culture, by contrast, is characterised by harmony, immediacy, 
authenticity and self-presence. The Japanese are “in sich gegenwärtig,” and thus “den Blumen und 
Thieren verwandt” (42). “Jeder Mensch muss seine wirkliche Welt finden,” the Japanese nobleman 





and, we might add, a more zoopoetic conception of the poetic animal. Henceforth, 
for Hofmannsthal, ‘a swan is a swan is a swan’, as it were. 
In effect, this transition mirrors Chandos’s movement away from a concep-
tion of the world as not only harmonious but comprehensible to one in which the unity 
of the cosmos is fundamentally unassimilable to meaning. Hans-Jürgen Schings, in 
a much earlier essay, locates the definitive expression of Hofmannsthal’s rejection of 
this “false symbolism” (“Allegorie,” 555) in his story “Das Märchen der 672. Nacht” 
(1895), in which the protagonist, a merchant’s son, leaves the safe aestheticism of his 
home and ventures out into the city at night, where he suffers a series of distressing 
repudiations of his belief in the mystical harmony and beauty of the world, culminat-
ing in his death after being kicked by an ugly cavalry horse while attempting to re-
trieve some jewels he had dropped. In her study of Hofmannsthal’s animal 
symbolism, Helen Frink regards this as a prime example of the way in which “the 
animals in Hofmannsthal’s work resist assimilation into the harmonious flux in 
which individual consciousness is suspended in blissful oblivious oneness with the 
universe” (Frink 12). This is certainly true of the sort of “blissful oblivious oneness” 
that characterises Chandos’s pre-critical life—or the life of the merchant’s son in the 
Märchen. An index of the horse’s incompatibility with the latter’s worldview is the 
repeated emphasis on how ugly (häßlich) it is. We see this even more clearly in the 
Reitergeschichte (1899), when sergeant Lerch rides through the nightmarish village 
and encounters an array of hideous and diseased animals, a “weiße unreine Hündin 
mit hängenden Zitzen” and two other dogs, the one starving and “von äußerst gieri-





the other “ein schlechter Dachshund auf hohen Beinen” (SW XXVIII: 44). Every-
thing about this village and the animals is ugly, ill-proportioned, and fundamentally 
at odds with the beautiful world—the adjective schön recurs at least seven times in 
the first few pages of the story, in the Märchen, the number is even greater—from 
which Lerch has just come. In this sense, the animals in these texts do subvert the 
characters’ worldview, frequently with fatal consequences, and are hence harbingers 
of the semiotic and existential crisis that befalls Lord Chandos. And yet, in the wake 
of this “false symbolism” it is the animals’ very unassimilability to signification that 
becomes the key to the new, post-critical zoopoetics of the Brief and the Gespräch—
and here it is not the human figures who must die: it is the animals. 
Hofmannsthal uses the terms Metapher, Chiffre, Bild, Symbol, and Hieroglyphe 
more or less interchangeably, but always to refer to the ability of poetic language to 
allow the individual to perceive “den großen Weltzusammenhang”: that is to say, in 
insisting that Hebbel’s swans are not metaphors or symbols but rather ciphers or hi-
eroglyphs, it is not because there is a strict distinction to be made between these 
terms, but rather because he wishes to emphasise the nonconceptuality of these poet-
ic animals. “Wie gern wollte ich dir das Wort ‘Symbol’ zugestehen,” says Gabriel, 
“wäre es nicht schal geworden, daß mich’s ekelt” (SW XXXI: 80). For Hofmannsthal, 
the way ordinary, everyday speech has worn down and cheapened the original poetic 
glory of language is a source of profound disgust. In a famous phrase, written in 
1895, he declared that people were “müde, reden zu hören. Sie haben einen tiefen 
Ekel vor den Worten: Denn die Worte haben sich vor die Dinge gestellt” (GW VIII: 





barrier, blocking our access to the things themselves and to ‘life’ as such. More im-
portantly, even metaphors and symbols have gone stale (schal) through overuse.18 
The feeling of disgust (Ekel) accompanies the awareness of one’s separation 
from the continuity of ‘life’. Thus, in the play Der Abenteurer und die Sängerin (1898), 
one of the characters remarks: “O laßt die Worte weg, sie sind Harpyen, | die Ekel 
auf des Lebens Blüten streun!” (SW V: 169). And in the first act of the dramatic 
fragment Das Leben ein Traum,19 the captive prince Sigismund contemplates the body 
of a dead rat caught in a trap, which has been partially devoured by its fellow rats. 
“Ich habe immer Mühe mich abzugrenzen,” he says, “um mich nicht zu verlieren. 
Von solchen Thieren aber fühle ich mich verschieden, durch Ekel.”20 And what is 
disgust, he asks? “Ein Wirbel in mir.”21 All words, he continues, are such vortices 
                                                   
18 Compare Nietzsche’s assertion that truths are nothing but “Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich 
kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Mün-
zen in Betracht kommen” (KSA I: 881). 
19 Hofmannsthal began working on this adaptation of Calderón’s La vida es sueño in the autumn of 
1901 and continued, on and off, until after World War I, at which point he finally abandoned the pro-
ject in favour of his own drama Der Turm (1923–28), which exhibits the same basic premise. Hof-
mannsthal was most intensively engaged with the project between 1902 and 1904, i.e. in the same 
period as he wrote the Brief and the Gespräch. 
20 SW XV: 233. Compare Walter Benjamin’s vignette “Handschuhe” from his Einbahnstraße, which 
traces the human sense of disgust in the face of the animal back to a primal fear “in der Berührung 
von ihnen erkannt zu werden. Was sich tief im Menschen entsetzt, ist das dunkle Bewußtsein, in ihm 
sei etwas am Leben, was dem ekelerregenden Tiere so wenig fremd sei, daß es von ihm erkannt wer-
den könne.” Disgust is grounded in the anxiety of being recognised as familiar by the animal. Human 
education consists not in suppressing this feeling of disgust, but in mastering it: “Verleugnen darf er 
die bestialische Verwandtschaft mit der Kreatur nicht, auf deren Anruf sein Ekel erwidert: er muß 
sich zu ihrem Herrn machen” (90–91)—which means subduing not only the animal Other, but also 
the animal part of man himself. 
21 “Alle Worte sind Wirbel die in mir rotierend mich ins Grundlose hinabschauen lassen,” he says. 
This formulation is strikingly similar to Chandos’s post-critical experience of words: “Die einzelnen 
Worte schwammen um mich; sie gerannen zu Augen die mich anstarrten und in die ich wieder hin-





whirling inside him: Sigismund’s juxtaposition of words and disgust highlights their 
analogous function as forces of separation and individuation, and moreover brings 
this problem once again into contact with the question of the human–animal rela-
tionship. Sigismund has trouble maintaining a strict boundary between himself and 
his surroundings and is at constant risk of losing himself. The tower in which he is 
imprisoned and the chains that bind him come to represent the shackles of language 
and signification which prevent him from being free like even the lowliest of ani-
mals: “Vögel sind, Iltisse, Ottern, | Mäuse, Würmer, Spinnen, Schlangen, | Alle frei! 
Ich an der Kette” (SW XV: 13). Why, he asks his warden Clotald, has he taught him 
the terrible art of speaking and reasoning? “Daß ich eingekerkert hier | Muß ver-
schmachten nach den Dingen, | Sicher, nie sie zu erreichen.” He longs to be an ani-
mal, “stumm, | Unter unbenannten Dingen” (SW XV: 20), but he is condemned to 
know the names of things that must forever remain out of his reach. 
Gabriel’s insistence that the swans in Hebbel’s poem signify nothing but 
themselves is a deliberate negation of the disjuncture of sign and signified, and plac-
es them outside the bounds of language as such. In so doing, Gabriel creates a way 
for poetry to transcend the limits of language: through the figure of the animal. It is 
therefore doubly significant that language should be incapable of ‘resolving’ 
(auflösen) Hebbel’s swans into an abstract concept. The animal always slips away to-
                                                                                                                                                      
und durch die hindurch man ins Leere kommt.” By contrast, at the end of the letter, Chandos de-
scribes a different kind of “Wirbel” produced by his new “fieberisches Denken,” which is “unmittelba-
rer, flüssiger, glühender” than words. “Es sind gleichfalls Wirbel,” he writes, “aber solche, die nicht 
wie die Wirbel der Sprache ins bodenlose zu führen scheinen, sondern irgendwie in mich selber und 
in den tiefsten Schoß des Friedens” (SW XXXI: 54). Which is to say, these vortices are not informed 





ward the ineffable and unknowable. Poetry, according to Gabriel, sees “jedes Ding 
jedesmal zum erstenmal”—hence each metaphor is also always the first metaphor, 
and the first metaphor, for Hofmannsthal as well as for Berger, was animal. Thus 
each poem, each poetic utterance, repeats the primal scene of poetry. And what is the 
primal scene of poetry? We already know the answer: it is the moment of sacrifice. 
“Weißt du was ein Symbol ist?” Gabriel asks Clemens. He then continues, seemingly 
via a non sequitur, to describe the origin of sacrifice.22 This extraordinary passage is 
worth quoting at length: 
Weißt du was ein Symbol ist? … Willst du versuchen dir vorzustellen, wie 
das Opfer entstanden ist? Mir ist, als hätten wir früher einmal drüber ge-
sprochen. Ich meine das Schlachtopfer, das hingeopferte Blut und Leben 
eines Rindes, eines Widders, einer Taube. Wie konnte man denken, 
dadurch die erzürnten Götter zu begütigen? Es bedarf einer wunderbaren 
Sinnlichkeit um dies zu denken, einer bewölkten lebenstrunkenen orphi-
schen Sinnlichkeit. Mich dünkt, ich sehe den ersten, der opferte. Er fühlte, 
daß die Götter ihn haßten: […] Da griff er, im doppelten Dunkel seiner nie-
dern Hütte und seiner Herzensangst, nach dem scharfen krummen Messer 
und war bereit, das Blut aus seiner Kehle rinnen zu lassen, dem furchtba-
ren Unsichtbaren zur Lust. Und da, trunken vor Angst und Wildheit und 
Nähe des Todes, wühlte seine Hand, halb unbewußt, noch einmal im wol-
ligen warmen Vließ des Widders. – Und dieses Tier, dieses Leben, dieses 
im Dunkel atmende, blutwarme, ihm so nah, so vertraut – auf einmal zuck-
te dem Tier das Messer in die Kehle, und das warme Blut rieselte zugleich 
                                                   
22 It is not only Clemens who is confused by this move on Gabriel’s part. Critics have also tended to 
regard this account of the nature of the symbol unhelpful at best and disastrously misleading at worst. 
Ritchie Robertson, for example, writes that “the dialogue becomes perplexing […] when Gabriel derives 
the poetic symbol from sacrifice” (20) and Helen Frink opines that the “attempt to define symbolism 
in terms of animal sacrifice […] merely confuses the issue, for instead of explaining the essence or 
function of symbolism, he explains how it originates. Furthermore, he approaches symbolism not in 
the comparatively simple form of a symbolic object, but as a symbolic act, that of animal sacrifice” (8). 
This assessment leads her to make the fateful decision to disregard Hofmannsthal’s own sacrificial 
theory of symbolism in favour of a “comparatively simple” definition borrowed from Alfred North 
Whitehead. As a result, her study of Animal Symbolism in Hofmannsthal’s Works fails categorically to 





an dem Vließ des Tieres und an der Brust, an den Armen des Menschen 
hinab: und einen Augenblick lang muß er geglaubt haben, es sei sein eige-
nes Blut; einen Augenblick lang, während ein Laut des wollüstigen Trium-
phes aus seiner Kehle sich mit dem ersterbenden Stöhnen des Tieres 
mischte, muß er die Wollust gesteigerten Daseins für die erste Zuckung 
des Todes genommen haben: er muß, einen Augenblick lang in dem Tier 
gestorben sein, nur so konnte das Tier für ihn sterben. Daß das Tier für ihn 
sterben konnte, wurde ein großes Mysterium, eine große geheimnisvolle 
Wahrheit. Das Tier starb hinfort den symbolischen Opfertod. Aber alles 
ruhte darauf, daß auch er in dem Tier gestorben war, einen Augenblick 
lang. Daß sich sein Dasein, für die Dauer eines Atemzugs, in dem fremden 
Dasein aufgelöst hatte. – Das ist die Wurzel aller Poesie (SW XXXI: 80–81) 
Language is powerless to resolve (auflösen) the animal-symbol, but it, on the other 
hand, can dissolve (auflösen) us: this, for Hofmannsthal, is the great mystery of poetic 
language. And once again it is the blood of an animal that makes possible the birth of 
poetry. What Gabriel is describing here is an ecstatic moment, of dissolution and 
overflowing, of participation in the existence of another being, of methexis. This dis-
solution of the self, what Freud referred to as the ‘oceanic feeling,’ is achieved 
through mimesis and metaphor: the animal dies for the man, it stands for him, as the 
man’s death is transferred onto the animal. The sacrificial death of the animal meta-
phorically substitutes for the death of the man. But this metaphorical substitution 
can only take place because there has been mimetic participation. The animal dies for 
the man, but he too must die in the animal, as his existence becomes merged with 
that of the animal, just as the man’s voice becomes merged with the voice of the ram 
in the ecstatic union of symbolic and literal death.23 
                                                   
23 Gabriel’s emphasis on the need for a specific kind of orphic sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit) in this pri-
mordial scenario of the birth of poetry places it in direct opposition to what is without a doubt the par-
adigmatic human–ovine encounter in German literature, namely the ‘first’ man’s encounter with the 





Perhaps the most striking of all the images in the Chandos letter also involves 
ecstatic participation in the death of an animal: Chandos describes how he had had 
poison put down in the milk cellar of one of his estates in order to deal with the rat 
infestation—quite a different image from that of the warm, foaming milk from the 
beautiful gentle-eyed cow he used to drink. Then one night, in the wake of his lin-
guistic crisis, as he was out riding in the fields, he suddenly became witness, in his 
mind’s eye, as it were (“mir im Innern”), to the “Todeskampf dieses Volks von Rat-
ten.” “Alles war in mir,” he writes: “die mit dem süßlich scharfen Geruch des Giftes 
angefüllte kühldumpfe Kellerluft und das Gellen der Todeschreie, die sich an den 
modrigen Mauern brachen” (51). He tries to find an analogy to his experience in 
Classical literature, invoking the destruction of Alba Longa and of Carthage, but, he 
says, “es war mehr, es war göttlicher, tierischer; und es war Gegenwart, die vollste 
erhabenste Gegenwart.” (In fact, for part of his description, Chandos suddenly shifts 
to the present tense). He sees “eine Mutter, die ihre sterbenden Jungen um sich zu-
cken hatte und nicht auf die Verendenden, nicht auf die unerbittlichen steinernen 
Mauern, sondern in die leere Luft, oder durch die Luft ins Unendliche hin blickte.” 
He is at a loss for words to express what he experienced when, “in mir die Seele die-
ses Tieres gegen das ungeheure Verhängnis die Zähne bleckte” (51). It was neither 
                                                                                                                                                      
solely to man’s faculty of reason (Besonnenheit), which is unclouded by passion or instinct. Whereas 
the hungry wolf or the bloodthirsty lion see the sheep as nothing but food—“die Sinnlichkeit hat sie 
überwältigt!” (55)—and the “brünstige[r] Schaafmann” sees it as nothing but the object of his bestial 
pleasure, man apprehends the sheep rationally and dispassionately, isolating its defining characteris-
tics and classifying it within his taxonomic system. Hofmannsthal’s birth of poetry, by contrast, de-
pends precisely on being overwhelmed by Sinnlichkeit, and on the eradication of the specific Merkmale 
that serve to divide the world up into discrete categories. The ram’s voice becomes merged with the 





pity nor sympathy, Chandos insists, that he felt for the dying rats, but rather “ein un-
geheures Anteilnehmen, ein Hinüberfließen in jene Geschöpfe” (51). Pity implies 
distance, indeed it presupposes a subject/object distinction, which is precisely the 
distinction which has been dissolved through this oceanic Hinüberfließen. 
This seemingly harrowing experience is actually one of the “guten Augenbli-
cke” that Chandos tries to describe to Lord Bacon in order to give him a sense of how 
his life has changed. That is to say, this experience of “ungeheures Anteilnehmen” 
comes closest to the sense of orderly and harmonious unity that characterised his 
pre-critical life.24 These experiences punctuate an existence so entirely “geistlos, ja 
gedankenlos” in its flow that he fears Lord Bacon will scarcely be able to imagine it.25 
What joyful and stimulating moments he does have, the ‘good moments’ like the ex-
perience with the rats, are impossible for him to put into words. “Denn es ist ja etwas 
                                                   
24 Monika Fick observes that “Solcher Verschmelzung gegenüber ist die Einheit des früheren Zu-
stands, in dem dem Lord Chandos die körperliche und die geistige Welt keine Gegensätze bildeten 
und in dem alles Erleben von ‘überirdischer Natur’ und ‘leiblicher Gewalt’ zugleich war, eine Lüge. 
Denn damals bedeuteten ihm die Gegensätze bzw. Ihre Namen etwas; die Trennung ging der Verei-
nigung voraus” (347). Nevertheless, even the new unity and dissolution of the ‘good moments’ is pred-
icated on a prior disunity and separation and is therefore ultimately beholden to it. 
25 It is worth noting that these two modes of being that are available to Chandos after his crisis, charac-
terised by insurmountable distance from the world on the one hand and overwhelming closeness—
the ‘good moments’—on the other, are almost exactly analogous to the contrasting experiences of the 
world Hofmannsthal had foreseen for the two princes Amgiad and Assad in his adaptation of their 
story from the Thousand and One Nights, which he began in 1895 but never finished. Of the one he 
writes: “für ihn sind die Wunder des Lebens so durcheinander gewachsen, dass immer eins dem an-
dern den Mund verschliesst. Nicht zu bewältigen erscheint es ihm, grösser als man begreifen kann. Er 
hat die Gabe des Lebens. […] es ist dieser der die vielen Abenteuer hat.” And of the other: “er sieht das 
Leben fortwährend harmonisch, aber wie hinter einer Glasscheibe, unerreichbar: das ‘gerade ich’ 
τυγχάνω ὤν, kann er mit dem Fall der Ereignisse nicht vereinigen. Fortwährend verwirrt ihn dass die-
selben Abenteuer in der Vorstellung und in der Realität so gar nicht zusammenzuhängen scheinen, 
seine Seele ist nicht ganz im Hades befangen, er sieht gleichsam mit einem halben Auge übers Leben 
hinaus, wie einer der träumt und dem die reale Welt hineinspielt weil er nicht tief genug schläft” (SW 






völlig Unbenanntes und auch wohl kaum Benennbares, das, in solchen Augenbli-
cken, irgendeine Erscheinung meiner alltäglichen Umgebung mit einer überschwel-
lenden Flut höheren Lebens wie ein Gefäß erfüllend, mir sich ankündet” (50). 
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent: when overwhelmed by 
this flood of exalted life, Chandos comes close to the state of animality, to being 
“stumm, unter unbenannten Dingen.” Moreover, he is explicit in characterising the 
experience as at once “göttlicher” and “tierischer” than any ordinary human experi-
ence: that is to say, it is informed by radical Presence (Gegenwart), not only spatial but 
also temporal. Animal Being, like divine Being, unfolds in an eternal present. At that 
moment, as he witnesses, or rather vicariously participates, in the fate of these rats 
for whose death he himself is responsible, he can, for a moment, transcend the world 
of discontinuous objects, cross over the narrow abyss into the “immanent immensi-
ty” and experience what it is like to be “like water in water.”26 And that is the root of 
all poetry. 
IV. Suitable for Sacrifice? 
Sacrifice, writes René Girard, “requires a certain degree of misunderstanding.” The 
sacrificial act, like the metaphor, is a figure of substitution, where the victims must 
“bear a certain resemblance to the object they replace.” “But,” Girard says, “this re-
semblance must not be carried to the extreme of complete assimilation, or it would 
lead to disastrous confusion. In the case of animal victims the difference is always 
                                                   
26 Jacques le Rider notes that “Les épiphanies qui se révèlent à Chandos relèvent de la ‘tautologie mys-
tique’. De l’immédiat de la perception émane un sentiment du sacré” (94). The formulation “like wa-





clear, and no such confusion is possible. Although they do their best to empathize 
with their cattle, the Nuers never quite manage to mistake a man for a cow—the 
proof being that they always sacrifice the latter, never the former” (Girard 7–12). Ac-
cording to Gabriel, what gives words and symbols the power to dissolve and to en-
chant us is the fact that “wir und die Welt nichts Verschiedenes sind” (SW XXXI: 
82). The monism at the root of this idea nevertheless reverts to a form of anthropo-
centric dualism simply by virtue of the fact that instead of sacrificing himself to ap-
pease the gods, Gabriel’s ‘first man’ sacrifices an animal. He is the one who 
experiences the ecstasy of heightened existence while it is the ram that dies. The 
great mystery of the sacrifice, the enigmatic truth it reveals is the animal’s ability to 
die for the man. Its death is symbolic precisely because it stands in for the man’s own 
death. And yet, Gabriel insists, the essence of poetry is that unlike ordinary language 
it never puts one thing instead of another (“Niemals setzt die Poesie eine Sache für 
eine andere”) but only ever the thing itself: “sie spricht Worte aus, um der Worte wil-
len, das ist ihre Zauberei” (81). The parallels to Bataille’s sacrificial theory of poetry 
are obvious: freed from the burden of signification, from their utility as media of 
communication, the words of a poem are there for their own sake. But for whose sa-
ke does the sacrificial act take place? Surely not the victim’s. 
A fundamental aspect of the “misunderstanding” which Girard attributes to 
the ritual of sacrifice is that “the celebrants do not and must not comprehend the true 
role of the sacrificial act” (Girard 7). The sacrificial victim acts as a surrogate for 
something else which is “unsacrificeable,” but the identity of the ‘true’ victim re-





must be sufficiently similar to the object it replaces to be substitutable for it, but not 
so similar that it is impossible to tell the difference. In the case of the animal, in or-
der for it to be suitable for sacrifice, it must first be withdrawn from the world of un-
differentiated objects, into the realm of language and signification—in other words, 
it must be brought to the brink of speaking, of saying “I” and thus declaring its pres-
ence. Like Mauthner, Hofmannsthal appears to conceive of language as a poison. 
Mauthner writes that man alone is “krank, vergiftet, entwurzelt in der ungeheuren 
sprachlosen Natur”—the only way to alleviate man’s intolerable solitude is to make 
the animal a gift of language, thus allowing it to ‘speak’ and absolving the human of 
the obligation to do so. As Chandos’s internal milk cellar fills up with the “süßlich 
scharfen Geruch des Giftes” and the “Gellen der Todesschreie, die sich an modrigen 
Mauern brachen,” is free to fall silent. While the others scream and thrash about, he 
may become “die stumme Creatur.” He has overcome the feeling of disgust that 
marked Sigismund’s separation from the world: this is underscored by the very fact 
that these rats—“das prototypische Ekel-Objekt” (Menninghaus Ekel, 478)—can serve 
as the “Gefäß [s]einer Offenbarung,” a vehicle for his new “ahnungsvolles Verhältnis 
zum ganzen Dasein.” 
Sigismund, for his part is singularly frustrated because he is “vollgestopft mit 
den eingeklemmten Reizen des Lebens!” (SW XV: 234) but the words and signs he 
has learnt are incapable of expressing his inner experience. He would like to cover 
the walls of his prison with representations of his existence, but claims he could nev-
er find “die Hieroglyphen, um den ungeheuren Rang meiner Leiden auszudrücken.” 





den Mord.” In the courtyard of his prison tower there lives a horde of toads: the sight 
of these creatures, full of “Saft und Leben,” is intolerable to Sigismund, and when, at 
night, he sees two of them copulating, he smashes them indiscriminately with a rock. 
“Wären sie nicht blöd und stumm, | Fragten etwa sie warum? | Ihr seid lauter Sigis-
munde, | Ihr elenden, blinden Kröten, | Ich bin Sigsmunds Geschick, | Mich gelüs-
tet’s euch zu töten” (14). Before killing the toads, in order for their deaths to be 
meaningful in a way that can grant him release, he first symbolically transfers his 
identity onto these animals, which conversely allows him to abandon his own subjec-
tivity and become, momentarily, the master of ‘his’ fate. 
ich muss eine Handlung begehen—nur eine solche entladet mich—bei der 
ich mich völlig hingeben kann; “bei der der arme Sigismund weg und die 
Welt auch weg ist, und nur der der thut ist da, der ist da und tödtet, tödtet, 
tödtet! Ekstase! (234) 
Symbolic acts allow Sigismund to merge fully (“aufzugehen”) with the world, with-
out having to worry about “das quälende ‘Wozu’.” But he feels the need to explain 
that “nicht auf das Tödten der Kröten komme es an (daran dürfe er gar nicht denken: 
er verscharre auch seine Opfer) sondern auf die Ekstase des Tödtens” (234). Here we 
have Schings’s argument about the sacrificial scene in the Gespräch in a nutshell: it’s 
not about the sacrifice at all, it’s about mystical union with the universe, about ecsta-
sy and oneness and flowing over.27 Theodor W. Adorno famously took issue with 
Hofmannsthal’s “blutrünstige Theorie des Symbols” for what he saw as its murky 
political implications (Adorno 234). In his article, Schings lambastes Adorno for the 
                                                   
27 “Nicht das Töten selbst macht das Symbolische aus—vielmehr die ‘Ekstase’, die völlige Hingabe, 





“Denkfehler” of equating the sacrificial scene with the origin of the symbol, whereas 
obviously it serves as a mere example of the sort of dissolution of the self that is the 
true essence of the symbol. But in his eagerness to disassociate sacrifice from the 
origin of poetry, Schings never pauses to consider how it can be self-evident that an-
imal sacrifice be enlisted as a prime example of the sort of dissolution and 
overflowing that is the ‘real’ root of all poetry. As I have argued in this chapter, it is 
misleading at best to disavow the significance of sacrifice and of the animal for Hof-
mannsthal’s poetics, even if—especially if—it is Hofmannsthal himself who disavows 
it. Adorno is completely right in observing that if Gabriel’s savage did not actually 
die, but rather simply slaughtered an animal, “so ist dafür das unverbindliche Opfer 
des Modernen um so drastischer zu nehmen” (Adorno 234). This sacrifice is non-
committal because there is nothing, ultimately, at stake: instead of overcoming the 
dualism it purports to subvert it actually reinforces it. 
The allure of sacrifice is the promise it holds of abolishing or suspending our 
own finitude. This is even more apparent in the case of animal sacrifice, since ani-
mals, because they are said to lack language and self-consciousness, are likewise ex-
cluded from the experience of finitude. According to the twisted logic of Western 
logocentrism, the animal cannot die, because it is incapable of death as death, as 
Heidegger cryptically puts it.28 And yet, death is the one thing we can be certain we 
                                                   
28 “Die Sterblichen sind die Menschen. Sie heißen die Sterblichen, weil sie sterben können. Sterben 
heißt: den Tod als Tod vermögen. Nur der Mensch stirbt. Das Tier verendet. Es hat den Tod als Tod 
weder vor sich noch hinter sich” (HGA 79 17–18). For an excellent survey of the tradition of excluding 
the animal from the awareness of death, see Akira Lippit’s Electric Animal, in which he identifies a 
“philosophical axiom” that holds that “animals, lacking the capacity for language, also lack the capacity 





will never experience. Sacrifice appears to offer us the experience of death without 
the threat of actually having to die. The “drift toward or through sacrifice,” writes 
Jean-Luc Nancy, 
is always connected to the fascination with an ecstasy turned toward an ab-
solute Other or toward an absolute Outside, into which the subject is emp-
tied the better to be restored. In this way, the subject is promised, through 
some mimesis and through some “sublation” of mimesis, methexis with 
the Outside or the Other ... Western sacrifice corresponds to an obsessive 
fear of the “Outside” of finitude, however obscure and groundless this 
“outside” may be. (80) 
Chandos’s “ungeheures Anteilnehmen” is precisely such a form of methexis. But, 
and Nancy is extremely emphatic on this point, there is no ‘outside’ to which the sub-
ject might be methectically offered. And, we might add, the ultimate failure of Hof-
mannsthal’s fantasy of overcoming dualism is inscribed within the very structure of 
sacrifice in which it is grounded.  
So the question remains: is a non-sacrificial zoopoetics possible? This will be 
one of the guiding questions for the chapters that follow, but one potential example 
might be the figure of Gregor Samsa in Kafka’s Die Verwandlung, namely in his char-
acterisation, in the famous first sentence of the story, as “ein ungeheures Ungezief-
er.” As Stanley Corngold has indicated, the word “ungeheuer,” insofar as it translates 
the Latin infamiliaris, “connotes the creature who has no place in the family,” while 
Ungeziefer refers etymologically to “the unclean animal unsuited for sacrifice, the 
creature without a place in God’s order” (Corngold Introduction, xix). Thus the figure 
of Gregor Samsa resists the sacrificial economy into which Hofmannsthal’s and Ba-





ed for sacrifice, unacceptable to God, he is also unfamiliar (infamiliaris). Man does not 
recognise himself in this animal’s gaze—the space it opens up is not familiar to us, 
contrary to what Bataille claims; we do not know this depth. Unlike the four-legged, 
warm-blooded, animal Others conjured up by their imaginations and sacrificed for 
the purposes of flowing over into the immanent immensity, Samsa’s many-legged, 
cold-blooded verminous insect is wholly Other, his death cannot serve as a conduit to 






Words are for those with promises to keep. 
—W. H. Auden, “Their Lonely Betters” (1950) 
Chapter 2 
A Lick and a Promise 
Rilke’s Anthropocynic Encounters 
I. “Wie ein Hund” 
In a letter to his wife Clara dated 23 October 1907, Rainer Maria Rilke describes the 
profound impression a self-portrait by the painter Paul Cézanne has made on him. 
He praises the uncompromising objectivity with which the artist has rendered his 
own likeness: “mit so viel demütiger Objektivität […], mit dem Glauben und der sach-
lich interessierten Teilnahme eines Hundes, der sich im Spiegel sieht und denkt: da 
ist noch ein Hund” (Briefe, 206). It’s an extraordinary image—but what does it 
mean? This is not the first time in these letters on Cézanne that Rilke compares the 
artist to a dog. In an earlier letter, dated 12 October, he tells Clara of a conversation 
with the painter Mathilde Vollmoeller, who sometimes accompanied him on his al-
most daily visits to that year’s Salon d’Automne, which included the first major post-
humous retrospective of Cézanne’s works following his death the previous year. 
“Denk Dir aber mein Erstaunen,” says Rilke, “als Fräulein V., ganz malerisch ge-
schult und schauend, sagte: ‘Wie ein Hund hat er davorgesessen und einfach ge-
schaut, ohne alle Nervosität und Nebenansicht’” (185). Yet it is not the strangeness of 
this analogy which surprises Rilke so much as its familiarity: just three days earlier 





he remains faithful and devoted even though it starves and beats him and won’t let 
him rest.1 But Rilke’s image is conventional compared to Vollmoeller’s: the former is 
one of fidelity and subservience, the archetypal attributes of dogs, whereas the latter 
involves a particular way of seeing the world and of representing it in a radically new 
form of art. On the one hand this new canine art has to do with a way of looking, and 
on the other with a way of painting in a personal, honest way that uses the paint to 
create a real object: “Die Farbe geht völlig auf in dessen Verwirklichung; es bleibt 
kein Rest” (185). 
Cézanne painted only what he “knew,” Vollmoeller told Rilke, which is to say 
only that which offered itself to his dog-like gaze, and which he would then “say,” 
without adding anything to this objective pictorial utterance. “‘Hier’, sagte sie, auf 
eine Stelle zeigend, ‘dieses hat er gewußt, und nun sagt er es (eine Stelle an einem 
Apfel); nebenan ist es noch frei, weil er das noch nicht gewußt hat. Er machte nur, 
was er wußte, nichts anderes.’ ‘Was muß er für ein gutes Gewissen haben’, sagte 
ich” (185). This little play on words (gewußt/Gewissen) reveals something about Rilke’s 
                                                   
1 “Und sitzt im Garten wie ein alter Hund, der Hund dieser Arbeit, die ihn wieder ruft und ihn schlägt 
und hungern läßt” (Briefe, 180). Rilke was fond of such canine analogies—particularly, it seems, when 
describing writers and artists. In September 1905, Rodin invited him to visit him at his house in Meu-
don, and Rilke describes how the sculptor greeted him “wie ein großer Hund […] wiedererkennend 
mit tastenden Augen, befriedigt und still” (109). The following year, when George Bernard Shaw 
came to Paris to sit for Rodin, Rilke asked Elisabeth von der Heydt if she was familiar with his work, 
adding that Shaw was “stolz auf seine Arbeiten, wie Wilde oder Whistler, aber ohne deren Prätension, 
wie ein Hund stolz ist auf seinen Herren” (qtd. in Schoolfield “Rilke’s Ibsen,” 466). Two years later, 
in a letter to Clara from the 3rd of October, 1907, Rilke describes a self-portrait by Van Gogh in which 
the artist “sieht dürftig und gequält aus, verzweifelt fast, aber doch nicht katastrophal: wie wenn es ein 
Hund schlecht hat. Und hält sein Gesicht hin und man sieht, sachlich, daß er es schlecht hat Tag und 
Nacht” (qtd. in Schneider Verheißung, 81n108). This last image of the dog proffering its face recalls 
Rilke’s poem “Der Hund,” written a few months previously, and his short prose text, Eine Begegnung, 





conception of artistic integrity and the moral dimension of this canine objectivity, 
which would allow us to extend the chain of associations to include Bewußtsein and 
Selbstbewußtsein. Human rational self-consciousness, as a form of knowing that con-
tinually extends beyond itself, subjectively filling in gaps in knowledge and the sen-
sory data, inevitably gives rise to an excess or a superfluity that no longer corresponds 
to the objective world. To Rilke, this form of anthropomorphic projection does vio-
lence to the things themselves and therefore must inevitably result in a guilty con-
science. The only way to make art with a clear conscience is to abandon such 
subjective supplementation. Cézanne, Vollmoeller observed, was able to use always 
exactly the right amount of paint for a given object: “Es ist wie auf eine Waage gelegt: 
das Ding hier, und dort die Farbe; nie mehr, nie weniger, als das Gleichgewicht er-
fordert. Das kann viel oder wenig sein: je nachdem, aber es ist genau, was dem Ge-
genstand entspricht” (185). There is an exact correspondence between the physical 
object and its mimetic representation, which, consequently, is not truly mimetic at 
all: the representation is the object, or rather, it is a thing in its own right, not an ob-
ject subordinate to a subject or a real-world referent. Thus, Cézanne’s canine gaze 
sees in the mirror not its own image but rather “another dog,” freed from the de-
pendency of mimesis and instead an autonomous, self-contained entity. 
It is easy to see how this would be appealing to Rilke as a model of artistic 
production. Ever since his first experience of Paris in 1902, and his intensive appren-
ticeship as Rodin’s secretary, Rilke had been in search of just such a poetics of exact 
correspondences, that could create or shape the things themselves with words, so 





the summer of 1903, Rilke had expressed his desperate need to find the right tools—
“den Hammer, meinen Hammer”—with which to ply his craft: “Irgendwie muß 
auch ich dazu kommen, Dinge zu machen; nicht plastische, geschriebene Dinge, – 
Wirklichkeiten, die aus dem Handwerk hervorgehen.”2 Rilke’s ambition to create ac-
tual things with words led him to abandon his earlier, somewhat overwrought lan-
guage in favour of the more objective, detached style of the Neue Gedichte, written 
between 1903 and 1908, mostly in Paris.3 Rilke’s desire for this new, objective lan-
guage went hand in hand with the project of ‘learning to see’ (Sehenlernen) that he 
describes in the semi-autobiographical novel Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids 
Brigge (1910), written, with frequent interruptions, during the same period. Sehen-
lernen is conceived as a propaedeutic exercise leading to the kind of “sachliches 
Sagen” that Rilke identified in Cézanne’s works: a wholly a-subjective, non-reflexive, 
anti-impressionistic perspective on the world, that records not the impression made 
by a given object or scene on the observer, but rather seeks to grasp the universal, 
                                                   
2 Rilke/Andreas-Salomé 105. Cf. Wodtke 67–69. On Rilke’s attempts to implement the techniques he 
learnt from Rodin in his own work, see Dürr. On Rilke and Cézanne, see especially Gerok-Reiter. The 
body of criticism on Rilke’s relationship to the visual arts more generally is vast, but for concise ac-
counts see Karl E. Webb’s and Helen Bridge’s essays on “Rilke and the Visual Arts” in A Companion to 
the Works of Rainer Maria Rilke and in the Cambridge Companion to Rilke, respectively. 
3 In a letter to Baron Jakob von Uexküll dated 19 August 1909, Rilke reacts to the great ethologist’s 
criticism of the New Poems’ “harte[] Sachlichkeit und Ungefühlsmäßigkeit,” insisting on the absolute 
necessity of this new, objective style and professing his clear conscience: “Wesentlicher scheint es mir, 
daß ich Ihnen, was jene neueren Bücher angeht, mein gutes, klares Gewissen zusichern kann: jedes 
Wort, jeder Wortzwischenraum in jenen Gedichten ist mit äußerster Notwendigkeit entstanden, unter 
dem Bewußtsein jener endgültigen Verantwortlichkeit, unter deren innerem Gericht meine Arbeit 
sich vollzieht” (Briefe, 245, emphasis added). Uexküll would later praise Rilke’s poem “Der Panther” 
for the “meisterhaft[e]” “Beobachtung, die Sie dort entwickeln,” noting that he clearly has “ein 






material essence of objects in the world through an unblinking gaze that does not 
filter out that which is deemed repulsive or frightening, but rather see in those things 
only “das Seiende […], das, mit allem anderen Seienden, gilt.”4 It involves “a perpetu-
al struggle not only to reconcile multiplicity with unity, but more fundamentally, to 
reconcile vision and object” (Bridgwater 31). In another letter, Rilke reflects on his 
earlier way of looking, which had informed the poems in his Stundenbuch (1899–
1903): “damals war mir die Natur noch ein allgemeiner Anlaß, eine Evokation, ein 
Instrument, in dessen Saiten sich meine Hände wiederfanden; ich saß noch nicht 
vor ihr.”5 Cézanne, by contrast, “hat [...] davorgesessen und einfach geschaut”—“wie 
ein Hund”. Learning to see like Cézanne means learning to see like a dog. 
Rilke’s search for a new way of seeing springs from a fundamental diffidence 
in the ability of language to describe reality. It is, in other words, a response to the 
Sprachkrise and, like so many of his contemporaries, Rilke turned to the animal for a 
way out of this crisis. In this chapter I will explore the role played by animals in Ril-
ke’s poetics, particularly in his middle and late period, i.e. from the period of Malte 
Laurids Brigge and the Neue Gedichte up to and including the Duineser Elegien, in 
                                                   
4 Letter to Clara Rilke, 19 October 1907 (Briefe, 195 [original italics]). Compare fragment no. 22 of 
Malte (“Ein Briefentwurf,” WA 11: 775), in which this phrase is repeated verbatim. 
5 Letter to Clara Rilke, 13 October 1907 (Briefe, 187; cf. Wilke “vor/nach Cézanne”). It may appear self-
contradictory that Rilke should strive to take up a position “before” or “in front of” nature when later, 
in the Duino Elegies especially, he will lament mankind’s fate of “gegenüber sein | und nichts als das 
und immer gegenüber,” which is to say always occupying a subject position and encountering the rest 
of the world as a series of discontinuous objects or “Gegenstände” rather than being fully in the world 
(like water in water, in other words). But, as we will see later in this chapter, the auto-extraction Rilke 
is describing here is in fact a preliminary step away from the kind of narcissistic anthropocentrism 
whereby all of nature serves as a hall of mirrors in which man encounters only himself, just as in 
Chandos’s pre-critical conception of nature as “eine große Einheit” in which all was “Gleichnis und 





which he first formulated the idea of “das Offene” as a rarefied sphere of fullness and 
immanence, which only non-human animals can see. The Open is the world as it 
“really” is, without the distorting lens of language; it is what lies on the other side of 
the “narrow abyss” between man and animal. In this, Rilke’s conception of the ani-
mal is similar to Hofmannsthal’s and Bataille’s, meaning that it is essentially Nie-
tzschean.6 The animal, because it lacks language and self-consciousness, is fully in 
the world (like water in water), in a way that is wholly inaccessible to humans. The 
animals in Rilke’s poetry—the panther, the black cat, the gazelle, the flamingos, 
etc.—represent absolute otherness, allowing them to be transformed into purely aes-
thetic Kunstdinge.7 
Dogs, by contrast, occupy a far more ambivalent place in Rilke’s poetics, be-
cause, unlike other animals, whose world is entirely closed to man, theirs is “eine 
verwandte Welt” (WA 11: 756). They invariably seek interaction with humans; they 
offer us their gaze, extending their “museau nostalgique” (WA 11: 1099) into the 
                                                   
6 Cf. Ulrich Baer: “Rilkes Auffassung vom Tier stammt zweifellos von Nietzsche” (190). This indebt-
edness to Nietzsche—summed up in Eric Heller’s pithy statement that “Rilke, however, is the poet of 
a world, the philosopher of which is Nietzsche” (137)—has led some scholars to view the poet’s ideas 
as essentially derivative. Baer cites the Swiss scholar Wolfram M. Fues as saying that Rilke’s insights 
into the human–animal relationship and the difference between subject and object are “im Grunde 
nicht neu.” “Selbstredend ist dieser Satz nur eine Finte,” comments Baer in a footnote: “Fues spielt 
dann die Dichtung gegen die Philosophie aus. Bei solchen Spielen gewinnt meist niemand” (190n4). 
7 Karl-Heinz Fingerhut notes that there is no essential difference between the way Rilke looks at an 
animal and how he encounters a work of art: “Der Dichter sieht in den Naturgegenständen schon 
während des ‘Werks des Gesichts’ die Stilisierung einer künstlerischen Intention, mit der er sich 
dann in seiner dichterischen Neugestaltung auseinandersetzt. Diese Tatsache beweist, wie wenig Ril-
ke ein ‘Dichter der Tiere’ ist, den das Tier als Naturwesen beschäftigt. Er betrachtet die ihm begeg-
nenden Kreaturen stets, als seien sie Kunstwerke, die im Material von Leben und Bewegung 






human “interpreted” world. In this way, they appear as messengers from beyond the 
“narrow abyss,” and hold the promise of bridging the gap. At the same time, this 
promise is tinged with melancholy, because while Rilke is desperately seeking a way 
out of the prison house of language, the dog seems to want to be let in. This creates a 
feeling of responsibility in Rilke, which he feels reluctant and ill equipped to live up 
to. The dog’s proximity to man is the result of a sort of “pact” between man and dog, 
whereby man’s sovereignty and mastery as the only animal that has language is 
confirmed by the dog’s silent subservience and admiration. In the wake of the 
Sprachkrise, Rilke no longer feels worthy of such admiration, but he is powerless to 
dissolve the “pact.” This ambivalent relationship is perfectly encapsulated in a short 
prose text entitled “Eine Begegnung,” which I will discuss text the end of this chap-
ter. 
II. Rilke’s Zoopoetics 
Rilke’s letters on Cézanne have long been regarded as a manifesto of Rilke’s poetics, 
specifically of his transition from his early to his middle period. It is striking, howev-
er, how few scholars seem to acknowledge the significance of animality, and of the 
figure of the dog in particular, to Rilke’s new mode of seeing and writing—that these 
letters are, in effect, a zoopoetic manifesto.8 At the end of the 13 October letter, which 
                                                   
8 A notable exception here is Filippo Fimiani’s somewhat exuberant and idiosyncratic article, “Portrait 
of the Artist as an Old Dog,” in which he reads Rilke’s letters on Cézanne as an affirmation “of the 
animality of painting as such” (116), placing them in relation to Franz Marc’s proclamation of the 
“Animalisierung der Kunst” a few years later. (Marc, too, was in Paris in 1907, though not, contrary to 
what Fimiani claims, at the same time as Rilke.) Marc’s desire for artistic renewal through the search 





features the first reference to Cézanne’s “sachliches Sagen,” Rilke points to ‘Die Ga-
zelle’ (one of the Neue Gedichte, written that summer) as an example of a poem exhib-
iting “instinktive Ansätze zu ähnlicher Sachlichkeit.” It is thus important to note that 
the project of Sehenlernen and the practice of “sachliches Sagen” is at every stage con-
ceived in terms of the animal: from the non-reflexive, objective dog-like gaze, to the 
gazelle, which at first is presented as utterly unassimilable to language (“wie kann 
der Einklang zweier | erwählter Worte je den Reim erreichen, | der in dir kommt und 
geht, wie auf ein Zeichen,” WA 2 506), but is then completely transformed into its 
poetic equivalent (“alles Deine geht schon im Vergleich | durch Liebeslieder”). 
This remainderless transformation of the object seen “like a dog” into an ar-
tistic object in its own right (“another dog”), is achieved by means of an artistic pro-
cess that is entirely physiological, and which takes place inside the dog. Painting, 
Rilke writes, is something that happens “unter den Farben,” and the less an artist is 
able to say about his intentions or the concepts behind the work, the better, since any 
interposition of reflexion or conscious will can only spoil the organic process. And 
this process, the interaction of the different colours on the canvas (and, by analogy, of 
the words on the page) is likened to the interaction of enzymes and saliva—the “Drü-
senwirkung”—in the mouth of a dog: 
                                                                                                                                                      
holistic, non-subjective poetic language, and indeed, Rilke appears to have been greatly impressed by 
his visit to the memorial exhibition of Marc’s work in Munich following the artist’s death at Verdun, 
writing enthusiastically to Marianne Mitford (later von Goldschmidt-Rothschild) on 28 September 
1916 that no-one could have foreseen how important it would be: “endlich wieder einmal ein Œuvre, 
eine im Werk erreichte und errungene Lebens-Einheit und welche seelige, unbedingte, reine” (qtd. in 






Alles ist [...] zu einer Angelegenheit der Farben untereinander geworden: 
eine nimmt sich gegen die andere zusammen, betont sich ihr gegenüber, 
besinnt sich auf sich selbst. Wie im Mund eines Hundes bei Annäherung 
verschiedener Dinge verschiedene Säfte sich bilden und bereit halten: zu-
stimmende, die nur umsetzen, und korrigierende, die unschädlich machen 
wollen: so entstehen im Innern jeder Farbe Steigerungen oder Verdünnun-
gen, mit deren Hilfe sie das Berührtwerden durch eine andere übersteht.9 
The dog’s palate becomes the artist’s palette, as it were: the salivary glands secrete 
various “juices” that break down and translate (“übersetzen”) the object so perfectly 
into its “malerischen Äquivalente” that there is no remainder. The object, placed on 
the artist’s scales along with the paint until a perfect equilibrium is found, emerges, 
transformed, to begin a new existence, “in einem Jenseits von Farbe […], ohne frühe-
re Erinnerungen.”10 The object emerges into this new state of perfect aesthetic equiv-
alence without any mnemonic remainder to tie it to its previous incarnation. At the 
same time, it is stripped of any use-value it might have carried in the everyday mate-
rial world. Thus, writes Rilke, the fruit in Cézanne’s paintings no longer carries any 
trace of edibility: “Bei Cézanne hört ihre Eßbarkeit überhaupt auf, so sehr dinghaft 
wirklich werden sie.”11 
                                                   
9 Letter to Clara Rilke, 22 October 1907 (Briefe, 204). 
10 Letter to Clara Rilke, 18 October 1907 (Briefe, 194). 
11 Letter to Clara Rilke, 8 October 1907 (Briefe, 176). We can see how this process is analogous to Ba-
taille’s principle of ‘poetry as sacrifice’ described in the previous chapter, whereby the sacrificial vic-
tim, or the poetic word, is removed from the world of utility, stripped of its thingness, which is to say 
of any meaning “foreign to [its] intimate nature,” and called back to the “intimacy of the divine world, 
of the profound immanence of all that is” (Religion, 44). Clearly, “thingness” means something quite 
different to Bataille than it does to Rilke—the exact opposite, in fact: for Rilke, becoming “dinghaft 
wirklich” entails precisely the elimination of that which Bataille considers “thingly,” namely its status 
as an object subordinate to a subject. Rilke’s “things” are effectively modelled on the Kantian Ding-an-






In her essay, “The Colors of Prose,” Anette Schwarz writes compellingly about 
the ingestive/digestive model of poetry laid out in Rilke’s letters on Cézanne, but 
blithely disregards the significance of the dog in the intermediate stage between 
“consumption” and “nonconsumption” (i.e. the inedibility of Cézanne’s fruit). “Sur-
prisingly,” she writes, “this stage occurs precisely in that organ of taste through 
which every saying, including that of sachliches Sagen, has to pass: the mouth, which 
in this case happens to be that of a dog.”12 Schwarz leaves entirely unproblematised the 
question of how (and more importantly why) this “sachliches Sagen” is supposed to 
pass through the mouth of a dog, a mute animal. 
And yet this very silence is itself connected to what Schwarz herself identifies 
as “one of the most important premises of Cézanne’s ideal of artistic perception, 
                                                   
12 Schwarz 196 (emphasis added). Schwarz reads Rilke’s “sachliches Sagen” in terms of Freudian and 
post-Freudian theories of melancholia. Strangely, however, she at no point comments on the 
significance of the dog as the traditional symbol of melancholy, most emblematically in Albrecht Dü-
rer’s Melencolia I—a link explored in greater detail by Alice A. Kuzniar in her book Melancholia’s Dog. 
Schwarz focuses especially on Julia Kristeva’s concept of the “melancholic wound,” which is 
defined as “one that does not close since it belongs to the constitution of the subject as a linguistic 
being.” “For Kristeva,” Schwarz explains, “the developmental stage for the occurrence of this wound is 
the preoedipal separation between mother and infant and the beginning of an autonomous speaking 
subject. The separation from the mother and the concomitant loss of immediate oral satisfaction 
wounds the ‘primitive self,’ leaving it ‘incomplete’ and ‘empty.’ This emptiness represents the wound 
that each speech act, attempting to substitute for the absence of the mother with words, seeks to fill 
and close. The melancholic emptiness opens first in the mouth that wants to close the wound with 
each and every word” (206). Although Schwarz does not mention this in her essay, Kristeva’s linguis-
tic theory of melancholia could be productively related to Rilke’s fixation on the “Schooß” as the lost 
interiority and wholeness of the Open, and of Weltinnenraum: birds and insects, because they were not 
“herangereift” inside the mother’s body, and have consequently never been separated from the mother 
by being born, continue to live ‘in’ the womb, as it were; the whole world is their “Schooß” and so they 
do not suffer the primordial separation that afflicts mammals and humans in particular (WA 11: 1074–
76; cf. Riedel 196–208). In general, it seems odd that Schwarz should entirely ignore the status of the 
animal and of “the Open” as the strived-for place, seen by animals and inhabited by angels, where pre-
cisely this “open wound” is closed—alternatively, one might instead view the very concept of “the 
Open,” tinged as it is with a melancholy, elegiac longing for a lost state of wholeness and presence, as 





namely ‘forgetting’” (Schwarz 197). Just as the aesthetic ‘thing’ emerges from this 
oral process “ohne frühere Erinnerungen,” for Cézanne it was imperative that the 
artist forget all preconceptions and prior knowledge of the world, in order to strip 
away all traces of subjectivity and self-consciousness and paint only what appeared 
before him: “Toute sa volonté doit être de silence. Il doit faire taire en lui toutes les 
voix des préjugés, oublier, oublier, faire silence, être un écho parfait” (Gasquet 109).13 
Thus “sachliches Sagen” is predicated upon a prior act of forgetting, a silencing of all 
prejudice and of all conscious, subjective will that might interfere with the artistic act. 
“Der Maler dürfte nicht zum Bewußtsein seiner Einsichten kommen (wie der Künst-
ler überhaupt)” writes Rilke on 21 October 1907: “ohne den Umweg durch seine 
Reflexion zu nehmen, müssen seine Fortschritte, ihm selber rätselhaft, so rasch in 
die Arbeit eintreten, daß er sie in dem Moment ihres Übertritts nicht zu erkennen 
vermag” (Briefe, 201). The artist’s insight must bypass reflection: even when he looks 
in the mirror, the artist-dog must not see himself. Only then can the artist begin to 
create something true and original. This eschewal of reflexivity and self-
consciousness makes it impossible to speak clearly and coherently about one’s own 
                                                   
13 Supposedly written in the winter 1912–13, six years after Cézanne’s death and many more after their 
friendship had ended, Gasquet’s “imaginary conversations,” as he called them, are notoriously prob-
lematic, mixing the authentic with the highly apocryphal and tendentious. Hence his book holds 
roughly the same status in Cézanne studies as Gustav Janouch’s Conversations with Kafka does in Kaf-
ka studies. Nevertheless, the importance of “forgetting” for Cézanne is sufficiently well established in 
other sources to be considered central to his ideal of artistic perception. See, for example, Vukićević 
23–24, and also Gerok-Reiter 504. 
Once the artist has become sufficiently forgetful and silent to be a perfect echo, “Alors, sur sa 
plaque sensible, tout le paysage s’inscrira,” indicating that Cézanne himself conceived of the process 
in quasi-photographic, rather than animalistic or even organic, terms. This machinic silence and radi-
cal impassivity are, in turn, the ideal state of being to which Pirandello’s cameraman Serafino Gubbio 






artistic goals and intentions. Thus, for instance, the fact that van Gogh’s letters are so 
easy to read, Rilke writes, the fact that there is so much in them, “spricht im Grunde 
gegen ihn, wie es ja auch gegen den Maler spricht [...], daß er das und das wollte, 
wußte, erfuhr” (201). Cézanne, by contrast, found it almost impossible to speak 
about his work: “Fast nichts konnte er sagen” (202).14 Rilke concludes the letter with 
the stark pronouncement that “Alles Gerede ist Mißverständnis”—as clear an ex-
pression of his own Sprachskepsis as he ever made.  
Into the Open 
Though perhaps less violently expressed than Hofmannsthal’s, Rilke’s crisis of lan-
guage likewise centred on the disjuncture between words and things, and particularly 
on the deadening effect words had on the world, stripping it of its wonder.15 In a fa-
mous early poem written in 1897 and published two years later in the collection Mir 
zur Feier, Rilke professed his fear of human language because it expresses everything 
so clearly: 
                                                   
14 Rilke does not appear to have regarded his own voluminous correspondence, in which he wrote a 
great deal about his artistic process and ideas, as a blot on his own artistic integrity, however. 
15 On the problem of language in Rilke’s poetry, see the articles by F. W. Wodtke and R. Sheppard. 
Both argue that Rilke never truly underwent a comparable crisis to Hofmannsthal’s, but in doing so 
they tend to conflate Hofmannsthal with the fictional Lord Chandos. This was of course a staple of 
Hofmannsthal scholarship until very recently, but it is highly doubtful that Hofmannsthal himself ever 
experienced first-hand the existential and linguistic crisis described in his famous letter. Sheppard’s 
article even bears the subtitle “Rilke’s Chandos Crisis,” whereas a more apt comparison would surely 
have been Malte and Chandos—and indeed, the Aufzeichnungen are very explicitly a document of a 
crisis of language and identity, and it is thus fully justifiable to read the novel as a response to the 
Sprachkrise as well. Moreover, there are substantial parallels between Rilke’s and Hofmannsthal’s po-
etics, as I indicate in this chapter, specifically with regard to the former’s notion of the Open and 
Chandos’s ‘good moments’, even (albeit in fundamentally different ways) in the way each tries to as-





Ich fürchte mich so vor der Menschen Wort 
Sie sprechen alles so deutlich aus: 
Und dieses heißt Hund und jenes heißt Haus, 
und hier ist Beginn und das Ende ist dort. (WA I: 194) 
In the final stanza of the same poem, seemingly in apostrophe to the words them-
selves, the young Rilke declares that he enjoys hearing things “sing” (“Die Dinge 
singen hör ich so gern”), but that people, in touching them with language, render the 
things stiff and mute, effectively killing them: “Ihr rührt sie an: sie sind starr und 
stumm | Ihr bring mir alle Dinge um.” These human words are thus implicitly op-
posed to the Romantic magic words, such as the Zauberwort in Joseph von Eichen-
dorff’s celebrated 1838 poem “Wünschelruthe,” which, if found, could awaken the 
song lying dormant in all things.16 It is debatable to what extent Eichendorff himself 
actually believed in the existence of such magic words, but certainly by the time 
Hofmannsthal and Rilke were writing their first, post-Romantic poems—
Hofmannsthal’s invocations of “Sprachmagie” and “grenzenloser Zauber” notwith-
standing—any hope of finding the magic formula to re-enchant the world had given 
way to a melancholy and ultimately hopeless yearning for an experience of reality that 
is not mediated by language and consciousness and therefore not characterised by 
fragmentation and differentiation, but rather whole, limitless, and immediate. 
Much like Hofmannsthal, Rilke participates in the “intense modernist long-
ing” to transcend “into a pure realm of writing that would leave all contingency be-
hind and overcome all splits and fissures of subjective perception and articulation” 
                                                   
16 “Schläft ein Lied in allen Dingen, | Die da träumen fort und fort, | Und die Welt hebt an zu singen, | 





(Huyssen “Notebooks,” 78–79). Like the language that Chandos imagines, in which 
“die stummen Dinge” speak to him and in which he may one day be called upon to 
defend himself “vor einem unbekannten Richter” (SW XXXI: 54), Rilke’s dream of a 
new, inviolate language of presence and truth—specifically as articulated in Malte 
Laurids Brigge’s prophecy of the “Zeit der anderen Auslegung” (WA 11: 756)—is es-
sentially messianic in nature, a fact which has led Andreas Huyssen to dismiss it as 
“aesthetic theology.” This new language of perfect equivalences—the language of 
presence and unity and fullness and truth—is represented in Rilke by the figure of 
the angel, and it is an angelic language to which Rilke aspires.17 But just as Chandos 
describes his experience of plenitude and presence as both more divine and more 
animal (göttlicher, tierischer) than ordinary experience, the transcendence inherent in 
Rilke’s angelology applies to the realm of the animal as well: specifically to what, in 
the eighth Duino Elegy, Rilke calls “the Open,” which is inhabited by the angels and 
which all animals except man gaze out upon: 
Mit allen Augen sieht die Kreatur 
das Offene. Nur unsre Augen sind 
wie umgekehrt und ganz um sie gestellt 
als Fallen, rings um ihren freien Ausgang. 
Was draußen ist, wir wissens aus des Tiers 
Antlitz allein; denn schon das frühe Kind 
wenden wir um und zwingens, daß es rückwärts 
Gestaltung sehe, nicht das Offne, das 
im Tiergesicht so tief ist. Frei von Tod. 
Ihn sehen wir allein; das freie Tier 
                                                   
17 “Diese, nicht mehr von Menschen aus, sondern im Engel geschaute Welt ist vielleicht meine wirkli-
che Aufgabe,” wrote Rilke to Ellen Delp on 27 October 1915, “aber, um die zu beginnen, Ellen, wie 
müßte einer beschützt und beschlossen sein!” (Briefe, 509–510, cf. Wodtke 73). I will return to the im-





hat seinen Untergang stets hinter sich 
und vor sich Gott, und wenn es geht, so gehts 
in Ewigkeit, so wie die Brunnen gehen. 
Wir haben nie, nicht einen einzigen Tag, 
den reinen Raum vor uns, in den die Blumen 
unendlich aufgehn. Immer ist es Welt 
und niemals Nirgends ohne Nicht: das Reine, 
Unüberwachte, das man atmet und 
unendlich weiß und nicht begehrt. Als Kind 
verliert sich eins im Stilln an dies und wird 
gerüttelt. Oder jener stirbt und ists. 
Denn nah am Tod sieht man den Tod nicht mehr 
und starrt hinaus, vielleicht mit großem Tierblick. (WA 2: 714) 
The animal sees the world as it is in its essence, without the intermediary of lan-
guage and consciousness: because their consciousness has not undergone the same 
“eigentümliche Wendung und Steigerung” that our human consciousness has, ani-
mals are fully in the world, “like water in water,” in other words: “das Tier ist in der 
Welt; wir stehen vor ihr.”18 The only way we can ‘see’ the Open is by the way it is 
reflected in the animal’s face, “des Tiers | Antlitz”—a somewhat unusual choice of 
word, as the archaic “Antlitz” is generally reserved for phrases such as “das Antlitz 
Gottes,” but a very deliberate one, since besides accentuating the intersection be-
tween animality and divinity, it also emphasises the oppositionality of the animal, 
since etymologically ant-litz refers to “das Entgegenblickende” (Kluge)—that which 
                                                   
18 Letter to Lev. P. Struve, 25 February 1926 (qtd. in Fülleborn/Engel I:326). Note the prepositionality 
of the human vis-à-vis the natural world (see fn 5 above). Interestingly, given the aqueous terms in 
which animal immanence tends to be conceived, Heidegger, in his explanation of the term “das Of-
fene” also resorts to an ‘oceanic’ metaphor: “Was dieses meint, sagt uns am ehesten die Redewendung 
vom ‘offenen Meer’. Dieses ist gewonnen, wenn alle Landgrenzen verschwunden sind. Das Offene ist 
das Fehlen und die Abwesenheit von Grenzen und Schranken, das Gegenstandslose, aber nicht als 
Mangel gedacht, sondern als das ursprüngliche Ganze des Wirklichen, in das die Kreatur unmittelbar 





looks back or returns the gaze. Thus, when we look at animals, they, because they are 
facing the other way, look at us, and in their faces we see, darkly (verdunkelt), the 
“Spiegelung des Frein.” But the experience of encountering, of being looked at by an 
animal, is in itself an intimation of the Open that is otherwise closed to us: “Oder 
daß ein Tier, | ein stummes, aufschaut, ruhig durch uns durch” (v. 32).19 The gaze of 
the animal sees right through us and it knows, as it says in the first Elegy, “daß wir 
nicht sehr verläßlich zu Haus sind | in der gedeuteten Welt” (WA 2: 685). 
By opening up the possibility of an alternative worldview, the animal’s silent, 
penetrating gaze is fundamentally disquieting to the human, in that it challenges the 
hegemony of anthropocentrism, and in doing so troubles the human’s sense of secu-
rity in his “interpreted” world, which is the world as seen through the matrix of the 
λόγος. We humans cannot see the Open because we are facing ‘the wrong way’, as it 
were, away from the Open space of infinite fullness and continuity, and toward “Ge-
staltung,” which is to say, the ordered and strictly demarcated outlines of a world we, 
as world-forming (“weltbildend”)20 humans, have created, by means of λόγος, which 
                                                   
19 As Klaus Laermann observes, Rilke was the first German-language poet to pay more than cursory 
attention to the animal gaze (125). Indeed, animals occupy a central position in Rilke’s poetics above 
all because they are radically Other—the animals in Rilke’s texts never serve simply as ciphers for 
specific human characteristics. And it is especially the gaze of the animal (e.g. the Panther, or the 
Black Cat, of the New Poems) that holds the promise of a different view of the world that is not frac-
tured and distorted by the tyranny of human language. In contrast to Hofmannsthal’s sacrificial zoo-
poetics, which seemingly do grant the poetic self access to the ‘immanent immensity’, Rilke’s hopes of 
glimpsing the Open are mostly dashed, rendering his a more essentially melancholic zoopoetics. 
20 The characterisation of the human as weltbildend is most familiar from Heidegger’s three theses 
concerning the relationship between various categories of entities to the world: “1. der Stein (das Ma-
terielle) ist weltlos; 2. das Tier ist weltarm; 3. der Mensch ist weltbildend” (HGA 29/30 263; cf. Agamben 
Open, 49–62; Derrida Of Spirit, 47–57), but Rilke also used the term, e.g. in a letter to Clara dated 20 
January 1907: “Wir stellen Bilder aus uns hinaus, wir nehmen jeden Anlaß wahr, weltbildend zu wer-





alienates us from our own death. Human existence is thus an inexorable being-
towards-death, but for that very reason a form of being that can never encompass or 
comprehend its own finitude. Animal existence, as Rilke conceives of it, faces away 
from death: animals’ deaths are always already ‘behind them’. The animal, as ever, is 
“on the side of death”—“nah am Tod”—which allows it to look past death and out 
into the Open. 
The primary faculty which sets the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον apart from the ζῷᾰ ἄ-
λόγοι is the ability to draw distinctions: “speech [λόγος] is designed to indicate the 
advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is 
the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has 
perception of good and bad and right and wrong” etc. (Aristotle 1253a). At the same 
time, this faculty allows man to differentiate himself from other animals and estab-
lish himself as an autonomous subject who can say “I,” but it is this act of differentia-
tion itself, and not some a priori distinction, which constitutes the difference it 
identifies (cf. Prade 90). For Rilke, this urge to divide the world up into discrete cate-
gories is the main reason why he fears human language and why all speech is ulti-
mately “Mißverständnis.” Words express everything too clearly; language is too eager 
to establish firm limits (“und hier ist Beginn und das Ende ist dort”), and we all 
make the mistake of drawing overly sharp distinctions—“aber Lebendige machen | 
                                                                                                                                                      
images in fact serves only to construct a barrier between us and the true essence of the world, whereas 
Heidegger conceives of Welt-Bildung as unambiguously positive and a hallmark of human exceptional-
ism. Heidegger performs an identical reappropriation and inversion of Rilke’s terminology when he 
takes “the Open” to be synonymous with “disclosure” (ἀλήθεια), and then posits that in fact it is man 
alone who can see the Open, whereas to animals, because they are “poor in world,” it must forever 





alle den Fehler, dass sie zu stark unterscheiden” (WA 2: 688). It is in this context 
that we must view Rilke’s decision not to indicate explicitly that his sixteenth Sonnet 
to Orpheus is addressed to a dog. It is a deliberate attempt to counteract the segrega-
tion and fragmentation inherent in the act of naming (“dieses heißt Hund”): “ich 
mochts nicht anmerken,” he writes to Clara, “eben um ihn vollkommen ins Ganze 
hereinzunehmen. Jeder Hinweis hätte ihn doch wieder isoliert und ausgesondert” 
(Briefe, 835). 
The excessive drawing of distinctions applies not only to those between hu-
man and animal, however, but also between life and death. It is an error, Rilke as-
serts, to divide the world and our existence in it into a “Diesseits” and a “Jenseits,” 
and hence to view death as the opposite of life. “Wie der Mond,” Rilke writes, em-
ploying a favourite analogy, “so hat gewiß das Leben eine uns dauernd abgewendete 
Seite, die nicht sein Gegenteil ist, sondern eine Ergänzung zur Vollkommenheit, zur 
Vollzähligkeit, zu der wirklichen heilen und vollen Sphäre und Kugel des Seins.”21 
The Open represents a state of being, or an experience of the world, in which life and 
death are not conceived as opposites, but rather as complementary halves of one 
great unity of being. The angels, Rilke says, make no such distinctions and often do 
not know “ob sie unter | Lebenden gehn oder Toten” (WA 2: 688). The fact that the 
figure of Orpheus becomes so central to Rilke’s later poetry is first and foremost due 
to the way his art allowed him to disregard the boundary between the living and the 
                                                   
21 Letter to Countess Margot Sizzo-Noris-Crouy, 6 January 1923 (Briefe, 806–7 [original italics]). Com-
pare Rilke’s letter to Hulewicz, in which he describes death as “die uns abgekehrte, von uns unbe-





dead and journey to the Underworld and back. Orphic poetry promises to undo the 
epistemic violence wrought by language upon the world, healing the fissures of hu-
man historico-linguistic consciousness, and reintegrating it into the “ungeheuere 
heile Kreis-Lauf des Lebens und Todes,” 22  in which “nichts ist gering und 
überflüssig” and “alles stimmt, gilt, nimmt teil und bildet eine Vollzähligkeit, in der 
nichts fehlt” (WA 11: 723, cf. Briefe, 184–85). 
“Vollzähligkeit”—a term practically untranslatable into English, except per-
haps through the unlovely neologism ‘pleninumerariness’—constitutes a poetic 
principle for Rilke, and it is linked to the fullness and immanence of the Open and of 
animal life. In a late poem (1924), written in French, Rilke speaks of the “calme des 
animaux” and wonders what it is that animals know that allows them to sleep so 
soundly and “jamais en vain”:  
Ils ignorent. . . . . Est-ce cela ? Ils ignorent 
cette science et demie dont nous savons un quart ;  
ils se remplissent de vie comme la calme amphore 
et leur interne loi comprend le hasard. 
(WA 4: 663–64). 
We humans know only one quarter of the “knowledge-and-a-half” that we sense is 
out there, leaving us perpetually dissatisfied and uneasy, whereas animals, because 
they are entirely ignorant of such knowledge, are filled to the brim with life. Their 
internal law is not a law of halves and quarters; it is full and complete, without lack, 
vollzählig. The only way for a human to approximate such Vollzähligkeit would be to 
forget such partial and incomplete knowledge and learn to see the world like an ani-
                                                   





mal does. “Vollzähliges Sehen” is the condition of possibility for the emergence of 
‘sachliches Sagen’.23 It is the type of seeing that simply registers, objectively and 
humbly, the outside world, without filtering anything out—e.g. death and other 
frightening or unsavoury elements—or adding anything, since both operations 
would destroy the holistic unity of the world and shatter it into disparate, irreconcila-
ble fragments, which is precisely the experience of the world that this new artistic 
vision is designed to overcome. It is, in other words, the type of dog-like seeing that 
Rilke identifies with Cézanne, the kind of pleninumerary seeing that, by means of a 
lengthy physiological process of mastication and digestion, can transform the world 
into its perfect aesthetic equivalent, into a world “in der | alles noch einmal da war” 
(WA 2: 544). 
III. Long Division 
“J’ai vu dans l’œil animal,” Rilke writes, “la vie paisible qui dure, | la calme impartial 
| de l’imperturbable nature.” The animal inhabits a “champ d’abondance,” grazing 
on “une présence | qui n’a pas goût d’ailleurs” (WA 4: 551)—an unmistakable parallel 
to the herd grazing peacefully in the opening passage of Nietzsche’s second Unzeit-
gemäße Betrachtung, “Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben” (1874): 
Betrachte die Heerde, die an dir vorüberweidet: sie weiss nicht was Ges-
tern, was Heute ist, springt umher, frisst, ruht, verdaut, springt wieder, und 
so vom Morgen bis zur Nacht und von Tage zu Tage, kurz angebunden mit 
ihrer Lust und Unlust, nämlich an den Pflock des Augenblickes und des-
halb weder schwermüthig noch überdrüssig. (KSA I: 248) 
                                                   
23 On the principle of “Vollzähligkeit” see especially Annette Gerok-Reiter, who refers to it as “eine 





Animal existence is one of blissful ignorance and insouciance, characterised by radi-
cal unity, presence and truthfulness. The animal has no conception of or relationship 
to the passage of time, and thus lives only in the moment without bothering about 
the past or the future. “So lebt das Thier unhistorisch” (KSA I: 249), as opposed to 
man, who is weighed down by the oppressive burden of history, a fate which has be-
fallen him on account of his inability to remember how to forget, having wilfully 
suppressed his natural animal forgetfulness in pursuit of his hypertrophied faculty of 
memory. Man is proud of his achievements, and likes to vaunt his human superiority 
over the lower animals, and yet he finds himself envying their carefree happiness. An 
imaginary dialogue unfolds, in which man asks the animal why it doesn’t speak to 
him about its happiness, but even as the animal is about to say that it remains silent 
because it always forgets what it was about to say: “da vergass es aber auch schon 
diese Antwort und schwieg.” Thus the animal’s silence becomes a factor of its forget-
fulness, and man is left wondering. 
The animal, however, doesn’t seem to wonder about anything: “es geht auf in 
der Gegenwart, wie eine Zahl, ohne dass ein wunderlicher Bruch übrig bleibt.” The 
“wunderlicher Bruch” which remains when the present is ‘divided by’ man (to keep 
with Nietzsche’s mathematical metaphor) is precisely that which constitutes his his-
toricity. If, as I suggested in the introduction, the human is traditionally defined ac-
cording to the formula “animal + x” then it is precisely this x which is left over when 
man is divided by the present. The animal, by contrast, represents an integer, evenly 
divisible by the moment—it is vollzählig, in other words. Man’s existence as “ein nie 





present tense. The animal sees each moment “wirklich sterben, in Nebel und Nacht 
zurücksinken und auf immer erlöschen,” but for man the moment comes back, 
ghost-like, to haunt him and ruin the tranquillity of future Augenblicke, no matter 
how far or fast he runs—“mag er noch so weit, noch so schnell laufen, die Kette läuft 
mit.” One is reminded of the terms of Faust’s pact with Mephistopheles, that he 
might be granted infinite knowledge, but that if he should ever stop and say to the 
fleeting moment, “Verweile doch! du bist so schön! | Dann magst du mich in Fesseln 
schlagen, | Dann will ich gern zugrunde gehn!” (vv. 1700–02). The chains of history 
are already around man’s ankles, holding him back and impeding his progress. What 
is more, Faust’s melancholy at the beginning of the play—having studied all the 
books in his extensive library, amassed all the knowledge in the world, and still none 
the wiser—is analogous to the state of inert historicity that Nietzsche is diagnosing 
here. In both cases, it is an encounter with an animal that will point to the way out of 
this impasse. 
For Nietzsche, animal forgetting represents a positive force, which, when 
coupled with a physiological, ‘digestive’ model of mental consumption, offers an an-
tidote to the ravages of mankind’s historical consciousness and the perennially guilty 
conscience that plagues such excessively memorious creatures as humans. By prac-
ticing a bit of judicious amnesia, by learning to forget inessential and obtrusive de-
tails, we too can enjoy the same sort of “gutes Gewissen” that Rilke saw in Cézanne. 
Forgetting, Nietzsche writes in the second treatise of his Genealogie der Moral (1887), 





ein aktives, im strengsten Sinne positives Hemmungsvermögen, dem es 
zuzuschreiben ist, dass was nur von uns erlebt, erfahren, in uns hineinge-
nommen wird, uns im Zustande der Verdauung (man dürfte ihn ‘Einver-
seelung’ nennen) ebenso wenig in’s Bewusstsein tritt, als der ganze 
tausendfältige Prozess, mit dem sich unsre leibliche Ernährung, die soge-
nannte ‘Einverleibung’ abspielt. (KSA V: 291) 
This healthy attitude of forgetting allows man to move on from a spot that’s been 
thoroughly denuded to another where the grass is still fresh, like the herd of animals 
grazing at the beginning of Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil, which “springt umher, frisst, 
ruht, verdaut, springt wieder.” The mental digestive process extracts the nutrients 
from the intellectual material and discards the rest. The unhealthy insistence on his-
torical awareness which causes man to code his existence as “ein ununterbrochenes 
Gewesensein” to the extent that he becomes “ein Ding, das davon lebt, sich selbst zu 
verneinen und zu verzehren, sich selbst zu widersprechen” (KSA I: 249) is linked to 
the constitution of man as the animal “das versprechen darf” (KSA V: 291). The opera-
tive word in both cases is ‘sprechen’: it is man’s reliance on language which propels 
him into a temporal-historical mode of being, where a natural degree of rumination 
(Wiederkäuen) becomes positively harmful and the creature begins to eat itself (sich 
selbst verzehren). The animal, by contrast, can neither contradict itself nor make 
promises because both actions presuppose a conception of future and past actions 
and utterances: “es weiss sich nicht zu verstellen, verbirgt nichts und erscheint in 
jedem Momente ganz und gar als das was es ist, kann also gar nicht anders sein als 
ehrlich” (KSA I: 249). The animal’s compulsive honesty is of a different order than 
man’s because it does not carry with it the possibility of deceit. Hidden within the 





Man’s status as an animal that is entitled to make promises is inherently par-
adoxical, Nietzsche suggests, because the acquisition of the faculty of memory pre-
supposed by the promise requires him to negate his natural animal forgetfulness. In 
placing this faculty of memory, and consequently the prerogative to make promises, 
within a genealogical framework, Nietzsche re-establishes a continuity between hu-
man and animal, where the human is merely another species of animal—“wir haben 
ihn unter die Thiere zurückgestellt” (KSA VI: 180)—and the evolution of human cul-
ture and society is simply a natural process. The human animal is an animal that has 
been bred (herangezüchtet) by nature in order to be allowed to make promises. This, 
Nietzsche suggests, is the paradoxical task that Nature has set itself with regard to the 
human, and is thus in fact the essential problem of the human as such: “das eigentli-
che Problem vom Menschen” (KSA V: 291). Culture is something that has developed 
and takes place within nature, not outside or in opposition to it. However strange and 
unnatural an animal the human may be, it is still an animal, albeit, as Nietzsche later 
phrased it: “das missrathenste Thier, das krankhafteste, das von seinen Instinkten 
am gefährlichste⟨n⟩ abgeirrte – freilich, mit alle dem, auch das interessanteste!” 
(KSA VI: 180). 
In order to give one’s word, with the added assurance that one will keep it, 
that one will be “as good as one’s word,” one must first have a word to give. Thus the 
definition of the human as “ein Thier, das versprechen darf” is predicated on the 
definition of the human as the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, as the animal that has “the word.” 





promise depends on the legitimacy of the word, a legitimacy which it in turn contin-
ually asserts for itself by means of the promise. To give one’s word is to avow that 
one will be “true” to it, an avowal which rests on the prior assurance that words can 
be either true or false. But as Nietzsche asserted in his treatise Ueber Wahrheit und 
Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne, telling the truth is really just a mode of lying “nach 
einer festen Convention” (KSA I: 881), because the truth itself is nothing but a collec-
tion of metaphors and anthropomorphisms that have been generally agreed upon. 
The promise, then, acts as an additional guarantee that a given utterance is “true” 
and will still be “true” tomorrow. The promise is something added to the word, guar-
anteeing its truth—in much the same way as the prefix ver- (“die vielleicht abgrün-
digste Vorsilbe der deutschen Sprache”24) is added to the speech act to transform it 
from a sprechen to a versprechen. Hence the promise is inherently excessive, and who-
                                                   
24 “‘Die ursprüngliche indogermanische Bedeutung der Partikel “fort, hinweg, ab”’ (Grimm) hat sich 
in der Entwicklung der deutschen Sprache nach zwei entgegengesetzten Richtungen mannigfach 
ausdifferenziert. Einerseits markiert ver ‘ein Hinweggehen, Hinwegschaffen vom bisherigen Wege’: 
verlaufen, verführen, verbiegen, verdrängen, verbannen. Auf dieser Linie hat sich auch die abstrakte 
Bedeutung von ver als Negation, als Verkehrung des einfachen Verbs ins Gegenteil entwickelt: versa-
gen, verbieten, verbitten. ‘In zweiter Linie hat ver die Bedeutung “fort, bis zum Ende”, bezeichnet also 
ein Vorwärtsschreiten, Vorwärtsbringen der im einfachen Zeitworte ausgesprochenen Tätigkeit auf 
dem eingeschlagenen Wege bis zur Vollendung’: verbrauchen, verbrennen, verbleiben, vertilgen. Statt 
der Negation liegt hier eine ‘Verstärkung’ und ‘Steigerung’ des Grundbegriffs vor. In einer Subklasse 
dieser Linie geht die Bedeutung des Zu-Ende-Führens noch über dieses Ende hinaus und kippt 
dadurch in ein ‘zu viel, zu sehr’ um: verschlafen, versalzen.” (Menninghaus Lob des Unsinns, 172). For 
Menninghaus, this etymological rumination leads to a consideration of the word “Verstehen,” whose 
combination of the prefix ver- and the root verb stehen is all but impossible to understand. The abyssal 
nature of ver- might equally well have been illustrated by means of the word “versprechen,” which, at 
least once its reflexive form is taken into consideration, unites the first and second senses of ver-: on 
the one hand the gesture toward the future and completion—the pro- in the promise, as something that 
has been put forward, into the future, to be “kept” at a later date—and on the other the divergence or 
perversion of the speech act implied by the reflexive “sich versprechen”—to misspeak, to say the 
wrong thing, something other than what you meant to say, but which, as in the classic “Freudian slip,” 





ever promises always promises too much, more than he can keep. One might say 
that there is always something ‘left over’—“ein wunderlicher Bruch,” in other words, 
which generates the sense of history by virtue of exceeding the present moment and 
projecting itself into the future, toward a time in which this promise will be remem-
bered. “Without this essential excess,” writes Derrida, 
[the promise] would return to a description or knowledge of the future. Its 
act would have a constative structure and not a performative one. But this 
“too much” of the promise does not belong to a (promised) content of a 
promise which I would be incapable of keeping. It is within the very struc-
ture of the act of promising that this excess comes to inscribe a kind of ir-
remediable disturbance or perversion. (Derrida Mémoires, 93–94) 
The promise is that which language adds to itself, in a constitutive, self-legitimising 
gesture, which, like any supplement, undermines the integrity of that to which it is 
added, because without the supplemental promise language could not “speak” at all. 
Which means “that the essence of speech is the promise, that there is no speaking 
that does not promise” (97). The promise, and specifically the permission or the li-
cence to make promises, is first and foremost something language promises itself, 
but this recursive supplement inflicts an error, an excess on the act of speaking, so 
that sprechen becomes not only versprechen, but quite literally sich versprechen—an act 
of misspeaking, an unintentional yet unavoidable corruption of the utterance. Or, in 
Paul de Man’s concise formulation: “Die Sprache verspricht (sich); to the extent that [it] 
is necessarily misleading, language just as necessarily conveys the promise of its own 
truth” (de Man 277). 
The structure of the promise, its function as guarantee of future consistency 





Nietzsche finds stifling. The human, in being bred to make promises, must be made 
“berechenbar, regelmässig, nothwendig” (KSA V: 292), must be anchored to a stable 
and self-identical “I” that will stand surety for the truth of its own word. If the crisis 
of language is linked to a consciousness of the irredeemable alterity of the “I” it is 
because the promise of truth and permanence that it is meant to guarantee has been 
revealed as untenable. Man, as the animal that has “the word” and can use it to say 
“I,” puts himself at stake in every linguistic utterance, because only by speaking, by 
giving the word that is his alone to keep, can he guarantee that he is who he says he 
is, and that what he says is true.25 But if “I” is another, if “I” is not who “I” says “I” is, 
then how can “I” act as a guarantor of the truth and validity of whatever “I” says? If 
all language is nothing but a collection of untruths, how can the would-be trustwor-
thy, predictable individual, whose word is his bond, differentiate himself from the 
“Lügner, der sein Wort bricht, im Augenblick schon, wo er es im Munde hat” (KSA 
V: 294)? Better to place the utterance in the mouth of an animal—a dog, say—that 
cannot break its word because it doesn’t have a word to break, “weiss sich nicht zu 
verstellen, verbirgt nichts und erscheint in jedem Momente ganz und gar als das was 
es ist.” Silence comes to betoken honesty; speech, deception and falseness. 
                                                   
25 Cf. Giorgio Agamben’s Sacrament of Language, in which he reads the oath as “call[ing] into question 
the very nature of man as a speaking animal and a political animal” (11). “The first promise,” he 
writes, “the first—and, so to speak, transcendental—sacratio is produced by means of this division, in 
which man, opposing his language to his actions, can put himself at stake in language, can promise 
himself to the logos. ¶ Something like a human language was in fact only able to be produced in the 
moment in which the living being, who found itself co-originarily exposed to the possibility of both 







Rilke doesn’t often mention promises, but when he does, they are almost invariably 
impossible to keep. “Hatte man nicht hundertmal versprechen müssen, nicht zu 
sterben?” (WA XI: 942), asks Malte Laurids Brigge at the end of his Aufzeichnungen, 
during his retelling of the parable of the prodigal son. In Malte’s reading, the parable 
is really about someone who refused to be loved, because being loved inevitably in-
volves making promises of that sort: infinite, unreasonable. Only a god can make 
such promises. Like the statues of the Roman gods in the fifth poem of Rilke’s cycle 
“Die Parke” (1907), 
die noch manchmal dann und wann 
 
Das gewähren, was sie einst gewährten 
[…] 
wenn sie ganz von ersten Schatten beben 
und Versprechen um Versprechen geben, 
alle unbegrenzt und unbestimmt. 
(WA 2: 606) 
At least one commentator has taken this last line to mean that these promises are not 
to be taken too seriously (Stewart 245), and that may indeed be true, given that these 
are “niemals ganzgeglaubte Götter,” but for Rilke all promises are constitutively un-
limited and indeterminate. 
What is it that these gods used to grant or bestow, and occasionally still do? 
Clearly it is these promises themselves that the gods “gewähren”—a word that shares 
a root with “Wahrheit,” and hence means to guarantee or vouchsafe the truth of 
something. By making these vague and limitless promises, then, the gods not only 





thus act as a guarantee of language’s ability to speak the truth at all, and hence of 
words’ capacity to refer to things in the world. The names of the gods testified to the 
coincidence of words and things, language and truth—but now these gods’ power 
has dwindled, their credibility is tarnished, and even their names are now regarded 
as nothing but “Elegante | Pseudonyme, unter denen man | sich verbarg” (WA 2: 
606). Like the truths denounced by Nietzsche as “eine Summe von menschlichen 
Relationen” that have been “poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, ge-
schmückt” (KSA I: 880), these gods are just anthropomorphic projections, disguises 
we humans used to hide behind, in order to imbue our words and actions with an 
aura of transcendental legitimacy. But now that we have been ‘unmasked’ and the 
real identity behind these elegant pseudonyms has been revealed, all bets are off, and 
any promises made in their name are null and void. 
Death marks the horizon of the promise for Rilke, and in order to be valid, a 
promise must extend beyond death. Every promise is essentially an act of defiance in 
the face of death. Thus, just as Alcestis, in Rilke’s version of the myth, is being led off 
to the underworld, she turns and smiles at her husband Admetus, in whose stead she 
has consented to die: 
Aber einmal sah 
er noch des Mädchens Antlitz, das sich wandte 
mit einem Lächeln, hell wie eine Hoffnung, 
die beinah ein Versprechen war: erwachsen 
zurückzukommen aus dem tiefen Tode 
zu ihm, dem Lebenden – 
 
Da schlug er jäh 
die Hände vors Gesicht, wie er so kniete, 





In order to keep the promise to the other, in order to be allowed to make promises at 
all, one would need to be able to transcend death. One would need to be Orpheus, in 
other words, who, unlike Admetus, was able to descend into the Underworld to re-
trieve his beloved Eurydice.26 But even Orpheus failed to lead Eurydice out of the 
world of the dead and back into the world of the living, because he was too impatient. 
As he walks along the path “der ins Leben aufstieg,” ahead of Eurydice and Hermes, 
his gaze runs ahead “wie ein Hund” and turns around, runs back to him and then 
ahead again to stand “wartend an der nächsten Wendung” (WA 2: 543). It is difficult 
to maintain the non-human, animal-like gaze away from death. Only the dead are 
completely “ohne Ungeduld” but this absolute patience, this total oblivion and inabil-
ity to draw distinctions—“Wer?” Eurydice asks, having no memory of Orpheus that 
would allow her to recognise him—also renders all communication impossible. Ril-
ke’s Orphic poetry is not so much the poetry of the Open, as inhabited by the angels, 
as it is the poetry of someone who has seen the Open, who has been to the other side, 
and has lived to tell the tale. 
The Greek word for promise is ἐπαγγελία (epangelía), from ἐπί, “on,” or 
“fitting” + ἀγγέλλειν, “to announce” (again it is something that is added to the speech 
act, guaranteeing its validity). To make a promise is to make a declaration that is 
fitting or apt, i.e. which is legitimate. And this legitimacy, as we have seen, can only 
come from God. Appropriately, then, the figure best suited to deliver such a legiti-
mate ἐπαγγελία is the messenger of God or the gods: ὁ ἄγγελος (ho ángelos), the an-
                                                   
26 In Euripides’ play Alcestis, Hercules descends to the Underworld and brings Admetus’ wife back 





gel. The angels in Rilke’s poetic universe, those terrifying figures at whom his songs 
and anguished cries are directed, are the ambassadors of a space in which promises 
are still fulfilled and where truth is still possible. But this is no longer the comforting, 
narcissistic truth of metaphysical anthropocentrism; it is the profoundly unsettling 
truth of radical “Diesseitigkeit,” of the total indifference and “Teilnahmslosigkeit” of 
the natural world. 
IV. The Other Side 
Rilke’s attitude toward nature in general was one of stark alienation. In his essay on 
the artistic community at Worpswede from 1902, he emphatically asserts that nature 
“weiß nichts von uns” and that one feels less helplessly alone with a dead body than 
one does with a living tree, for 
so geheimnisvoll der Tod sein mag, geheimnisvoller noch ist ein Leben, 
das nicht unser Leben ist, das nicht an uns teilnimmt und, gleichsam ohne 
uns zu sehen, seine Feste feiert, denen wir mit einer gewissen Verlegenheit, 
wie zufällig kommende Gäste, die eine andere Sprache sprechen, zusehen. 
(WA 9: 11) 
The same essay may provide a key to understanding Rilke’s statement in the first 
Duino Elegy that “Das Schöne ist nichts | als des Schrecklichen Anfang,” for in it he 
suggests that mankind built cities in order not to have to be confronted with nature 
and her “erhabene Gleichgültigkeit (welche wir Schönheit nennen)” and instead to 
comfort itself with the “scheinbaren Natur des Häusermeeres,” which “wie mit gro-
ßen Spiegeln” reflects mankind’s ingenuity back on itself. Thus the terror heralded 





Rilke writes that we humans only began to understand nature once we no 
longer understood it: “man begann die Natur erst zu begreifen, als man sie nicht-
mehr begriff; als man fühlte, daß sie das Andere war, das Teilnahmslose, das keine 
Sinne hat uns aufzunehmen, da war man erst aus ihr herausgetreten, einsam, aus 
einer einsamen Welt” (WA 10: 521). This is what Rilke means when he says that in 
his Stundenbuch phase he had not yet taken up a position in front of nature (“ich saß 
noch nicht vor ihr”): he was still too much in nature to understand how indifferent 
and alien it was. Once man had extracted himself from his view of nature, he began 
to paint “Bilder von Landschaften, in denen nichts geschieht. Leere Meere hat man 
gemalt, weiße Häuser in Regentagen, Wege, auf denen keiner geht, und unsäglich 
einsame Wasser.”27 And gradually, Rilke continues, as man began to understand this 
a-human language, he began to appreciate “die große Ruhe der Dinge,” (what Rilke 
will later call the “calme des animaux”); “man empfand, wie ihr Dasein in Gesetzen 
verging, ohne Erwartung und ohne Ungeduld” (522, emphasis added). And when 
man, having successfully extracted himself from the landscape, began tentatively to 
reintroduce human figures into that natural landscape, it was as one thing among 
                                                   
27 The fact that Rilke cannot resist this hypallage (“einsame Wasser”) goes to show that he had, at this 
point at least, not succeeded in expelling every trace of anthropomorphism and the “pathetic fallacy” 
from his impassive, impersonal view of the landscape and the natural world. Ultimately, of course, 
both of these these conceptions of nature are fundamentally human projections, corresponding to 
what Nietzsche ironically referred to as “die gute und die böse Natur”: “Erst haben die Menschen sich 
in die Natur hineingedichtet: sie sahen überall sich und Ihresgleichen, nämlich ihre böse und lau-
nenhafte Gesinnung, gleichsam versteckt unter Wolken, Gewittern, Raubthieren, Bäumen und Kräu-
tern: damals erfanden sie die ‘böse Natur’. Dann kam einmal eine Zeit, da sie sich wieder aus der 
Natur hinausdichteten, die Zeit Rousseau’s: man war einander so satt, dass man durchaus einen 
Weltwinkel haben wollte, wo der Mensch nicht hinkommt mit seiner Qual: man erfand die ‘gute Na-
tur’” (KSA III: 29–30). Crucially, both ideas of nature—the “bad” anthropomorphic version, and the 
“good” disanthropic version, uncontaminated by human presence—are nothing but constructs based 





many. Only by subtracting the human from the natural equation can the poet hope to 
catch a glimpse of the Open, in which there is a perfect equivalence between words 
and things. 
In a short prose text, entitled Erlebnis, written in 1913, Rilke describes a quasi-
mystical experience—not unlike one of Lord Chandos’s ‘good moments’—which 
supposedly took place a year previously on the grounds of Castle Duino on the Adri-
atic coast, and has thus generally been read in relation to the first two Duino Elegies, 
which were written at that time. The unnamed protagonist of Erlebnis has stopped to 
lean on a bifurcated tree, and suddenly feels “angenehm unterstützt,” “reichlich 
eingeruht,” and “völlig eingelassen in die Natur” (WA 11: 1037)—evidently this is an 
experience quite unlike the feeling of unsettling alienation Rilke had associated with 
the trees of Worpswede a decade earlier. He begins to sense barely perceptible vibra-
tions coming from deep inside the tree, which resonate inside his own body. He be-
gins to conceive of these vibrations as a message of some sort, but he is unable to 
decipher its meaning. Nevertheless, he quickly finds what he deems to be an apt de-
scription of this new state: “er sei auf die andere Seite der Natur geraten” (1038). Like 
the dark side of the moon, the “unbeschienene Seite des Lebens,” this other side of 
nature is characterised by radical presence, in which nothing is absent. Even the dead 
may still walk here, as there are no such distinctions any longer. In short, this 
“Erlebnis” is an experience of the Open. 
Eine Vinca, die in seiner Nähe stand und deren blauem Blick er wohl auch 
sonst zuweilen begegnet war, berührte ihn jetzt aus geistigerem Abstand, 
aber mit so unerschöpflicher Bedeutung, als ob nun nichts mehr zu ver-





entfernter und zugleich irgendwie wahrer gaben, es mochte dies an seinem 
Blick liegen, der nicht mehr vorwärts gerichtet war und sich dort, im Offe-
nen, verdünnte; er sah wie über die Schulter zu den Dingen zurück, und ih-
rem für ihn abgeschlossenen Dasein kam ein kühner süßer Beigeschmack 
hinzu, als wäre alles mit einer Spur von der Blüte des Abschieds würzig 
gemacht. (1039) 
In the second part of the text, he tries to think back to earlier moments in his life that 
in retrospect seem like they may have presaged this mystical experience. It seems to 
him that there might have been such moments stretching back to his earliest child-
hood, and indeed the whole experience has the character of a dream or a memory, 
specifically a memory of a time before his gaze, like that of all children, was turned 
around, away from the Open, and toward human “Gestaltung,” as described in the 
eighth Elegy. Thus, what he describes as an experience of looking “back” at things 
“over his shoulder” should be read in both spatial and temporal terms: it is a “looking 
back” to a pre-“Gestaltung” apperception of the world, at the same time, this attitude 
of retrospection temporarily undoes the original “Wendung” carried out on “das 
frühe Kind,” re-orienting his gaze and allowing it to dissolve into the Open, like an 
animal’s, as it once did. 
“Vogelruf” and “Weltinnenraum” 
When thinking back to precursors to this experience, the man remembers a moment 
in Capri when “ein Vogelruf draußen und in seinem Innern übereinstimmend da 
war, indem er sich gewissermaßen an der Grenze des Körpers nicht brach, beides zu 
einem ununterbrochenen Raum zusammennahm, in welchem, geheimnisvoll ge-





state of total coherence, of perfect equivalence between inside and outside, is what 
Rilke refers to as “Weltinnenraum,” and it is almost invariably heralded by a bird’s 
cry, or else by the experience of a bird flying silently “through” us—“Durch alle We-
sen reicht der eine Raum: | Weltinnenraum. Die Vögel fliegen still | durch uns hin-
durch” (WA 3: 93)—just as the sound of the bird’s cry does not “break” when it 
encounters the boundary of the man’s body. The state of perfect equivalence that ob-
tains in the Open renders all such boundaries ineffectual and meaningless. 
At the same time, the “Vogelruf” itself defies reduction to any unequivocal 
meaning. Nor is it a metaphor or a symbol in the traditional sense. As Ulrich Baer 
observes, “bei jedem ‘Vogelruf’ in Rilkes Werk geht es darum, daß ein Ereignis den 
normalen Lauf der Dinge stoppt und damit das Vorhandensein einer anderen und 
letztlich höheren Ebene bestätigt, auf der die Dinge eine weitere Bedeutung erlan-
gen.” It functions exclusively as an interruption, a break in the rhetorical logic of the 
text: “Der ‘Vogelruf’ markiert an jeder dieser Stellen also den Punkt, wo er nicht 
mehr einfach als Metapher dient, sondern die Störung und Unterbrechung solcher 
rhetorischer Konventionen und der vom Gedicht entworfenen Programme aufzeigt” 
(Baer 265–66). It is, in other words, what Akira Lippit refers to as an “animetaphor,” 
the intrusion of “an other expression” into language, an animal presence that both is 
and is not part of the discourse that surrounds it, at once a metaphor and an anti-
metaphor. Baer seems to confirm this when he writes, “Rilkes ‘Vogelruf’ steht für ein 
Ereignis, das nicht nur alles durchdringt, sondern in sich vollkommen ist. [...] Als 






The figure of the “Vogelruf” resounds throughout Rilke’s poetry, from the ear-
ly poem “Bangnis” (1900) to a very late fragment, written shortly before his death in 
1926, which begins: “Die Vogelrufe fangen an zu rühmen.” The birds’ cries break 
the silence surrounding the poet and his fellow humans, but the meaning of their 
cries is impossible to make out: “Was rufen sie? Ein wenig Eigensinn, || ein wenig 
Wehmut und sehr viel Versprechen, | das an der halbverschlossenen Zukunft feilt” 
(WA 3: 508). The Vogelruf is “eigensinnig,” in the sense that its meaning is entirely 
“eigen,” (self-contained, autological). Like the animal, which, for Nietzsche, conceals 
nothing and ‘is what it is,’ the Vogelruf is both the medium and the message; “es 
bleibt kein Rest.” And for that very reason it holds “sehr viel Versprechen”—the 
promise of another, non-human language, the angelic language of presence and full-
ness and truth. 
Blood Work 
The phrase “Die Vogelrufe fangen an zu rühmen,” unites three central poetic princi-
ples of Rilke’s late work: First, Rühmen, which forms the crux of Rilke’s Sonnets to 
Orpheus, a self-contained and autotelic song of praise, which, when proclaimed by the 
poet (who is “einer der bleibenden Boten”; an abiding messenger, an ἄγγελος), does 
not admit of the lie and is thus intrinsically true and valid. Second, the Vogelruf, 
which, as we saw, is likewise whole, unbroken, and self-contained; the sudden irrup-
tion of “an other expression” in the midst of the prevailing silence. In his “Improvisa-





human language for this monotonous all-purpose birdcall, which is so much more 
effective at opening the world than words are: 
und ich wollte, mir wüchse, wie einem Tier, 
eine Stimme, ein einziger Schrei 
für alles –. Denn was soll mir die Zahl 
der Worte, die kommen und fliehn, 
wenn ein Vogellaut, vieltausendmal, 
geschrien und wieder geschrien, 
ein winziges Herz so weit macht und eins 
mit dem Herzen der Luft, mit dem Herzen des Hains 
und so hell und so hörbar für Ihn… (WA 3: 13) 
The third poetic principle is the notion of beginning (anfangen). From the Paris expe-
rience onwards, Rilke’s poetic project is conceived in terms of starting again, with a 
clean slate (“ohne frühere Erinnerungen”), which is why he must re-learn how to see. 
“Habe ich es schon gesagt?” Malte asks (in fact he has already said, but since he is a 
beginner in all things, he cannot remember what has been said and what hasn’t): 
“Ich lerne sehen. Ja, ich fange an” (WA 11: 711); “Ich glaube ich müßte anfangen, et-
was zu arbeiten, jetzt da ich sehen lerne” (723); “Ich habe es augenblicklich etwas 
schwer, weil alles zu neu ist. Ich bin ein Anfänger in meinen eigenen Verhältnissen” 
(775). 
As early as 1898, Rilke had announced such a poetics of new beginnings, in 
§2 of his Notizen zur Melodie der Dinge: “Ich kann mir kein seligeres Wissen denken, 
| als dieses Eine: | daß man ein Beginner werden muß. | Einer der das erste Wort 
schreibt hinter einen | Jahrhundertelangen | Gedankenstrich” (WA 10: 412). And this 
first word, emerging at a rare hour, after a century of silence, will not be the product 





for the sake of a single verse, writes Malte in the fourteenth fragment of his Aufzei-
chungen, one has to have seen many cities, people, and things, “man muß die Tiere 
kennen, man muß fühlen, wie die Vögel fliegen, und die Gebärde wissen, mit wel-
cher die kleinen Blumen sich auftun am Morgen” (WA 11: 724). But it is not enough 
merely to have had such experiences, one also has to be able to forget them and wait 
patiently—“ohne Ungeduld”—until they return: 
Denn die Erinnerungen selbst sind es noch nicht. Erst wenn sie Blut werden 
in uns, Blick und Gebärde, namenlos und nicht mehr zu unterscheiden von 
uns selbst, erst dann kann es geschehen, daß in einer sehr seltenen Stunde 
das erste Wort eines Verses aufsteht in ihrer Mitte und aus ihnen ausgeht. 
(724–25) 
Blood is a key concept for Rilke’s poetics—which, like Hofmannsthal’s, is fundamen-
tally a form of ‘haematopoetics’, but, unlike the latter’s, is not grounded in a 
sacrificial impulse. Indeed, Rilke is not interested in ecstasy and excess and flowing 
over so much as in perfect equilibrium, harmony and plenitude. True poetry is not 
released through the violent spilling of blood, but rather in the quiet, patient internal-
isation of experience, which, by means of a lengthy physiological process, is com-
pletely assimilated into the poet’s body until it becomes an inseparable part of him. 
The invisible circulation of blood inside the poet’s body then becomes linked, via the 
principle of Weltinnenraum, to “das Blut des größesten Kreislaufs”28 which flows 
through the great unity of existence. 
Rilke’s name for this process is “heart-work,” a task to be undertaken once the 
“work of looking” has been done and the poet has captured enough images. The 
                                                   





transition from these two forms of work is depicted in Rilke’s poem “Wendung,” 
written in Paris in the summer of 1914, which begins: “Lange errang ers im An-
schaun.” But now mere looking is no longer sufficient, 
Denn des Anschauns, siehe, ist eine Grenze. 
Und die geschautere Welt 
will in der Liebe gedeihn. 
 
Werk des Gesichts ist getan, 
tue nun Herz-Werk 
an den Bildern in dir, jenen gefangenen (WA 3: 84). 
One of the triggers for this about-face is the experience of the natural world returning 
the gaze: 
Tiere traten getrost 
in den offenen Blick, weidende, 
und die gefangenen Löwen 
starrten hinein wie in unbegreifliche Freiheit; 
Vögel durchflogen ihn grad, 
den gemütigen; Blumen 
wiederschauten in ihn 
groß wie in Kinder” (WA 3: 82). 
We will notice that these are the same things—animals, birds, flowers—the 
knowledge of which had, for Malte, been indispensible for the production of poetry. 
The birds fly straight through him, establishing a link to the Weltinnenraum, while 
the flowers stare back at him, like the blue periwinkle of Erlebnis I. 
The caged lions recall the prose poem “Der Löwenkäfig” (WA 11: 1135–36), 
thematically linked to “Der Panther” and probably written around the same time (late 
1902 or early 1903) and subsequently revised in the summer of 1907 (Kayser). The 





floor of the cage, repeatedly tracing a figure of indescribable contempt “mit dem wei-
chen Pinsel seines Schwanzes,” she paces restlessly back and forth “am Rand der 
Wälle, wo nichts mehr ist,” dimly aware of a longing for home, the shattered 
memory of which lies “im Dunkel auf dem Grund ihres Blutes,” like the shards of a 
broken mirror at the bottom of the sea. 
In a third zoo text, “Die Aschanti,” from the Buch der Bilder (1906), also writ-
ten in 1902 or early 1903, the poet turns his gaze away from the African tribespeople 
on display at the Jardin d’Acclimatation, preferring the animals, “die in Gittern auf 
und niedergehn,” because unlike the Ashanti, who actively seek out and return the 
European spectators’ gaze, establishing a curious reciprocity with the vanity of the 
“hellen Menschen,” the animals in their cages are “so viel treuer”: They do not partic-
ipate in this spectacle and are “mit ihrem großen Blut allein” (WA 1: 395; cf. Baer 15–
25)—where alone should also be read in its etymological sense of all-one, i.e. singu-
lar, unitary, not contaminated or split through the acknowledged presence of anoth-
er. 
Let us pause here to recall John Berger’s assertion that “no animal confirms 
man, either positively or negatively” (Berger 5). Rilke too prefers his animals to be 
pure indecipherable markers of otherness, because they hold the promise of a world 
without difference and fragmentation. Rilke’s life and work is in many respects char-
acterised by the studied avoidance of the gaze of the other. This is the other side of 
not recognising yourself in the mirror; the radical othering of the self and the total 
abdication of subjectivity in fact functions as a line of defence against the demands of 





prodigal son at the end of Malte’s Aufzeichnungen, who refuses to be loved, because 
being loved means being projected into a state of dependency. “Geliebtwerden ist 
vergehen” (WA 11: 937): a state of perpetual dying, vanishing, perishing, and moreo-
ver one in which you are constantly forced to promise not to die. 
V. More Broken Promises 
The fact that Rilke prefers animals to humans rests primarily on their silence and on 
their “Teilnahmslosigkeit”—their sublime indifference to human concerns. One sees 
this above all in his attitude towards cats (both panthers and lions as well as domestic 
cats), which are so wholly other that Rilke wonders if they even exist: “J’avoue que, 
pour moi, leur existence ne fut jamais qu’une hypothèse passablement risquée” (WA 
11: 1099). In order for an animal to be part of our world, he writes in his preface to 
Balthusz’s Mitsou, “il faut qu’elles y entrent un peu” (1099). Cats don’t do this: “Les 
chats sont des chats, tout court, et leur monde est le monde des chats d’un bout à 
l’autre.” They have never been man’s contemporaries, and it is doubtful to Rilke that 
any cat has ever deigned to allow man’s “futile image” to register on their retina. 
They simply do not see us, anymore than we can see them—“aber da, an diesem 
schwarzen Felle | wird dein stärkstes Schauen aufgelöst” (WA 2: 595)—and if any-
thing they find our existence equally implausible as Rilke does theirs. In the end, he 
concludes, there are no cats: “Il n’y a pas de chats” (WA 11: 1103). 
With dogs it is a completely different story, however: their “rapprochement 
confidentiel et admiratif” is such that they appear at times to have abandoned their 





“même nos erreurs.” This, Rilke writes, is what makes them tragic and sublime. 
“Leur décision de nous admettre les force d’habiter, pour ainsi dire, aux confins de 
leur nature qu’ils dépassent constamment de leur regard humanisé et de leur mu-
seau nostalgique” (WA 11: 1099). Dogs are liminal animals, caught between the hu-
man and the canine world, “ni homme ni animal, métis touchant et pitoyable” (Betz 
178). They are the result of “une sorte de pacte entre l’homme et l’animal” (Betz 177), 
and Rilke is only too painfully aware of the obligations associated with that pact: “es 
[fällt] mir Hunden gegenüber ganz besonders schwer […], mich nicht aufzuopfern,” 
he writes from Duino to Ilse Sadée on 8 February, 1912: “sie gehen mir ganz und gar 
nah, diese auf uns völlig verlassenen Wesen, denen wir zu einer Seele heraufgehol-
fen haben, für die kein Himmel da ist” (Briefe, 331). Almost a decade later, in Decem-
ber of 1921, when Rilke was staying at Muzot, some friends offered to give him a dog 
to keep him company, but he refused, not wanting to commit to the kind of respon-
sibility such companionship would inevitably require of him. As he told Lou Andre-
as-Salomé, “alles Lebendige, das Anspruch macht, stößt in mir auf ein unendliches 
Ihm-recht-geben,29 aus dessen Consequenzen ich mich dann schmerzlich wieder 
                                                   
29 In the winter of 1910–11, following the publication of the Aufzeichnungen, Rilke underwent some-
thing of a personal crisis, during which time he travelled to North Africa. In a letter to Lou Andreas-
Salomé, he describes how, on this journey, he was bitten by a dog, for the first time in his life (in 
which, he notes, “das Verhalten der Hunde nicht ohne Bezug war”): “da gab ich ihm recht, er drückte 
nur auf seine Art aus, daß ich völlig im Unrecht sei, mit Allem” (16.2.1912; Briefwechsel, 269). For 
more on Rilke’s trip along the Nile and its relation to the zoo poems in the Neue Gedichte, see Lisa 
Gates’s “Rilke and Orientalism.” Gates’s approach is notable in that, contra the dominant symbolic or 
allegorical readings of these poems, she “insist[s] on viewing the animal depicted not merely as a 
Kunstding or symbol, but originally as a living animal” (72n28). Rilke’s zoo animals, she argues, are 
not representations of the animals themselves, but rather inescapably bound up in orientalist fanta-
sies, where the animals are doubly trapped behind the bars of their cages and the orientalist discourse 





zurückziehen muß, wenn ich gewahre, daß sie mich völlig aufbrauchen” (Briefwech-
sel, 438). Cats make no such Ansprüche, and nor do the lions and panthers at the zoo, 
whose gaze stops at the bars of their cages and who are all alone in their “großem 
Blute.” 
To Malte Laurids Brigge, dogs are essentially synonymous with his memories 
of a longed-for, inviolate past. Their “museau nostalgique” points forever back to a 
time before fragmentation and alienation. “Was für ein Leben ist das eigentlich: ohne 
Haus, ohne ererbte Dinge, ohne Hunde. Hätte man doch wenigstens seine Erinne-
rungen. Aber wer hat die?” (WA 11: 721); “Ich würde so gerne unter den Bedeutun-
gen bleiben, die mir lieb geworden sind, und wenn schon etwas sich verändern muß, 
so möchte ich doch wenigstens unter den Hunden leben dürfen, die eine verwandte 
Welt haben und dieselben Dinge” (756). Even in Paris, there are enclaves of peaceful 
human-canine co-existence, such as the antiquarian bookshops he passes now and 
then, whose proprietors sit all day and read, not worrying about money or success or 
the passage of time, with a dog sitting patiently by their side. “Ach, wenn das genüg-
te,” Malte writes: “ich wünschte manchmal, mir so ein volles Schaufenster zu kaufen 
und mich mit einem Hund dahinterzusetzen für zwanzig Jahre” (747; cf. Briefe 171–
72). This is a form of reciprocity that Rilke fantasises about, but from which he is ul-
timately forced to shy away because it would mean entering into a relationship of de-
pendency and trust which he feels incapable of living up to. 
                                                                                                                                                      
the dog biting Rilke’s hand symbolically, as “a sore reminder of the other’s anger in the face of [Ril-





In a diary entry from December of 1900, Rilke writes about an evening spent 
at Lou Andreas-Salomé’s in Berlin with the author Gerhart Hauptmann and the 
Worpswede artist Heinrich Vogeler, where the conversation had turned to animals 
and our responsibilities toward them. 
Man sprach vom Tode der Tiere, vom Kranksein irgend eines kleinen 
hilflosen Kaninchens oder Vögelchens, dem man nicht zu helfen weiß. Ich 
sagte, ich fände es immer ungerecht, ein Tier an sich zu gewöhnen, es 
gleichsam zu Verkehr und Freundschaft zu überreden. Es faßt allmählich 
Vertrauen, und sobald ihm nur irgend etwas Kleines fehlt, müssen wir die-
sem Vertrauen schon wehe tun, da wir nicht imstande sind, den Grund 
seines Leidens oder seiner Wünsche Sinn zu verstehen. Was können wir 
ihm geben? Wir können es an uns heranziehen, es mit unseren Gewohn-
heiten verwöhnen, d. h. spielen mit ihm. Was an ihm Ernstes geschieht, ist 
unserer Hilfe und Teilnahme entzogen, – wer hat noch je das Schicksal 
seines Lieblingstieres wirklich wie ein Freund und Bruder zu teilen gewußt? 
Wir laden eine Schuld auf uns, eine Menge uneingelöster Versprechen und 
ein fortwährendes Versagen: das ist unser Anteil an diesem Verkehr. Und 
beim Menschen: da tragen beide gleichmäßig an dieser Schuld, und das 
macht ihre Beziehungen vielleicht ernster und tiefer, als ein vollkommenes 
einander Erfassen es zu tun vermöchte.” (Tagebücher 343–42) 
Rilke would include these reflections in his short story Der Totengräber (1901), in 
which the titular gravedigger comforts a young girl, who is mourning the death of 
her pet rabbit: “Man soll kein Tier an sich gewöhnen, Gita, das ist wahr. Man lädt 
eine Schuld auf sich damit, man verspricht und man kann nicht halten” (SW 8: 
698). Similarly, in a scene based on the death of Lou Andreas-Salomé’s beloved dog 
Lotte in the summer of 1899, Malte recalls the traumatic death of his own dog, “der 
mich ein- für allemal beschuldigte.” In its final moments, the dog had looked at 





sich, daß er mich immer überschätzt hatte. Und es war keine Zeit mehr, ihn aufzu-
klären. Er sah mich befremdet und einsam an, bis es zu Ende war. (WA 11: 859–60) 
Despite the intolerable sadness of these relationships, the guilt and the broken 
promises they inevitably entail, dogs exert an irresistible pull on Rilke because by vir-
tue of protruding from their own world into ours, “nicht ausgestoßen und nicht ein-
gereiht,” they come closest to bridging the gap between our ‘gedeutete Welt’ and the 
Open. This is also why they can serve as models for artistic production: Cézanne’s 
gaze is “like a dog’s,” not “like a cat’s” or “like a panther’s” because those feline gazes 
are so wholly other that we could not hope to comprehend them. Their worlds are 
hermetically sealed to us, and there is no point of contact or overlap. Dogs, by con-
trast, come to us, offer us their “Gesicht,”30 inviting us to look through their eyes, if 
only so that they might see and comprehend the image of the world that we create 
with our gaze. This is the situation described in Rilke’s poem Der Hund (June/July 
1907) which begins: “Da oben wird das Bild von einer Welt | aus Blicken immerfort 
erneut und gilt.” The dog appears next to the man, quietly, secretly, pushing through 
this created image, “und wie im Zweifel seine Wirklichkeit | weggebend an das Bild, 
das er vergißt, || um dennoch immer wieder sein Gesicht | hineinzuhalten, fast mit 
einem Flehen, | beinah begreifend, nah am Einverstehen | und doch verzichtend: 
denn er wäre nicht” (WA 2: 641).31 The dog’s proffering of its face and its gaze (both 
                                                   
30 Compare Rilke’s remark from the Improvisationen aus dem Capreser Winter: “Kommen einem die 
Tiere nicht | manchmal, als bäten sie: nimm mein Gesicht?” (WA 3: 12). This cycle of poems was writ-
ten in Capri between December 1906 and February 1907, the same period during which he also wrote 
Eine Begegnung (see below). 
31 The temporal proximity and similarity of the imagery has led several critics to assume that Der Hund 





meanings implied in “Gesicht”) almost results in complete understanding and total 
integration of the dog into the human world, but the process nevertheless stops 
short, because if the dog were ever fully to comprehend the human world, it would 
cease to be a dog. 
Close Encounters 
And yet, there are moments when a complete understanding between man and dog 
is nevertheless possible, as long as such encounters are random and fleeting and not 
dependent upon structures of ownership and responsibility that render human–dog 
relations so difficult for Rilke. Thus, in a December 1912 letter to Princess Marie von 
Thurn und Taxis, Rilke describes a recent encounter in Cordoba with a “kleine häßli-
che Hündin,” heavily pregnant with a brood of “zufälliger Junge”: 
es war kein rühmliches Tier, [...] aber sie kam, da wir ganz allein waren, so 
schwer es ihr fiel, zu mir herüber und hob ihre von Sorge und Innerlichkeit 
vergrößerten Augen auf und begehrte meinen Blick, – und in dem ihren war 
wahrhaftig alles, was über den Einzelnen hinausgeht, ich weiß nicht wohin, 
in die Zukunft oder ins Unbegreifliche; es löste sich so, daß sie ein Stück 
Zucker von meinem Kaffee abbekam, aber nebenbei, o so nebenbei, wir la-
sen gewissermaßen die Messe zusammen, die Handlung war an sich 
nichts als Geben und Annehmen, aber der Sinn und der Ernst und unsere 
ganze Verständigung war grenzenlos. (Briefe, 383) 
                                                                                                                                                      
das Selbstbildnis des Paul Cézanne, das die Polarität seines Daseins darstellt”), even though the poem 
is written before the retrospective exhibition opened. Patrick Bridgwater suggests that it is in fact 
“probably based on Goya’s famous ‘The Dog’” (31)—presumably because of the way the dog enters the 
image “ganz unten,” but there is no further evidence to support this claim. The poem and the letter 
use “the dog image in so similar a way that it has been misinterpreted as representing Cézanne,” 
Bridgwater continues, “whereas in reality it stands, like the panther, for Rilke himself.” This reading 
conforms to the dominant interpretation of Rilke’s animal poems, which almost invariably reads them 
as reflections on the life of the poet, thus immediately negating any significance figure of the specific 





This impromptu, quasi-religious communion is taken by Rilke to indicate that his 
“nouvelle opération,” as he calls his new poetic project, should not be dependent on 
any human intervention, and that his true calling is in fact “gleichsam am Menschli-
chen vorbei, ans Äußerste zu kommen” (383). What is more, such an encounter is 
only possible “auf Erden”: this decidedly inglorious, lowly animal is the very antithe-
sis of the sort of sublime and beautiful creatures that might traditionally have been 
deemed worthy of poetry and art. But then the adulation of such noble creatures—
lions and eagles and swans—no doubt reflected a warped and disproportionate idea 
of the significance and worth of the human in the grand scheme of things. In this 
sense, this ugly Spanish bitch is far closer to the poisoned rats in Chandos’s milk cel-
lar, with the notable distinction that she does not have to be sacrificed in order to in-
augurate an experience of mystical harmony and oneness. 
This experience in Cordoba echoes a short text of Rilke’s entitled Eine Be-
gegnung, written in Capri in January 1907. On a deserted road outside of town, a trav-
eller encounters a stray dog, which casts “merkwürdig sichere Blicke nach dem 
Fremden,” none of which “geht verloren.” The setting is explicitly allegorical: the text 
specifies that this road is “ein beliebiger Weg,” the ‘only prerequisite’ being that it is 
deserted. The man, then, is Everyman, and the dog is “Everydog”—and not, as 
should be clear by now, “Everyanimal,” since, in Rilke, true encounters between man 
and other species of animal are practically impossible. 
The dog appears suddenly, “wie ein Einfall,” and begins to bark at the stranger 





Der Hund in freudiger Erwartung: 
Es steht noch bevor. 
Er schluchzt vor Gefühlsüberfülle. Endlich stürzt er sich, das Ge-
sicht hinaufhaltend, nochmals vor den rascher ausschreitenden Mann: 
Jetzt kommt es, denkt er, und hält sein Gesicht hin, inständig als Erken-
nungszeichen. 
Jetzt kommt es. 
Was? Sagt der Fremde, einen Augenblick zögernd. 
Die Spannung in den Augen des Hundes geht in Verlegenheit über, 
in Zweifel, in Bestürzung. Ja wenn der Mann gar nicht weiß, was kommen 
soll, wie soll es dann kommen? — Beide müssen es wissen; nur dann 
kommt es. (WA 11: 981–82) 
The dog proffers its face in joyful expectancy, but the stranger doesn’t know what it is 
expecting, or how to meet this expectation. Following this disappointment, the dog’s 
and the man’s eyes no longer meet. The dog doesn’t understand why the man isn’t 
fulfilling his part of the bargain. Such a small thing (Kleinigkeit) is all it would take, 
but the man insists, “Es ist keine Kleinigkeit.” At this the dog is taken aback: com-
munication has actually taken place between them, but only in order to announce the 
impossibility of a real exchange between the two. 
Der Hund erschrickt: Wie (er faßt sich mühsam), wenn ich doch fühle, daß 
wir … Mein Inneres … meine … 
Sprich es nicht aus, unterbricht ihn der Fremde fast zornig. Sie ste-
hen einander gegenüber. Diesmal gehen ihre Blicke ineinander, die des 
Mannes in die des Hundes, wie Messer in ihre Scheiden gehen. (982)  
The two gazes meet finally, sharply, like two knives being sheathed, betokening the 
potential for violent conflict instead of amicable communication. The dog, which at 
first had been behaving “absichtlich hündisch,” now backs down, and assumes a 
subservient role. “Ich möchte etwas für dich tun. Alles möchte ich für dich tun. Al-





insouciance, but still keeping an eye on the dog, which in turn playfully runs about 
until it finally, “ohne ein Wort,” picks up a stone in its mouth which it had been play-
ing with as though it were alive. 
Nun bin ich unschädlich und kann nichts mehr sagen; das liegt in dem Ni-
cken, mit dem er sich zurückwendet. Es ist etwas beinah Vertrauliches in 
diesem Nicken, eine Art Vereinbarung, die aber, bei Gott, nicht zu ernst 
genommen werden soll. So obenhin und scherzhaft ist die ganze Sache, 
und so wird auch das Tragen des Steines aufgefaßt. (983) 
Now that the dog has picked up a stone and is playfully, as it were, performing its si-
lence for the man, the latter feels compelled to speak. He tells the dog that it’s no 
use, and that he had been inclined to ask the dog who it was. “Du hättest Ich gesagt, 
denn Namen sind ja nicht zwischen uns,” but it would only have confused things 
further. Certain memories are not allowed to resurface, and it is in man’s nature to 
suppress them. These memories, presumably, are of a quasi-mythical, Edenic time in 
the past when man and animal lived together in harmony and understanding. 
“Da der Fremde so sprach, hatte der Hund eingesehen, daß es nichts half, die 
Verstellung oberflächlichen Spielens fortzusetzen” (984). Instead, it takes up a hos-
tile posture vis-à-vis the man, but the man recognises from the dog’s body language 
that this is just pretence, and reassures the dog that they don’t need to pronounce the 
word that caused the misunderstanding: “Du hast Recht, Lieber, es soll unausge-
sprochen bleiben zwischen uns, das Wort, das zu so viel Mißverständnissen Anlaß 
gab” (984). It is open to interpretation exactly what word is meant. It might be “I,” as 





Rilke, all speech is “Mißverständnis,” and so perhaps the word in question is in fact 
“the Word”: λόγος. 
At this, the dog carefully puts the stone back down, and instead follows him 
“unauffällig, anhänglich, ohne eigene Meinung, wie ein Hund seinem Herrn nach-
geht. Das schmerzt ihn fast” (984). 
Nein, sagt er, nein; nicht so. Nicht nach dieser Erfahrung. Wir würden bei-
de vergessen, was wir heute erlebt haben. Das Tägliche stumpft ab, und 
deine Natur hat die Neigung sich unter meine zu ordnen. Dabei wächst 
schließlich eine Verantwortung an, die dein ganzes Vertrauen sich auf mich 
stellt; du würdest mich überschätzen und von mir erwarten, was ich nicht 
leisten kann. Du würdest mich beobachten und gut-heißen, auch was nicht 
gut ist. Wenn ich dir eine Freude bereiten will: find ich denn auch eine? 
Und wenn du eines Tages traurig bist und klagst – werde ich dir helfen 
können? – Und du sollst nicht meinen, daß ich es bin, der dich sterben 
läßt. Nein, nein, nein. Geh, ich bitte dich: geh. 
Und der Mann begann beinah zu laufen, und es sah aus, als ob er 
vor etwas flüchtete. Erst allmählich mäßigte sich sein Schritt und schließ-
lich ging er langsamer als vorher. 
Er dachte langsam: Was wohl sonst heute gesprochen worden wäre 
zwischen uns. Und wie man sich zum Schluß die Hand gereicht hätte –. 
Eine unbeschreibliche Sehnsucht regt sich in ihm. Er bleibt stehen 
und wendet sich rückwärts. Aber das Stück Weg biegt gleich hinter ihm in 
die Dämmerung hinein, die inzwischen eingebrochen ist, und es ist nie-
mand zu sehen. (984–85) 
By the end of the story, the man has been abandoned by the dog, and is facing back-
wards (rückwärts), which is precisely the attitude which, in the eighth Duino Elegy, 
children are forced to take up: “denn schon das frühe Kind | wenden wir um und 
zwingens, daß es rückwärts | Gestaltung sehe, nicht das Offene, das | im Tiergesicht 
so tief ist” (WA 2: 714). The animal too is forced to give up the pretence of silence 





counter with the man. If he had indeed asked it “who are you”32 it could have re-
sponded using the first person pronoun, the marker of subjecthood. But the animal 
cannot respond, not properly at least, not within the anthropocentric tradition where 
animals merely ‘react’ to external stimuli and cannot be said to ‘respond’ in the true 
sense of the word, which would require human consciousness, language, and all the 
rest of it. Indeed, as the man’s final thoughts on the encounter suggest, had the ani-
mal responded, it would have ceased to be an animal: “Und wie man sich zum 
Schluß die Hand gereicht hätte”—the narrative otherwise contains multiple refer-
ences to the dog’s paws (Pfoten); only humans have and shake hands.33 
Here, too, we find a reflection on both human and animal forgetting. Having 
reached an understanding, the dog takes up its proper place, following behind man, 
abdicating its subjectivity, the man is worried that they will both forget the experience 
of near-communication, and instead lapse into the old hierarchical structure, where-
by the man is the master and the dog is the dog. Rather than being equals, the dog 
will now expect something of its master; as the only one capable of responding with 
                                                   
32 Such a question is inherently childish, and hence indicative of a time before the original perversion 
of the human gaze away from the Open. Cf. Rilke’s Requiem auf den Tod eines Knaben (1915), in which 
the child asks: “…Du Mutter, wer war eigentlich | der Hund?” (WA 3: 107). 
33 In Kafka’s Bericht für eine Akademie, the ape, Rotpeter, reflects on the significance of the handshake 
in marking the transition from animal to human existence: “Das erste, was ich lernte, war: den Hand-
schlag geben; Handschlag bezeugt Offenheit; mag nun heute, wo ich auf dem Höhepunkt meiner 
Laufbahn stehe, zu jenem ersten Handschlag auch das offene Wort hinzukommen” (KKAD 300). The 
entry into human society is performed by the handshake, which, we are told ‘engenders openness’, 
even as this entry into the domain of logos—into the prison-house of language—in fact marks a clos-
ing off of Rotpeter’s access to the freedom that characterised his prelinguistic existence as an ape. The 
entire opening of the text is structured according to the dichotomies of ‘open’ and ‘closed,’ but both of 





words, he is now responsible for the dog, a responsibility (Verantwortung) that the 
man feels both reluctant and ill-equipped to accept. 
“An animal does not give its word,” Derrida insists (Animal, 129). The animal 
cannot give its word because it doesn’t have a word to give—or at the very least it has, 
as in Rilke, to remain “unausgprochen.” Thus the ‘pact’ (Vereinbarung) between dog 
and master is inherently asymmetrical, yet there is a strong sense that man’s word 
doesn’t amount to much either, grounded as it is in innumerable metaphors and 
broken promises. The animal allowed to make promises cannot promise the other 
animals anything; the truth-value of man’s word is incommensurable with the hon-
esty of the animals’ silence. In the past, this asymmetry might have been taken as 
proof of man’s superiority, but for Rilke it comes instead to betoken his inadequacy 
and deficiency. We should both forget what we have experienced today, the man tells 
the dog, but what pains him most is that while the animal appears to have no trouble 
forgetting, it continues to haunt him. Most importantly, then, the animal now serves 
as a constant reminder to man of the agreement which he has entered into with it; 
the terms of which dictate that the animal shall be denied the word and moreover 
that it consistently forget that it ever wanted to speak in the first place. It is an 
agreement that was made long ago, asymmetrically, which is to say unilaterally, and 
which man now feels was unjust. But it is above all he who is bound by this agree-
ment, and however much he might like to, he cannot simply back out of it. And now 
he finds himself alone on a deserted stretch of road built by people he does not know, 





Cunde la tarde en mi alma y reflexiono 
Que el tigre vocativo de mi verso 
Es un tigre de símbolos y sombras, 
Una serie de tropos literarios 
Y de memorias de la enciclopedia 
Y no el tigre fatal, la aciaga joya 
Que, bajo el sol o la diversa luna, 
Va cumpliendo en Sumatra o en Bengala 
Su rutina de amor, de ocio y de muerte. 
—Jorge Luis Borges, “El otro tigre”1 
Chapter 3 
Fearful Symmetries 
Pirandello’s Tiger and the Resistance to Metaphor 
I. Of Other Tigers 
Tigers, it seems, are difficult to frame. Since well before Blake, the tiger has been re-
garded as the most beautiful and most ferocious of animals: a powerful symbol of 
sublime, unbridled Nature.2 Naturally, then, man has sought to contain this beast, be 
it in the steady rhythm of trochaic tetrameter, or in the cages and enclosures of the 
zoo and the circus. Here the beauty and magnificence of nature is displayed—
framed, as it were, by the power and ingenuity of man. The spectacle of the zoo is a 
performance of man’s dominion over the animals, even as it caters to the fantasy of 
being able to escape, however briefly, from the confines of modern urban existence 
                                                   
1 “Evening spreads in my spirit and I keep thinking | that the tiger I am calling up in my poem | is a 
tiger made of symbols and of shadows, | a series of literary tropes, | scraps remembered from encyclo-
paedias, | and not the deadly tiger, the fateful jewel | that in the sun or the deceptive moonlight | fol-
lows its paths, in Bengal or Sumatra, | of love, of indolence, of dying” (Borges 116–17, transl. 
modified). 
2 See for example Parsons. For a cultural history of the tiger, see Osterhammel, and Green who focus-




and gain access to ‘wild’ nature. The zoo experience thus relies on the spectator’s 
ability to participate in this escapist illusion whilst remaining completely safe. If, as 
John Berger claims, “each cage is a frame round the animal inside it,” (Berger 23) it 
is because that frame transforms it into an aesthetic object that can be studied at a 
safe distance. At once the index and the guarantor of human sovereignty, this frame 
marks the physical boundary between the human and the animal. At the same time, 
it also points to the constant re-assertion of the symbolic boundary between nature 
and culture, and hence to the production of nature within culture. 
This function becomes all the more prominent when the physical boundary is 
rendered invisible, as was the case with Carl Hagenbeck’s revolutionary new design 
for his Tierpark, which opened at Stellingen near Hamburg in 1907.3 The so-called 
“Hagenbeck Revolution” was in part the result of an attempt to address visitor dissat-
isfaction with the cages separating them from the animals. Hagenbeck had devised a 
system of discreet moats around the enclosures, wide enough to prevent the animals 
from escaping, whilst providing visitors with an uninterrupted line of sight. The qua-
si-authentic stagings in Hagenbeck’s enclosures thus offered visitors supposedly 
unmediated access to the animals, all within the cultural dominion of man. Dis-
guised in this way, without any metal bars to act as a constant visual reminder of the 
separation, the frame begins to appear almost natural and unobtrusive rather than 
violent and artificial. Moreover, although the individual cages separating the specta-
tors from the animals on display are rendered invisible in the Hagenbeck model, the 
                                                   




very existence of the zoo as an enclosed space for animals within the context of the 
modern city points to the stark and constantly reinforced demarcation of nature vis-à-
vis culture. Animals have a clearly defined space which they are permitted to occupy 
in modern society, the boundaries of which they must under no circumstances be 
allowed to transgress.4 
The difficulty of framing a tiger is arguably the subject of Luigi Pirandello’s 
1915 novel Si gira… (later republished as Quaderni di Serafino Gubbio operatore in 
1925).5 The novel consists of seven notebooks written in the first person by Serafino 
Gubbio, a cameraman working for the fictional Kosmograph film studio in Rome, 
who is involved in filming a large-scale exotic adventure film, entitled La donna e la 
tigre. For this production, Kosmograph have procured a tiger from the Zoological Gar-
den in Rome (designed by Carl Hagenbeck).6 The tiger, we learn, had tried repeated-
                                                   
4 Christina Wessely succinctly illustrates this point in her book Künstliche Tiere, by means of a map of 
the Vienna underground (9–10). 
5 The novel has a relatively complex genesis and publication history. It was first published in instal-
ments in the Nuova Antologia 1915 under the title Si gira…, and appeared in a single volume the follow-
ing year with the same title. In 1925 it was republished with minor stylistic revisions and the longer 
title by which it is known today. Pirandello had initially sought to have it published in La Repubblica’s 
literary supplement in 1913, at which point it was entitled La tigre, but it was rejected in large part be-
cause the editors found the narrator’s long, philosophical monologues too boring and distracting from 
the main business of the central plot. For a thorough account of the novel’s publication history, see 
Càllari 18–24. 
6 The moated enclosures of the Tierpark were not the only facet of the radically new possibilities in the 
exhibition of live animals ushered in by the Hagenbeck Revolution. The growing film industry was 
also keen to offer its audiences an escape from their everyday urban environment and zoos like Ha-
genbeck’s were only too happy to furnish the major studios with wild animals for the adventure and 
safari films, which were hugely popular at the time. These films offered moviegoers an excellent 
means of experiencing wild nature and the thrill of the hunt all from the comfort of the cinema. Due 
to the prodigious costs and logistical problems involved, however, the ‘jungles’ and ‘savannahs’ of the-
se films were for the most part artificially reconstructed on sets in Europe and North America. Thus 
legendary American producer and filmmaker William N. Selig’s notorious fake safari film, Hunting 




ly to jump across the moat separating her from the unsuspecting visitors, until the 
zoo decided the animal was a liability, and sold her to the studio. Now her ferocity is 
to be exploited for the purposes of this colonial melodrama: she is to be shot ‘live’ on 
camera by the romantic leading man, Aldo Nuti, during the climactic scene. Gubbio, 
who will be the one in charge of filming the scene, is disgusted by the fate of this 
beautiful creature: “In the midst of a universal sham,” he writes, “her death alone 
will be genuine.”7 
The eternal tension between reality and artifice is one of the dominant preoc-
cupations in all of Pirandello’s work, but nowhere is it as strongly linked to the ques-
tion of the animal as in Si gira. And yet this aspect of the text remains critically 
                                                                                                                                                      
filmmaker and founder of Nordisk Film, had purchased a pair of lions from Hagenbeck for use in his 
1907 film Løvejagten (The Lion Hunt), directed by Viggo Larsen who also starred alongside Olsen as 
one of the two hunters. The film combined footage from the Copenhagen Zoo with scenes filmed on 
the small island of Elleore just north of Roskilde. Despite the fact that the ‘jungle’ was entirely fake, as 
Eric Ames observes, Olsen’s safari film nevertheless “made a strong and, on some level, undeniable 
claim to authenticity, that is, all of the animals that Olsen acquired from Hagenbeck were literally shot 
and killed before the camera. Unlike the living habitat, which needed the bodies on display to thrive, 
photography and film allowed for the continued visibility of animals in spite of—and in this case pre-
cisely because of—their death” (Ames 200). 
The same is true of Selig’s film. As Cynthia Chris explains, “Selig renovated his studio to re-
semble an African jungle, purchased an elderly zoo lion, and hired an actor who easily doubled for 
‘T.R.’ and some black Chicago actors to pose as African porters. While the on-screen Roosevelt fired 
blanks, someone off-screen shot and killed the lion” (11). The film was conceived as a direct competitor 
to Cherry Kearton’s Roosevelt in Africa, a documentary of one of the president’s many hunting expedi-
tions. Kearton’s film was shot entirely on location and at great expense but flopped at the box-office 
and with critics, who complained that the film lacked any kind of drama or narrative force. Selig’s 
film, by comparison, was a runaway success, and helped pave the way for a slew of wildlife adventures 
and gaudy Hollywood romances set in exotic, far-flung locations, much like the Kosmograph feature 
which stands at the centre of Pirandello’s novel. 
7 Pirandello Shoot!, 60. Scott-Moncrieff’s translation, published in 1926, remains the only version of 
the novel in English, and, unlike his translation of Proust, it has not been ‘updated,’ despite the 
significant number of errors and omissions. In 2005 it was reissued by the University of Chicago 
Press with a new introduction by Tom Gunning. All quotations refer to this edition, although I have 
frequently emended the translation. Page numbers for the Italian refer to volume two of the critical 




underexamined,8 not least, I would argue, because of the dominant role Walter Ben-
jamin’s discussion of the novel in his essay “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner tech-
nischen Reproduzierbarkeit” has assumed in shaping the critical reception of the 
text. Benjamin cites Pirandello as one of the first authors to have recognised the al-
ienating effects of the cinematic apparatus and the concomitant disappearance of the 
aura (“Kunstwerk,” 489), but his reading is exclusively focused on the relationship of 
man to technology, which, to be sure, occupies a prominent place in the novel, but, 
as this chapter will demonstrate, the man–machine binary must be seen in relation 
to the binary man–animal (or man–nature) with which Pirandello consistently juxta-
poses it. It is this ternary structure (animal–man–machine) and the constant oscilla-
tion and cross-pollination of its constituent parts which produces the central tension 
of the novel and makes it not only an important document of its time, reflecting 
many of the aesthetic and existential concerns of European modernism but also, par-
ticularly at a formal level, emblematic of the ‘new’ literary animal whose symbolic 
value is no longer stable and easily determined. 
But why should tigers in particular be difficult to frame? On a practical level, 
of course, tigers are not any harder to ‘frame’ than any other wild animal. More ab-
                                                   
8 Even what little criticism there is concerning the figure of the animal in Pirandello’s works has sur-
prisingly little to say about the Kosmograph tiger. Robert Perroud’s short article on Pirandello’s “besti-
ary” offers a clear and concise account of the ways in which Pirandello employs animals in his texts as 
a foil to human insecurities and pretensions. He singles out Si gira as one of two texts in which ani-
mals play a central role, as opposed to texts in which they perform only an epithetic or figurative func-
tion, but the majority of his essay is devoted to the other, “Il signore della nave” (1916). Franco 
Zangrilli’s Il bestiario di Pirandello is encyclopaedic in scope and is useful as a compendium of all the 
animal imagery employed by Pirandello throughout his literary career, but his approach is purely 
thematic and self-avowedly concerned primarily with illustrating how Pirandello made use of “la 




stractly, however, as soon as the frame has been established and the distinction be-
tween nature and culture been drawn, there are ‘always already’ two distinct tigers: 
one natural and one cultural. In his poem “El otro tigre,” Jorge Luis Borges faces the 
problem that the tiger he has captured in verse is not the one he was looking for. The 
greater the symbolic and cultural significance of the animal, the harder it becomes to 
grasp fully through language, and thus Borges’s tiger becomes nothing more than “a 
series of literary tropes.” In the final stanza, Borges makes a further attempt at locat-
ing “the other tiger, the one not in this poem,” even though he knows that this one 
too will be “un sistema de palabras | Humanas y no el tigre vertebrado | Que, más 
allá de las mitologías, | Pisa la tierra.”9 Yet something, Borges writes, compels him to 
pursue this vague, foolish, and ancient adventure (“esta aventura indefinida, | Insen-
sata y antigua”). The very concept of the frame, of boundedness and finitude, intro-
duces the possibility of surplus, superfluity, overabundance, and, conversely, lack. 
Borges’s other tiger is forever beyond the reach of his poem because the process of 
framing it transforms it into a metaphor, a placeholder which exists only by virtue of 
pointing beyond itself, to something that it is not, in this case the ‘real’ tiger, but also 
the chimerical assemblage of associations and inferences adherent to it. 
In Si gira, the question of the identity (and location) of the real tiger comes to 
occupy a central position in the framework of the narrative. The Kosmograph tiger 
forms the conceptual and dramatic centre of a novel preoccupied with the juxtaposi-
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tion of the constructed, social world with the genuine, unmediated natural world.10 
On the one hand, as the embodiment of pure and artless Nature, of the irreducibly, 
inaccessibly Real, the tiger serves as a foil to the artificial “sham” of human existence. 
But on the other hand, it also has the potential to trouble or even undermine the 
strict separation of reality and artifice: against the fake-jungle backdrop in the final 
scene, the tiger’s literal death will violently interrupt the fictional logic of the film. 
Jonathan Burt has argued that “the animal image is a form of rupture in the field of 
representation.” 
Although the animal on screen can be burdened with multiple metaphori-
cal significances, giving it an ambiguous status that derives from what 
might be described as a kind of semantic overload, the animal is also 
marked as a site where these symbolic associations collapse into each oth-
er. (Animals in Film, 11) 
Burt is referring specifically to the presence of ‘real’ animals on screen, not on the 
page, and his argument is thus dependent on the peculiar ontology of the cinematic 
image as it relates to animals in film, and thus to questions of performance and iden-
tity as well as to representation. Because animals are perceived as lacking the neces-
sary subjectivity and interiority to be said to ‘act’ in any conventional sense of the 
word, the status of the animal within a staged performance, particularly in the medi-
um of film where montage and other framing techniques allow for a greater degree 
of authorial control, is always inherently double: the identity of the animal as part of a 
fictional or constructed diegesis versus the viewer’s underlying awareness of the an-
imal as an extra-diegetic presence which has been ‘made’ to participate in the ar-
                                                   
10 Thus Franca Angelini avers that the tiger “rappresenta in certo senso la chiave di lettura” (21) of the 




tifice.11 In a sense, this doubleness is analogous to that of Borges’s tiger, except that 
whilst in his poem the ‘real’ tiger is perennially absent, in the cinematic image it is 
forever and troublingly present. And so, even though literary animals cannot be said 
to be ‘real’ in the same sense as animals on stage and screen, they nevertheless cause 
(or can cause) a certain kind ‘rupture’ in the field of representation qua constructed, 
framed space. In both instances, moreover, this rupture pertains ultimately to the 
relationship between animals and metaphor, and, perhaps, their position within hu-
man language as such. 
The animal, excluded from the domain of language, is ‘carried over’ into hu-
man discourse in the form of a metaphor; in an oblique reference to our own animal 
origins, human language relies on animality to describe that which is not animal, 
namely ourselves. This is just one of the ways in which animals become ‘available’ to 
humans by means of λόγος. This is also why, as Akira Lippit asserts, “animals resist 
metaphorization” (“Death of an Animal,” 13): the animality of the metaphor is fun-
damentally at odds with the animality of the animal. That is to say, animals can be 
made to signify via a transferential economy of epithets and attributes, but the mean-
ing that emerges through this transaction is always ultimately irreconcilable with the 
animal itself. In short, there is always at some level an irresoluble tension between 
what the animal is and what the animal means. The ontological status of the tiger is 
never called into question as explicitly in Pirandello’s novel as in Borges’s poem, but 
                                                   
11 On the issue of animals and performance see the special issue of The Drama Review edited by Una 
Chaudhuri, particularly the essays by Chaudhuri and Michael Peterson. On the status of animals as 




by means of its mise en abyme conceit of the film within the novel, Si gira neverthe-
less succeeds in mobilising both of the aforementioned ‘ruptures’ (i.e. the intrusive 
presence and the elusive absence of the ‘real’ tiger) at a formal and narrative level. 
II. Frames within Frames 
The destabilising or rupturing effect of the tiger in Pirandello’s novel reaches its full-
est iteration in the climactic scene, when Aldo Nuti, playing the hunter, is supposed 
to shoot the tiger while Gubbio turns the handle of his camera. What actually hap-
pens is that Nuti turns and shoots the leading lady, Varia Nestoroff, who is standing 
outside the cage, and is then himself promptly torn to pieces by the ferocious tiger. 
Finally, someone from outside thrusts his arm inside the cage and shoots the tiger at 
point-blank range and Gubbio is pulled from the cage, still compulsively turning the 
handle of his camera, to safety. 
How did this happen? Leading up to this moment is an extremely convoluted 
web of intrigue, betrayal, and death. Nuti’s apparently erratic act appears to be a care-
fully premeditated murder/suicide, perpetrated in order to avenge the death of his 
friend Giorgio Mirelli, who had committed suicide after breaking off his engagement 
to Varia Nestoroff, with whom Nuti had fallen madly in love. Nuti thus blames him-
self and her for his friend’s death and concocts a plan to set things right. The entire 
novel may be said to revolve around this love triangle, but its plot is significantly 
more complicated, brimming with extraneous details, digressions, and petty 
conflicts. In the interests of space, I will refrain from providing a more detailed out-




opposition of reality and artifice with which the novel operates: in other words, the 
plot of the film, which Gubbio never tires of deriding as vulgar and melodramatic, is 
nothing compared to the hopelessly convoluted structure of ‘real life’, which, after all, 
is also a construct.12 
The novel’s plot is thus inherently excessive, full of superfluous details. This 
unmanageable superabundance of plot led Giacomo Debenedetti to characterize Si 
gira as a “romanzo da fare”—literally, a novel to be made, or a novel in the making—
by which he means not a new literary genre but rather precisely the end of an estab-
lished one, namely the nineteenth century realist novel, which here practically im-
plodes under the weight of its disparate and internecine narrative strands: 
sin dal 1915, dal momento della sua stesura, il romanzo si era presentato 
come un “romanzo da fare”, con l’implicita aggravante che tutto si sarebbe 
distrutto, avrebbe perso valore e senso, se un dissennato autore si fosse 
arrischiato a congegnarne gli spunti, la storia multiforme e polivalente di 
un romanzo fatto. (257)13 
The term “romanzo da fare” is an explicit reference to the subtitle of Pirandello’s 
most famous play, Sei personaggi in cerca d’autore: commedia da fare (1921),14 and in-
                                                   
12 Guido Baldi, for example, remarks on the fundamental paradox that “il romanzo è una continua, 
accanita requisitoria contro la ‘stupidità’ (il sostantivo, con il suo aggettivo, vi ricorre un numero im-
pressionante di volte) delle finzioni cinematografiche; eppure la trama centrale, tutta la vicenda che 
coinvolge la Nestoroff, il Mirelli, il Nuti, Luisetta Cavalena, con il relativo scioglimento sanguinoso, 
sembra proprio uno di quei soggetti da film anni Dieci, di un dannunzianesimo di seconda mano, con 
al centro la sua brava femme fatale, la donna-tigre distruttrice di uomini, in opposizione alla fanciulla 
innocente e salvifica” (Baldi 123). 
13 At a later point in his analysis, Debenedetti describes the novel as consisting of “tante storie che in-
sorgono, e tutte cercano di predominare, di accamparsi in un punto focale, che ne farebbe la storia 
centrale, mentre poi tutte, facendo rispettare la loro singola prepotenza, collaborano a quello che si 
potrebbe chiamare il loro intreccio” (280). 
14 In fact, the first recorded mention of the idea for the play is in a letter from Pirandello to his son 




deed there is more than a casual relation between the novel and Pirandello’s theatre. 
Si gira marks a transitional moment in Pirandello’s passage from prose to drama, 
and more specifically away from the nineteenth-century realism which characterises 
many of his earlier prose works toward a more fully-fledged modernist aesthetic. The 
almost universal assurance among critics that the theatre constituted the true telos of 
Pirandello’s literary career has meant that, until relatively recently, his novels and 
short stories were regarded as merely propaedeutic to that grander project and rarely 
if ever considered in their own right.15 Thus, Arcangelo Leone di Castris, one of the 
first scholars to take the novel seriously on its own terms, writes that “Si gira vale so-
prattutto come documento di poetica”: 
come testimonianza singolarmente esplicita, in un contesto pur ricco di ri-
sonanza propriamente artistica, di quell’evento naturale ma pure travaglia-
to che è il passaggio di Pirandello all’esperienza teatrale. (132)16 
This characterisation of the novel as a document of Pirandello’s poetics dovetails 
neatly with Debenedetti’s reading. Firstly, as Leone de Castris notes, the setting in a 
film studio involves a manifest theatricality and attention to different levels of per-
                                                                                                                                                      
case it is likely that he simply meant that it was a novel he had yet to write (Klettke 92). 
15 In large part, the exclusive dominance of the theatre in Pirandello scholarship has its roots in Adri-
ano Tilgher’s enormously influential essay “Il teatro di Luigi Pirandello” published in 1923, which 
posited the Bergsonian opposition between Life and Form as the central dialectic at the heart of all of 
Pirandello’s works. The essay not only set the tone for Pirandello studies but also exerted a powerful 
influence over Pirandello himself. Furthermore, as Franco Zangrilli notes, Tilgher’s lasting influence 
on Pirandello criticism was not only theoretical but also methodological, namely through his practice 
of regarding the novels and short stories as nothing more than raw material for the dramas 
(“Pirandello novelliere,” 288). For an account of the personal and professional relationship between 
Pirandello and Tilgher see Giudice (chapter six); Illiano; and Caputi 106–8. 
16 Giorgio Bàrberi Squarotti similarly describes the novel as “una dichiarazione di poetica” (86), argu-
ing, with Debenedetti, that the machine-like, anti-subjective impassivity Gubbio aspires to is at heart a 
critique of the realist ideal of objective observation which Pirandello is definitively moving away from 




formance and representation which Pirandello would explore more explicitly in his 
theatrical works, most obviously in his so-called “teatro nel teatro” trilogy (Sei perso-
naggi in cerca d’autore, 1921, Ciascuno a suo modo, 1924, and Questa sera si recita a sog-
getto, 1928–9), in particular the second of the three, which redeploys the Nuti–
Nestoroff–Mirelli love-triangle, but introduces an additional layer of representation: 
The play is about an actress named Delia Morello, whose fiancé, the artist Giorgio 
Salvi, committed suicide on the eve of their marriage after he discovered that she had 
had an affair with his brother-in-law Michele Rocca. While these characters perform 
on stage, in the audience sit Baron Nuti and his former lover, Amelia Moreno, who 
have each come separately to see the play in order to verify their suspicion that it is 
really about the scandal surrounding them in ‘real life’. 
A central concern in these meta-theatrical works is the troubling of the tradi-
tional boundaries between characters and actors, actors and audience, as well as in-
tra- and extra-diegetic space more generally—in short, the plays explore the limits 
and possibilities of framing. Evidently, the possibility of involving the audience and 
thwarting its expectations regarding theatrical conventions afforded Pirandello more 
room in which to explore these particular problems of representation than prose—or, 
for that matter, cinema—would have, because of the necessary separation between 
the text—or the film actor—and the reader/audience: a separation which the actors 
in the novel lament and which forms the crux of Benjamin’s argument regarding the 
disappearance of the aura in the age of mechanical reproducibility. Seen in this con-
text, Si gira does indeed appear to pave the way for Pirandello’s theatrical conversion, 




cept insofar as I am necessarily making a case for the novel’s importance in its own 
right, independent of whatever artistic trajectory its author may have followed subse-
quently. The question, rather, is how the meditation on the nature and instability of 
the frame which the novel stages is influenced and informed by the central position 
occupied by the tiger. 
The Lady and the Tiger 
There are several distinct levels at which the novel engages, challenges, and under-
mines established frames. Firstly, there are the explicit reflections on the actors’ dis-
comfort vis-à-vis the image they see of themselves on the screen, where, stripped of 
their aura, they hardly recognise themselves. This dichotomy is further complicated 
by the discrepancy between individuals’ self-perception and the identities they are 
forced to inhabit in their everyday lives—a favourite topos of Pirandello’s and a salient 
feature of his novels from Il fu Mattia Pascal (1902) to Uno, nessuno e centomila 
(1926), not to mention innumerable other prose and dramatic works, perhaps most 
prominently the play Così è (se vi pare) (1917). Thus, late in the novel, we discover that 
Varia Nestoroff is not in fact quite the ‘man-eater’ she is reputed to be, but is really 
more of a femme fatale malgré elle, as it were, unable to escape from the identity which 
others have constructed for her.17 This realisation highlights another facet of the nov-
                                                   
17 The name “Varia” may itself be taken as an indication of the instability and plurality of her various 
identities, a reading ironically offset by the curious recurring error on the part of several Pirandello 
scholars who give the actress’s name as “Vera” Nestoroff—in fact, however, there is no “true” Nestor-
off in the novel. See, for example, Debenedetti 263; Vettori 98 & passim; and Ganeri, who claims in 
her otherwise excellent analysis of the novel that “Vera” is Varia’s stage name (170, 195) but there is no 




el, namely its deliberate use of cliché and narrative commonplaces as a means of cri-
tiquing those very conventions. As numerous critics have observed, the character of 
Varia Nestoroff appears to be a more or less overt nod to the dangerous and alluring 
heroines that populate the novels of Gabriele D’Annunzio (cf. Angelini 25; Baldi 147; 
i.a.). That is to say, Nestoroff has good reason to feel that her identity is an artificial 
construct imposed on her from outside: she is the unwitting star of a lurid melodra-
ma, the conventions of which require that she play the part of the exotic and sexually 
voracious femme fatale.18 
“She has something in her, this woman, which the others do not succeed in 
understanding,” writes Gubbio of the Russian actress, “because even she herself does 
not clearly understand it. One guesses it, however, from the violent expressions 
which she assumes, involuntarily, unconsciously, in the parts that are assigned to 
her” (39). The peculiar and uncontrollable violence of her expressions, Gubbio ob-
serves, is the result of the fact that Nestoroff, more so than any of the other actors 
with the company, takes her roles seriously, no matter how grotesque or contradicto-
                                                   
18 Nestoroff’s identity is even more meta-textually overdetermined, insofar as the pervasive semantic 
association between her and the tiger, as well as the suicide of her former lover Giorgio Mirelli, also 
recall the Russian countess Nata from the 1875 novel Tigre reale by Pirandello’s fellow Sicilian, the Ital-
ian verista Giovanni Verga. The novel’s title refers to the countess Nata, whose felinity is one of her 
most prominent characteristics, invoked the moment she is introduced in the text: “si diceva avesse 
spinto al suicidio il solo uomo che avesse mai amato, e amato alla follia, un amore da leonessa — si 
chiamava Nata, nome dolce come due note di musica” (13). Verga himself later adapted the novel for 
the screen, and the film, directed by Giovanni Pastrone, was released in 1916, starring Pina Menichelli 
as the countess. The film was conceived as the second part of Pastrone’s “dittico dannunziano,” the 
first being Il Fuoco, based on Gabriele D’Annunzio’s eponymous novel and also starring Menichelli in 
her first major role. As if to solidify these inter-textual references, when Pirandello approached Italian 
film pioneer Anton Giulio Bragaglia with the aim of producing a film version of Si gira, he suggested 
Menichelli for the role of la Nestoroff. The film, however, was never made. See Càllari 88; Nichols and 




ry. “She alone ruins more films than all the other actors in the four companies put 
together,” he continues: 
For one thing, she always moves out of the picture [esce dal campo]; when 
by any chance she does not move out, her action is so disordered [scom-
posta], her face so strangely altered and disguised, that in the rehearsal 
theatre almost all the scenes in which she has taken part turn out useless 
and have to be done again. (39) 
These “demoniacal pictures [immagini da ossessa]” appear uncanny to everyone, not 
least to Nestoroff herself, who is terrified by her own image on the screen: “She sees 
there someone who is herself but whom she does not know” (40). Nestoroff’s turbu-
lent past, Gubbio surmises, has in fact been a series of desperate attempts on her 
part to catch up with this other self which “lives and suffers, so to speak, outside her-
self [di là da se stessa]” (41).19 Nestoroff’s awareness of an implacable ossessa who is at 
once inside and outside herself corresponds to Gubbio’s affirmation at the very be-
ginning of his notebooks that “there is a something more in everything [c’è un oltre (lit. 
‘beyond’) in tutto]” (4), and which, moreover, he alone is in a position to perceive, 
thanks to his detachment and impassivity. Most people, he writes, either cannot or 
will not look beyond the surface, beyond the “mechanical framework [congegno … 
meccanico]” of life. His disdain for the superficiality and stupidity of modern life is 
focused especially on the medium of cinema, which, as he never tires of asserting, 
embodies all the dehumanising and stupefying traits of technological, capitalist mo-
dernity.20 
                                                   
19 I have taken the liberty of reinstating the original italics which the University of Chicago Press edi-
tion omits. 




Following his opening invective against the senseless speed and superficiality 
of modern life and the endless search for distraction under the motto “Svaghiamoci!” 
(let us be entertained), Gubbio admits that he too is engaged in these “lavori per lo 
svago” (labours for entertainment/amusement) in his capacity as a cameraman for a 
movie studio, but he explicitly disavows his complicity by insisting that he is merely 
the (im)passive, disembodied and depersonalised hand that turns the handle of his 
machine. His nickname, “Si Gira,” refers to this action—“girare” means to turn, and 
coupled with the impersonal pronoun “si” the phrase means essentially “we’re turn-
ing” (in English the equivalent phrase would be “roll camera… Action!”)21—but it also 
appropriates his initials, S.G., transforming Serafino Gubbio into a depersonalised, 
automatic function of the filmmaking process, and by extension of the all-consuming 
socio-political machinery of capitalist modernity.22 “I am an operator,” he writes. 
“But, as a matter of fact, being an operator, in the world in which I live and upon 
which I live, does not in the least mean operating. I operate nothing [Io non opero 
nulla]” (5). “Operatore” recalls “operaio” (worker) via the shared root of “opera” 
(work). Like the alienated factory worker toiling by the assembly line, Gubbio, the op-
erator, turns the handle of his camera in the service of the film industry—or “dream 
                                                                                                                                                      
modern life. Many of his novels, Si gira being prime among them, contain lengthy passages written 
“contro il trionfalismo modernolatra e l’incipiente industria (anche culturale)” (Grignani “Sintassi,” 
9). 
21 Scott-Moncrieff translates the phrase as “Shoot!” fortuitously adding a layer of ambiguity not present 
in the original, given the climactic scene in which the tiger is “shot” both literally and figuratively by 
two disembodied hands. 
22 As previously indicated, this aspect of the novel has been the subject of by far the most critical scru-
tiny, and I will only engage it cursorily in the present chapter. In addition to the numerous analyses 




factory” to use a label that would later be applied to the American film studios in Hol-
lywood. In other words, the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction is 
something created by machines, not by human beings, and Gubbio morosely antici-
pates the day when his services will no longer be required and the entire process can 
be carried out automatically. But for the time being at least, Gubbio is not yet su-
perfluous, for, as he explains, he “do[es] not always turn the handle at the same 
speed, but faster or slower as may be required” (6). Someday, he says, they may come 
up with a machine that “will go by itself [girerà da sé]” but for the moment, there is 
still an irreducible trace of human subjectivity in the impersonal “si” of “si gira” as 
opposed to the utterly mechanical automatism of “girare da sé.” 
Running parallel to Gubbio’s constant gestures of self-effacement is his con-
viction that his very apartness imbues him with a unique perspective on the world 
which allows him to see past the false exterior and uncover the workings of the “me-
chanical framework” that determines the shape of everyday life and human con-
sciousness. Insofar as this idealistic self-stylisation as an Archimedean, non-
participant observer is credible (which is not very far), it is made possible only by 
Gubbio’s self-confessed complicity in the creation and policing of the boundaries of 
that framework. He may not literally cause the actors to move, “as an organ-grinder 
creates the music by turning his handle” (6), but he sets the limits within which they 




I set up my machine on its knock-kneed tripod. One or more stage hands, 
following my directions, mark out on the carpet or on the stage with a long 
wand and a blue pencil the limits within which the actors have to move to 
keep the picture in focus. 
This is called marking out the ground [segnare il campo]. (5) 
Thus the process of filming is predicated on an act of demarcation that establishes 
the campo within which the action is to take place. The problem with Nestoroff is that 
in her performances she consistently transgresses these established limits (“esce dal 
campo”), rupturing the frame and rendering the take unusable. Even though Nestor-
off appears on the surface to be the prototypical film diva, and, as I have indicated, is 
in many ways predetermined to fulfil that role, in actual fact her irrepressible out-
ward momentum, beyond herself (di là da se stessa), towards the oltre, constantly 
threatens to undermine the rigid “mechanical framework” of the film medium. 
Moreover, this tendency of hers, Gubbio insists, is entirely unconscious and involun-
tary, which on the one hand implies that it is simply ‘in her nature’, so to speak, but 
it is also a structural consequence of the semantic overload which determines her 
character. In other words, she is ‘difficult to frame’ in a way analogous to that of the 
tiger, and it is by no means coincidental that these two figures should be intimately 
linked at a number of distinct levels within the text—indeed it is the persistent se-
mantic fluctuation at work between la donna and la tigre that allows for the spectacu-
lar collapse of the multiple literal and metaphorical valences attached to the two that 
transpires in the climactic triple death scene.23 As the novel progresses, it becomes 
                                                   
23 Luciana Martinelli observes that “nella scrittura pirandelliana la fluttuazione semantica dei lessemi 
instaura un processo di ampliamento della loro valenza, che di continuo fa slittare l’asse della si-
gnificazione. I sintomi diventano simboli” (77). Martinelli presents an extremely cogent and rhetori-




increasingly ambiguous whether “she” refers to “la Nestoroff” or “la tigre”—the iden-
tical grammatical gender produces a discursive polyvalence within the text that the 
English translation cannot adequately reproduce.24 The one echoes the other, and 
each statement about the tiger can, on some level, potentially be read as referring to 
the lady, and vice versa. This is one of the ways in which the tiger may be said to 
cross the boundary of its cage at a linguistic level. 
III. “Più tigre della tigre” 
The tiger, as we know, was only sold to Kosmograph because she had repeatedly 
threatened to leap across the moat and savage the spectators at the Villa Borghese. 
Gubbio caustically notes the hypocrisy inherent in the zoo’s decision to destroy the 
tiger for her recalcitrance, given that the purpose of putting her on display in the first 
place was “to give the public a ‘living idea’ of natural history.” For what could be 
more natural, Gubbio rhetorically asks, than for a tiger to assume “that the moat in 
question was put there on purpose so that she might try to jump it, and that those 
ladies and gentlemen stopped there in front of her in order that she might devour 
them if she succeeded in jumping it?” (58). Gubbio here presents the reader with the 
                                                                                                                                                      
notwithstanding—focusing specifically on the character of Varia Nestoroff and explores at length the 
complex web of associations that revolve around her and the tiger. Martinelli’s primary concern is the 
representation of women in Pirandello’s works, however, not the figure of the animal. 
24 In Italy it is customary to refer to actresses and female celebrities, particularly if they are young and 
sexually attractive, by their surname preceded by the definite article—la Cardinale, la Loren, la Bel-
lucci, la Nestoroff. Scott-Moncrieff awkwardly renders “la Nestoroff” as “the Nestoroff” throughout his 
translation, seemingly in an effort to reproduce this practice and perhaps to convey a sense of the ob-
jectification of women. It should be noted, however, that the same rule also applies to male actors and 
celebrities (Aldo Nuti, for instance, is frequently referred to as “il Nuti” in the Italian, but never as “the 
Nuti” in the English), and thus any perceived or implied objectification is a facet of Italian culture—




view from inside the cage, as it were, a non-anthropocentric perspective on the hu-
man world. From the tiger’s point of view, the invisible boundaries of the Ha-
genbeck-style zoological garden represent a challenge to be overcome, rather than a 
safeguard to prevent the illusion of unfettered access to nature from becoming a 
gruesome reality. The Pirandellian topos of the characters’ revolt against the role as-
signed to them thus applies, to a certain extent, to the tiger, who refuses to remain 
inside her enclosure at the zoo, but is ultimately forced to play the part of the fero-
cious beast that is put to death for the sake of human entertainment. 
“There comes every day,” writes Gubbio, “like myself, in front of your cage 
here, a lady intent on studying how you move, how you turn your head, how you look 
out of your eyes.” She does this, Gubbio notes, in preparation for the part she is to 
play in the film, namely that of the English lady, “more tiger than the tiger” (più tigre 
della tigre). As it happens, la Nestoroff is not actually meant to play the title role in 
the film, but, says Gubbio, “[p]erhaps she does not yet know this, she thinks that the 
part is hers; and she comes here to study.” (61) Once more the intimate connection 
between the donna and the tigre of the film’s title is reinforced: in order to study for 
the part, in order to inhabit this role, she must be ‘more’ than the tiger, but her per-
formance is nevertheless grounded in the pure animal being of the tiger in its cage. 
This gesture of excess stands in correlation to the “something more” (oltre) 
which Gubbio sees in everything. The structural principle underlying his conception 
of reality is thus at base metaphorical: everything points beyond itself and overflows 
its limits. This, moreover, is also the source of mankind’s separation from the animal 




self than is necessary for one’s survival. Whereas animals “have in themselves by na-
ture only so much as suffices them,” human beings “have in them a superfluity 
which constantly and vainly torments them, never making them satisfied with any 
conditions, and always leaving them uncertain of their destiny” (10). Superfluity sets 
man apart from nature, and is thus at once the source of his superiority and of his 
perpetual dissatisfaction and misery. It is this superfluity, which, “to afford itself an 
outlet [darsi uno sfogo], creates in nature an artificial world [mondo fittizio], a world 
that has a meaning and value for [man] alone” (10). Which is to say: this superfluity 
is language. 
There is a distinction being made here between the earth (la terra), which is 
inhabited by and designed for animals, and the world (il mondo), which is man-made 
and artificial, the product of man’s superfluity, which, exceeding the limits imposed 
on it by nature, requires an outlet. It is easy to see the parallel to Heidegger’s concep-
tion of the animal as “poor in world” (weltarm) in contradistinction to human Dasein, 
which is “world-forming” (weltbildend). For Pirandello, too, the world is not a given, 
but rather always a dynamic construct, the product of human consciousness, albeit 
by no means the result of a concerted act of will on the part of any individual human 
being. This world of which man is the artificer is almost entirely beyond his control. 
On the contrary, he falls foul of his creation, it is nothing but a constant source of 
torment and dissatisfaction, in response to which he can do nothing but find new 
sluices through which to channel his superfluity. For Gubbio, this outlet is provided 
by his writing. As he announces at the beginning of the second section of the first 




which is overpowering” (7). Gubbio’s superfluity, which he must suspend or sup-
press in his professional capacity as a “hand that turns the handle,” finds an outlet in 
writing, through linguistic creation. The fundamentally excessive character of the 
novel as discussed above thus reproduces in miniature the overflowing excess that 
continuously creates and shapes the human world. 
The distinction between animal sufficiency and human superfluity translates 
into a dichotomy of immanence and transcendence: for Pirandello, as for Bataille, the 
animal is “in the world like water in water” (19). There can be no overflow or su-
perfluity because the animal is seamlessly fused with its environment, without any 
“wunderlichen Brüche” being left over. As we saw in the previous chapter, This ‘cu-
rious’ indivisible remainder that is left over when man is ‘divided’ by the present 
moment translates into surplus value which gives rise to history and memory as an 
awareness of the passing of time, which in turn carries with it the anticipation of our 
finitude. Similarly, the vain torments and existential uncertainty that man suffers on 
account of his superfluity appear yet greater and more intolerable when reflected in 
the mirror of the animal’s carefree innocence. 
Indeed, the animal’s innocence is intolerable in and of itself. “We cannot en-
dure,” Gubbio explains to the tiger, “that you, after a gory feast, should be able to 
sleep calmly” (60). In the wild, he continues, a man might kill a tiger in self-defence 
and not lose a wink, and this too is a factor of the animal’s innocence, because, as 
Gubbio insists throughout, this is the natural way of things: but to pretend to be de-




the sole purpose of killing it for profit and amusement, that’s something else entire-
ly. 
The beautiful, ingenuous innocence of your ferocity makes the iniquity of 
ours seem disgusting here. […] A sham [finto] hunter, in a sham forest, 
among sham trees.... We shall be worthy in every respect, truly, of the con-
cocted plot. Tigers, more tigerish than a tiger [Tigri, più tigri d’una tigre]. 
(60) 
In another context, Nietzsche notes that humans are the greatest predators 
(Raubthiere) because, in order to compensate for their weakness and deficiency, they 
effectively ‘rob’ (rauben) the animals of their most prominent characteristics, becom-
ing “subtler,” “cleverer,” more “like a human” (KSA IV: 263).25 As ever, becoming 
human proceeds via the animal, by means of an indiscriminate plundering or rob-
bing, which reciprocally transforms the animal into a metaphor and a predicate—
humans have become “Tigri [metaphor], più tigri [predicate] d’una tigre,” quite liter-
ally more like a tiger than the tiger itself. 
It is fitting, then, that la Nestoroff should turn to the tiger when ‘getting into 
character’: the artificial world produced by human superfluity ultimately derives from 
the realization that animal being is impossible or unobtainable for humans. Thus, 
faced with the inaccessibility of the animal, human superfluity initiates a chain reac-
                                                   
25 There is significant disagreement among scholars concerning the question of Pirandello’s familiari-
ty with Nietzsche. Michael Rössner, the editor (and in some cases translator) of the German edition of 
Pirandello’s complete works, is at pains to debunk what he terms the “geradezu legendenhafter Glau-
be an [Pirandellos] ‘deutsche Bildung’” (10) entertained by Italian Pirandello scholars on account of 
the two years (1889–91) the author spent studying in Bonn. “Pirandello,” Rössner shows, “hat Nietz-
sches Werk, wenn überhaupt, erst sehr spät und oberflächlich kennengelernt” (12), but, as he goes on 
to note, while this may rule out any direct influence on Pirandello’s work, it does not by any means 
preclude “eine grundlegende Parallelität des Denkens,” for which Rössner convincingly argues in the 




tion, creating artifice upon artifice in an effort to reclaim what has been lost. Instead 
of looking into the cage, mankind now looks out at the elegant sufficiency of the an-
imal. La Nestoroff’s daily visits to the tiger thus become the vehicle for her becoming-
animal, the site of a reciprocal exchange across the boundary marked by the cage. 
The tiger herself, in return, locked in her cage, is significantly diminished. “A captive 
like this, far from your savage haunts, powerless to tear anyone to pieces, or even to 
frighten him, what sort of tiger are you [che tigre sei tu]?” (202). The transaction 
whereby men have become more tiger than a tiger, has, in turn, rendered her less 
tiger than a tiger. And thus, like Borges with his shadowy series of literary tropes, for 
Gubbio the ‘real’ tiger is always ‘out there’ and forever out of reach. 
IV. Spiders and Elephants 
Besides the tiger, there is one other ‘animal’ that occupies a central position in the 
novel: Gubbio’s camera, which he describes throughout as a “huge spider watching 
for its prey [in agguato]” atop its “knock-kneed tripod” (68). In contrast to the tiger, 
this “spider” is completely unnatural and indeed embodies the artificiality and men-
dacity of human consciousness. This “spider” may suitably be read as a literalisation 
of what Pirandello in his treatise on humour refers to as the “spider of experience” 
which weaves “the web of mentality” from the “dribble” of social life.26 This spider 
                                                   
26 Pirandello On Humor 135. Pirandello’s treatise on umorismo is not so much a theory of humour or 
the comic per se as it is a document of his poetics and a meditation on the truth value of art. As a con-
cept, umorismo is, above all, a way of seeing and interpreting the world that takes note of the contradic-
tions and inconsistencies of appearances, typically relating to human pretensions and self-delusions. 
In limning a genealogy of umorismo, thus Pirandello singles out Copernicus as “one of the greatest 




ordinarily lives within the individual, and every web is slightly different, but with the 
arrival of the movie camera the limitations of such subjective experience can seem-
ingly be overcome; the spider is externalised, as an autonomous, mechanical, objec-
tive observer, able to record reality without filtering it through a mediating 
consciousness. The camera, however, is simply the latest in a series of “infernal little 
machines [macchinette infernali],” by means of which mankind seeks to make sense 
of and impose order on the world, starting with logic and reason (cf. O’Rawe “Mac-
chinetta”). Unlike a tree, which, writes Pirandello, is alive without being conscious of 
its existence—in Heideggarian terms, the tree is not just “weltarm” but “weltlos”—
and hence perceives no difference between itself and the world around it, man “is 
given at birth the sad privilege of feeling himself alive [questo triste privilegio di sentirsi 
vivere], with the fine illusion that results from it: that of taking this inner feeling, 
changeable and varying, as something that really exists outside of himself” (On 
Humor, 140). 
It is in response to this sad privilege, which is part and parcel of the condition 
of superfluity, that man has devised these various infernal mechanisms of which the 
camera is the latest manifestation. For Gubbio, as for his friend Simone Pau (and, 
ultimately, Pirandello himself), both the radical objectivity of scientific endeavour 
and the fundamentally subjective belief in a higher power are rooted in mankind’s 
                                                                                                                                                      
satisfaction and anthropocentric thought. In this regard, Nietzsche would also have to be considered a 
great umorista—e.g. in the thoroughly non-anthropocentric, anti-humanist history of the world with 
which his “Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne” begins—as would Serafino Gub-
bio, whose ability and willingness to adopt the tiger’s perspective on the moat separating her from the 
zoogoers exposes the hypocrisy and self-delusion at work in the structure of human society. On 




superfluity; one seeks to eliminate it altogether, whilst the other abandons itself to it 
completely, but both fail to reconcile the inherent contradictions of human existence. 
But “Life,” according to Gubbio, “is not explained; it is lived [La vita non si spiega; si 
vive].” 
To set life before one as an object of study is absurd, because life, when set 
before one like that, inevitably loses all its real consistency and becomes an 
abstraction, void of meaning and value. And how after that is it possible to 
explain it to oneself? You have killed it. The most you can do now is to dis-
sect it. (Shoot! 143) 
Here, as elsewhere, Gubbio becomes little more than a mouthpiece for Pirandello’s 
views on the irreducible opposition between “the flow of life” and the “stable and de-
termined forms” in which we try to arrest it (On Humor, 137). It is this eternal flux of 
life which for Pirandello renders the identification of a fixed personality, or identity, 
impossible, both in ourselves and in others, for we do not merely construct our own 
identities but those of others as well, and thus we are, to coin a phrase, simultaneous-
ly uno, nessuno, e centomila.27 
On a literal level, then, the Kosmograph tiger may be regarded as the embodi-
ment of “the flow of life” which has been “arrested,” fixed in a “stable and deter-
mined form” in the shape of a cage. Gubbio’s disdain for the foolish rationalists who 
seek to capture life and transform it into an object of study translates directly into his 
                                                   
27 Pirandello’s protagonists invariably seek to circumvent this process in various ways, be it, like Si-
gnora Ponza in Così è (se vi pare), by embracing the ambiguity and renouncing any claim to an auton-
omous, subjective identity, or adopting a fictional identity and retaining control of it through madness, 
like Henry IV, or else regressing to a pre-individuated, ‘oceanic’ Self, as Vitangelo Moscarda does. All 
of these characters, however, in attempting to ‘opt out’ of the Life/Form dichotomy, essentially cease 
to be alive. Mattia Pascal’s living death is paradigmatic of the sort of limbo they all find themselves in, 
alienated from themselves, and from the world around them, stuck in a no-man’s-land between life 




mockery of the notion of placing a tiger in an enclosure in order to give the paying 
public an idea of “living nature.” What is more, this act of bracketing off, of creating 
a discrete space for the animal, marked by a clear boundary separating it from the 
human spectators, mirrors the internal bracketing off of the animal within the hu-
man. Writes Gubbio, 
I see your wild nature steaming from your whole body, like the heat from 
glowing embers; I see marked [segnato] in the black stripes of your coat the 
elastic force of your irrepressible leaps [slanci irrefrenabili]. Whoever studies 
you closely is glad [gode] of the cage that imprisons you and checks in him 
also the savage instinct which the sight of you stirs irresistibly in his blood. 
(60, transl. mod.) 
Here Gubbio effectively reads the tiger, interpreting the markings on her fur as ex-
ternal signs of the wildness within, which emanates from her body in all directions. 
The cage, moreover, serves a double function: on the one hand, it literally contains 
the wild beast, protecting the cast and crew of the film studio until the time comes to 
unleash it in front of the camera. On the other hand, it acts as a metaphor for the ar-
tificial barrier dividing nature from culture, erected as a bulwark against the savage 
and uncivilised instincts within man himself. That is to say, at any given moment, 
every man is both inside and outside the cage. 
“The forms,” Pirandello specifies, “in which we seek to stop, to fix in ourselves 
this constant flux are the concepts, the ideals with which we would like consistently 
to comply, all the fictions we create for ourselves, the conditions, the state in which 
we tend to stabilize ourselves” (On Humor 137). In Gubbio’s terms, the stable form 
which we call our identity is in actual fact nothing but a “metaphor of ourselves” 




selves in the process. Gubbio yearns instead to abandon himself to his innermost be-
ing, giving up the futile pretense of maintaining the false exterior and surrendering 
to the infinite. These forms may have arrested the flow of life superficially, but “with-
in ourselves,”—which, in this context, also means inside the cage—“in what we call 
the soul and is the life in us, the flux continues, indistinct under the barriers and be-
yond the limits we impose as a means to fashion a consciousness and a personality 
for ourselves” (On Humor 137). The condition of superfluity, which for Gubbio is the 
human condition tout court, is brought about by the inadequacy of the frames and 
forms we humans construct in an effort to contain the flow of life. If “animals resist 
metaphorization,” as Lippit observes, it may be because they lack the superfluity that 
transforms humans into “metaphors of themselves.” At the same time, however, a 
factor of this resistance is the way the tiger permeates the text, its influence flowing 
outward “under the barriers and the beyond the limits” imposed on it by the cage, 
until its presence is felt at every level. 
Gubbio’s “spider” is the antithesis of the tiger; it exists only to devour and de-
stroy the “live reality” embodied by the tiger and transform it into the ghostly artifice 
of the image. For the actors, the experience of seeing their images on screen is unset-
tling and uncanny: reduced to a pure appearance, they suddenly are what they appear 
to be, namely artificial constructs. The tiger, by contrast, is always what she appears 
to be. It is for this reason that the tiger’s encounter with the “spider” must prove fa-
tal. As Gubbio remarks, everyone involved in the filmmaking process is intent on 
fooling the camera: “Scene painters, stage hands, actors all give themselves the air of 




(57). The tiger, on the other hand, does not need to fool the machine, nor could she, 
since, like Nietzsche’s animal, which “erscheint in jedem Momente ganz und gar als 
das was es ist, kann also gar nicht anders sein als ehrlich” (KSA I: 249, emphasis ad-
ded). This radical honesty and openness presents an antidote to the deadening, de-
humanising influence of modern, mechanised reality on the life of the artist. 
The fate of the artist in the modern world is illustrated in the novel via the 
figure of the violinist, whom Gubbio is introduced to by Simone Pau the day after his 
arrival in Rome. Like everyone associated with mechanical reproducibility in the 
book, he has been saddled with a “disgusting nickname” but we never discover what 
it is, nor do we learn his real name—he remains simply the man with the violin. This 
man, Pau explains, in addition to being a formidably gifted violinist, once owned a 
printing press in Perugia, which he ran into the ground and moved to Rome, where, 
on account of his drinking problem he had been forced repeatedly to pawn his most 
prized possession: the violin. In order to earn enough money to retrieve it, he took a 
job at a printing office, working for one of his former employees, feeding bricks of 
lead to a Monotype machine, “a pachyderm, flat, black, squat; a monstrous beast 
which eats lead and shits books” (19, transl. mod.). To add insult to injury, once he 
had made enough to retrieve his violin, he was able to find a job at a cinema that re-
quired a violin and a clarinet for its orchestra. As it soon emerged, however, this ‘or-
chestra’ in fact consisted of nothing but a player piano, which he was to accompany 





A violin, in the hands of a man, accompanies a roll of perforated paper 
running through the belly of this other machine! The soul, which moves 
and guides the hands of the man […] obliged to follow the register of this 
automatic instrument! (20) 
This experience so traumatised the violinist that he stopped playing altogether, aban-
doning himself entirely to the bottle. The perforated rolls of paper that pass through 
the ‘bellies’ of these machine-beasts stand in metaphorical relation to the perforated 
rolls of film on which the movie cameras store the life they have devoured, until it 
can be reanimated by a different machine. But before that can happen, the film needs 
to be developed, which takes place in the “Art or Negative Department”: “Here the 
work of the machines is mysteriously completed [Qua si compie misteriosamente 
l’opera delle macchine].” The Negative Department becomes a “womb, in which is de-
veloping and taking shape a monstrous mechanical birth” (54). The text employs 
naturalistic, biological metaphors to describe every stage of mechanical reproduction. 
The machines are ‘beasts’ whose only purpose is to ‘devour’ and ‘ingest’ life, ‘repro-
ducing’ it in the form of artificial offspring, stillborn and endlessly stupid. “It does 
everything by itself [da sé],” the foreman tells the violinist, referring to the elephan-
tine Monotype machine. As soon as they invent a machine to feed it lead bricks, he 
will be truly superfluous. (Heaven knows what manner of books this pachyderm 
spews out of its anus, but judging by the description of the printing process, they 
don’t appear to have been written by people, and they certainly could not ever be con-
sidered art.) 
Ever since the incident with the pianola, the violinist has given up playing, 




on the Kosmograph lot, accompanied by Simone Pau who announces that his friend, 
in order to “break the evil spell,” will “play to the tiger” (73). “Don’t be afraid!” Pau 
shouts encouragingly as the violinist stands alone before the cage, the large crowd 
standing back, “Play! She will understand you!” (74). Alone with the tiger, the violin-
ist has the opportunity to reclaim his humanity, ‘speaking’ the wordless musical lan-
guage of authentic artistic expression, ‘she will understand’ him, just as the 
onlookers understand, able, for once, to escape from their daily lives serving the ma-
chines. The transcendent significance of this encounter between this man and the 
tiger is emphasised through the absence of mechanical mediation: the director, we 
read, is furious with himself for not having sent Gubbio off to fetch his camera in 
order to record the moment. Instead, it remains irreproducible—mechanically at 
least; Gubbio is still recording the incident, just with his pen and not his camera. “It 
did not last long,” he writes. The violinist is carried off in triumph to the nearest bar 
where he proceeds to drink himself to death, and the cycle continues. The tiger, too, 
is forgotten. We do not discover how the violinist’s performance affects her. Instead, 
we are left with the image of Varia Nestoroff, la donna tigre, “who had looked on at 
the scene, as though in an ecstasy instinct with terror [un’estasi piena di sgomento]” 
(75). This is a shift which subtly foreshadows the substitution of these two tigers in 
the final scene. 
V. Resistance to Metaphor 
On page 576 of the copy of Tutti i romanzi, vol. 2 in Butler Library—just after Gubbio 




someone has written in the margin: “È Serafino la vera tigre!” What are the implica-
tions of this exclamation? What would it mean for Serafino to be the “real” tiger, as 
opposed, presumably, not only to Nestoroff, who is “more tiger than the tiger,” but 
also to the actual tiger languishing in its cage on the Kosmograph lot? How many ti-
gers are there in this novel, anyway? 
Gubbio’s initial discussion of superfluity is prompted by an outburst from his 
vitriolic friend Simone Pau, a former university professor whom he had been telling 
about the “frail hopes” and “misadventures” that had brought him to Rome. “Excuse 
me,” Pau interrupts, “but what do I know about the mountain, the tree, the sea? The 
mountain is a mountain because I say: ‘That is a mountain.’ In other words: ‘I am the 
mountain’” (10). This seemingly incongruous rejoinder presents a conception of 
meaning and value as at once mimetic and metaphorical. Structurally, it is analogous 
to the argument put forth by Nietzsche in his treatise “Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge,” 
where he writes that finding something which you yourself have hidden in the bush-
es with a mind to discovering it later is no great achievement: 
Wenn ich die Definition des Säugethiers mache und dann erkläre, nach Be-
sichtigung eines Kameels: Siehe, ein Säugethier, so wird damit eine Wahr-
heit zwar an das Licht gebracht, aber sie ist von begränztem Werthe, ich 
meine, sie ist durch und durch anthropomorphisch und enthält keinen ein-
zigen Punct, der “wahr an sich”, wirklich und allgemeingültig, abgesehen 
von dem Menschen, wäre. (KSA I: 883) 
In other words: I am the camel, just as I am the mountain, and, by the same token, I 
am the tiger. All such statements (all statements in general, ultimately) are by 
definition made within the “social world,” which, as Gubbio repeatedly emphasises 




his poem, Borges imagines his tiger, “powerful, innocent, bloodstained, and new-
made,” prowling through the jungle and leaving “its footprint on the muddy edge | of 
a river with a name unknown to it | (in its world, there are no names, nor past, nor 
future, | only the sureness of the present moment).” This tiger, too, exists outside his-
tory and ‘goes into’ the moment without any ‘curious fractions’ being left over, frac-
tions like names or dates or times. Borges tries to isolate this moment, specifying 
that he means this tiger—“the real one”—that casts its shadow on the plain “today, 
the third of August, ’59,” but this now is of a different denomination than the tiger’s, 
and the poet must recognise that “the act of naming it, of guessing | what is its na-
ture and its circumstance | creates a fiction, not a living creature [Lo hace ficción del 
arte y no criatura | Viviente]” (Borges 116–19). 
A central tension in Pirandello’s treatment of the tiger (and his natural image-
ry) is the insistence on its being authentic, ‘real’, genuine, etc. as opposed to the 
fictional, fake, constructed and fragile nature of human identity and reality. But the 
‘reality’ of the natural is also constantly undermined, ‘humoristically’ in that it al-
ready contains its opposite. These too are merely metaphors we live by. The tension, 
then, is that Pirandello seems to yearn for this authenticity even as he unmasks it as 
illusory, constructed, and fake. The tiger, in other words, is on the one hand the real 
tiger, the epitome of tigerishness, raw, uncultivated, untameable, and so forth. But 
this too is a construct, an illusion, a form of “rhetoric” which Gubbio-Pirandello so 
disparages, but which comes up again and again with reference to animals and their 




As a result, the tiger—just as la Nestoroff, the violinist, and Gubbio himself—
is an allegorical figure in the novel. It stands for not only all tigers ever, but more im-
portantly the battery of associations and significances that the figure of the tiger has 
amassed over the centuries. In the same way as Varia Nestoroff occupies the position 
of the inevitable diva, the exotic and seductive ‘man-eater’, the “usual lady more tiger 
than the tiger.” And Gubbio comes to embody the downtrodden, disenfranchised, 
dehumanised, alienated labourer (“io non opero nulla”), the victim of the rationalistic 
mechanisation of the modern world. It is in this sense that the anonymous annota-
tor’s comment must be read: the tiger’s fate is sealed by the advance of technology 
and capitalism, and so, in a way, is Gubbio’s. Indeed, the annotation continues: “È 
Simone Pau, è il violinista … è tutti coloro che sono stati vinti, risucchiati dalla mac-
china” [He’s Simone Pau, he’s the violinist … he’s everyone who has been defeated, 
sucked in by the machine/camera]. Thus Gubbio may become the ‘real’ tiger insofar 
as we regard the real tiger to be the metaphorico-allegorical one. 
But there is another tiger in the text. In addition to the symbolic tiger, 
freighted with multiple metaphorical associations, Gubbio again and again insists on 
the singularity of this tiger, here in this cage, right now. This is underlined by the way 
the tiger is introduced into the novel through a series of digressions: thus, following 
another tirade against the stupidity and falsity of the movie industry, Gubbio begins 
the next section, “Excuse me a moment. I am going to pay a visit to the tiger” (57).28 
                                                   
28 Maria Antonietta Grignani notes how Pirandello values digression as “a perpetual flight from the 
linearity of the story” and as “a subversive strategy [aimed] at pillorying classical rhetoric through the 
implementation of a counterrhetoric conceived as the art of unmasking and persuasion.” She goes on 




Gubbio assures us that he will continue his story afterwards, but that right now he 
“must go and see the tiger.” The implication is that the tiger is not part of the story, 
and yet she exerts an imperative force which disrupts the flow of the narrative. Gub-
bio must go and see the tiger. This interruption also carries with it a shift to the pre-
sent tense, as if the animal’s ‘eternal present’ were suddenly mirrored in Gubbio’s 
narration. At a certain level, then, the tiger is presented as unassimilable to the sur-
rounding narrative, even though she is quite literally the centrepiece of that narrative. 
At the same time, the emphatic insistence on the haecceity of this tiger is in itself an 
act of framing, without which an encounter with it would be impossible. 
“No animal has ever spoken to me like this tiger,” (57, transl. mod.) says Gub-
bio, by way of explaining why he goes every day to stand in front of her cage. Alt-
hough this encounter repeats itself daily, it nevertheless assumes the character of an 
interruption, a caesura. In some ways, it is reminiscent of the arresting encounter 
Jacques Derrida describes having with his cat in the bathroom, which likewise “is re-
peated every morning” (Animal, 13) but nevertheless stands out as a singular event. “I 
must immediately make it clear,” he writes, interrupting himself with some urgency, 
the cat I am talking about is a real cat, truly, believe me, a little cat. It isn’t 
the figure of a cat. It doesn’t silently enter the bedroom as an allegory for all 
the cats on the earth, the felines that traverse our myths and religions, lit-
erature and fables. (6) 
But of course, as Derrida well knows, he is protesting too much. Such is the meta-
phorical force of the animal in language that it is all but impossible to dissociate this 
                                                                                                                                                      





cat from “Montaigne’s cat” (6), or “Baudelaire’s family of cats, or Rilke’s, or Buber’s” 
(7) and so on. All the insistent deictic specificity he can muster is not enough to iso-
late this cat from all the others. Or, perhaps rather, the deixis is always both endo-
phoric (this cat right here) and exophoric (referring to ‘other’ cats, outside the text). 
That is to say, this little cat is always, at one and the same time, one, specific, real cat, 
and an “ambassador” of “the immense symbolic responsibility with which our cul-
ture has always charged the feline race.” Derrida insists on this being a real cat “in 
order to mark its unsubstitutable singularity.” Caught in the gaze of this animal, he 
recognises in it, prior to any identification in terms of species or gender, a specific 
“irreplaceable living being.” “Nothing can ever rob me of the certainty that what we 
have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized [rebelle à tout concept]” (9). 
This ‘rebellion’—or, alternatively, this ‘resistance to metaphor’—is inherent in 
Derrida’s coinage of the neologism animot, a chimerical portmanteau of animals 
(animaux) and the word (mot), which, when spoken aloud, appears to violate the rules 
of French grammar, an uneasy singular/plural hybrid which Derrida employs in or-
der to trouble the traditionally self-evident capacity of language to d(en)ominate the 
living other. It performs the ‘fictionalisation’ that the act of naming effects, even as it 
leaves open a space which may be inhabited by the animal thus named without its 
having to conform to the strictures of human linguistic practice. This space, which 
we might imagine as existing somewhere between the two constituent parts of the 
word animot, means that this word designates three things at once: 1) the specific an-
imal named, 2) the multiplicity of other animals contained in that denomination, and 




metaphorisation. Each in their own way, Derrida, Borges, and Pirandello are all driv-
en to pursue that ‘ancient, foolish, and vague’ quest for this third, elusive cat.29 
VI. Inside the Cage 
“Girare, ho girato.” This inflection of the verb to turn, which opens the final chapter 
of the notebooks, also marks a shift in narrative perspective. Up until now, Gubbio 
has always related things more or less as they happen, chronicling, as in a diary, the 
events of a particular day or part thereof. Here, instead, a month has passed since 
“the appalling disaster” [fatto atrocissimo], and Gubbio declares that he has now at-
tained perfection in his role as a cameraman: “As an operator I am now, truly, per-
fect.” In practice, this means that he has lost the power of speech, and, as his final 
notebook draws to a close, he abandons his writing.30 From now on his hand will on-
ly turn the handle and nothing more. If superfluity is language, it stands to reason 
that in abandoning superfluity, he also abandons linguistic expression. The problem 
with superfluity and the ideal of animal transcendence is that we cannot simply 
abandon our language and hope to become like the animals; the most we can hope 
for is to become like the machines we have created. 
                                                   
29 In his famous poem “The Naming of Cats,” from Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats (1939), T.S. 
Eliot notes that a cat “must have three different names”: one for everyday use, one “that’s peculiar, 
and more dignified,” like “Munustrap, Quaxo, or Coricopat,” which never belongs to more than one 
cat. “But above and beyond there’s still one name left over, | And that is the name that you never will 
guess; | The name that no human research can discover— | But the cat himself knows, and will 
never confess” (Eliot 149). 
30 Several critics have suggested (e.g. Angelini 20) that Gubbio begins writing his diary only after the 
final scene, but this cannot be the case, since he often comments on things that have just happened or 




The perfect tense of “ho girato” also marks a shift especially from the way in 
which the tiger was always written about, namely in the present tense. Now that she 
has fulfilled her function and been slaughtered in the name of entertainment, that 
present moment has receded into the past, even though, as Gubbio notes, the “appal-
ling disaster” is “still being discussed everywhere.” More specifically, the tiger’s 
‘eternal present’ has been replaced by the eternal present of mechanical reproducibil-
ity: her life has been sucked in by the ‘spider’ and now leads a ghostly existence on 
the cinema screen, reanimated again and again for the benefit of the paying public. 
But before all that can happen, we must first return to the climactic scene where 
Nuti, the aggrieved actor, and Gubbio, the observer-narrator, both enter the cage, 
waiting, in the sham forest, for the arrival of the tiger. Inside that cage, man and an-
imal will finally meet on equal ground, and the stable boundary between inside and 
outside, reality and artifice, nature and culture, of which the cage has been the con-
stant guarantor, will be rendered temporarily inoperative. 
While Gubbio is setting up his camera, he notices Nuti go to the edge of the 
cage and thrust apart a section of the foliage serving as a backdrop before returning 
to his designated spot, but Gubbio thinks nothing of it. The door linking the two cag-
es is opened and the tiger appears; Gubbio begins filming, and narrates: 
I saw Nuti take his aim from the beast and slowly turn the muzzle of his 
rifle towards the spot where a moment earlier he had opened a loophole 
among the boughs, and fire, and the tiger immediately spring upon him 
and become merged with him [con lui mescolarsi], before my eyes, in a hor-
rible writhing mass. Drowning the most deafening shouts that came from 
all the actors outside the cage as they ran instinctively towards la Nestoroff 




the beast and the horrible gasp of the man as he lay helpless in its fangs, in 
its claws, which were tearing his throat and chest[.] (212, transl. mod.) 
There are several things all happening at once here, but one way of describing them 
would be as a curious instance of “de-metaphorisation” or of a conflation of the literal 
and the figurative.31 Instead of shooting the ‘actual’ tiger, Nuti shoots the metaphori-
cal tiger, la Nestoroff, who, moreover, is standing outside the cage, and hence outside 
the diegesis of the scene. The plot of the novel becomes enmeshed in the plot of the 
film: the two narrative levels collapse into one just as the two tigers, on and off cam-
era, are symbolically and literally fused. At the same time, Nuti, whose nerves of steel 
and steady aim had singled him out as the ideal representative of rational thought 
and superior firepower is caught up in his own becoming-animal, as he is described 
as “becom[ing] merged with” the tiger: man and beast united in a “horrible writhing 
mass,” each issuing inarticulate sounds until the one is indistinguishable from the 
other. 
This undermining of identity and species boundaries would thus seem to 
have rendered inoperative the symbolic order. But Gubbio continues: “I heard, I 
heard, I kept on hearing above that growl, above that gasp, the continuous ticking of 
the machine, the handle of which my hand, alone, of its own accord,32 still kept on 
                                                   
31 Gavriel Moses refers to this process as “unmetaphoring,” a phrase he borrows from Rosalie L. Colie, 
and which he places in opposition to Genette’s notion of “secondarization”: “The process of ‘unmet-
aphoring’ is an artistic strategy very apt in overcoming the ‘secondarization’ which occurs with figures 
once they become part of the traditional, expected repertory of literary discourse. […] Unmetaphoring, 
it seems to me, manages to recreate the shock inherent in the actual creation of the figures (that 
unique moment when the figure had not yet become part of a convention) by reversing the process.” 
(Moses 10n11). 
32 “…la macchinetta, di cui la mia mano, sola, da sé, ancora, seguitava a girare la manovella” (Romanzi, 




turning” (212). The sound of the camera drowns out the noise of the commotion out-
side the cage as well as the carnage inside it. This is the sound of the symbolic order 
re-establishing itself, after this interruption. It is the sound, to borrow Mary Ann 
Doane’s terminology, of the contingent being transformed into an event. “Death and 
the contingent have something in common,” writes Doane, “insofar as both are often 
situated as that which is unassimilable to meaning. Death would seem to mark the 
insistence and intractability of the real in representation” (145).33 The planned death 
of the Kosmograph tiger was supposed to supply a frisson of dangerous authenticity to 
an otherwise contrived fiction. Unleashed, however, upon the field of representation, 
in the final scene, the tiger precipitates an explosion of contingency, which, as we 
have seen, disrupts the flow of the narrative, if only for a moment. 
But Gubbio’s hand goes on turning the handle, and by doing so, the contin-
gent is transformed into an event, i.e. something delimited (of a specific duration), 
and which has a particular significance. Recall Gubbio’s definition of “superfluity” as 
that which “creates in nature an artificial world, a world that has a meaning and value 
for [man] alone.” The terrible, not to say fearful, force of the contingent may thus be 
framed and exhibited for profit. Which is precisely what happens with this scene, for, 
as Gubbio informs us, the film goes on to become a box-office hit, “what with the 
enormous publicity and the morbid curiosity which the sordid atrocity of the drama 
                                                                                                                                                      
their own accord (da sé), rendering him superfluous. 
33 Doane is referring here to Thomas Edison’s notorious “actuality” Electrocuting an Elephant (1903) in 
which Topsy, a celebrated former circus elephant was executed at Coney Island for having killed three 
of her trainers in as many years. Her fate is thus analogous to the Kosmograph tiger’s, but it was by no 




of that slaughtered couple would everywhere arouse.” The death of the couple (Nuti 
and Nestoroff) is now the main attraction. There is no mention of the tiger; her death 
has been eclipsed by that of the two lovers. But this too might be read in terms of the 
transfer which occurred during that fatal scene, where the tiger became merged first 
(metaphorically) with Nestoroff and then (literally) with Nuti. This process also mir-
rors the transition of the animal into language: the “event” of language excludes the 
animal, indeed it depends on that exclusion for its existence. Language is the residual 





Hier gilt auch nicht daß man in seinem Haus ist, vielmehr ist 
man in ihrem Haus. 
—Kafka, “Der Bau” 
Chapter 4 
The Enemy Within 
Kafka’s Zoopoetics 
I. Musophobia 
In the summer of 1917, Franz Kafka suffered a haemorrhage and was subsequently 
diagnosed with tuberculosis. A month later, on 12 September, he went to stay with 
his sister Ottla in the village of Zürau, where, he would remain until the spring of the 
following year, convalescing. As his diaries and letters attest, he had some of the 
most intensive encounters with animals in his life. “Mir geht es recht gut zwischen 
allen den Tieren” (KKAB3 339), he wrote to Max and Elsa Brod in early October, in a 
letter describing his careful observation of one of his sister’s pigs, and his practice of 
feeding the goats in the garden. Perhaps the most complex and intimate relationship 
of this period was with his sister’s cat, which assumed a particularly prominent posi-
tion in Kafka’s everyday life on account of a third category of animal: hordes of mice 
which kept him up at night with their incessant scurrying, gnawing, and burrow-
ing—“man hört Kralle für Kralle.” 1  The sensation of being surrounded by this 
“schreckliches stummes lärmendes Volk […] dem die Nacht gehört,”2 working away 
secretly in his room, filled him with terror. As he explained to Max Brod: 
                                                   
1 Letter to Max Brod, 24 Nov. 1917 (KKAB3 367). 




Das was ich gegenüber den Mäusen habe, ist platte Angst. Auszuforschen 
woher sie kommt, ist Sache der Psychoanalytiker, ich bin es nicht. Gewiß 
hängt sie wie auch die Ungezieferangst mit dem unerwarteten, ungebete-
nen, unvermeidbaren, gewissermaßen stummen, verbissenen, geheimab-
sichtlichen Erscheinen dieser Tiere zusammen, mit dem Gefühl, daß sie 
die Mauern ringsherum hundertfach durchgraben haben und dort lauern, 
daß sie sowohl durch die ihnen gehörige Nachtzeit als auch durch ihre 
Winzigkeit so fern uns und damit noch weniger angreifbar sind.3 
Kafka describes how his hearing became infinitely more sensitive, to the point where 
he was hearing these industrious mice everywhere, and how he sat up in bed at-
tempting, unsuccessfully to peer with “Katzenaugen in das Mäusedunkel hinein.”4 
He eventually came to an understanding with the cat and was able to leave the busi-
ness of watching out for the mice to it, but Kafka never truly got over his fear of these 
creatures, his attempts at “toughening himself up”5 by observing the field mice in the 
surrounding countryside during the day notwithstanding. 
This experience immediately brings to mind two of Kafka’s late stories, name-
ly “Josephine, die Sängerin oder das Volk der Mäuse” and “Der Bau,” both written 
roughly six years later in the winter of 1923/24, shortly before Kafka’s death on 3 
June of that year. Certain passages in “Der Bau” in particular resonate strongly with 
the feeling of defencelessness that accompanied Kafka’s musophobia on account of 
the creatures’ small size. Having worked tirelessly at constructing and patrolling his 
                                                   
3 Letter to Max Brod, 3 Dec. 1917 (373). 
4 Letter to Max Brod 10 Dec. 1917 (378). 
5 “Mäuse vertreibe ich mit der Katze, aber womit soll ich die Katze vertreiben? Du glaubst, Du habest 
nichts gegen Mäuse? Natürlich, Du hast auch gegen Menschenfresser nichts, aber wenn sie in der 
Nacht unter allen Kästen hervorkriechen und die Zähne fletschen werden, wirst Du sie bestimmt 
nicht mehr leiden können. Übrigens suche auch ich mich jetzt auf Spaziergängen durch Betrachtung 
der Feldmäuse abzuhärten, sie sind ja nicht übel, aber das Zimmer ist kein Feld und der Schlaf kein 




burrow, the animal narrator of “Der Bau” relates how he fell asleep, but was awak-
ened by “ein an sich kaum hörbares Zischen” (KKANII 606) produced, he surmises, 
by a “kleine[s] Volk” (608), who spoil the integrity of the narrator’s burrow by dig-
ging tunnels of their own. “Was für ein unaufhörlich tätiges Volk das ist und wie läs-
tig sein Fleiß” (606). And yet these industrious creatures are a mere nuisance 
compared to the enemies lurking “im Innern der Erde”: 
ich habe sie noch nie gesehn, aber die Sagen erzählen von ihnen und ich 
glaube fest an sie. Es sind Wesen der innern Erde, nicht einmal die Sage 
kann sie beschreiben, selbst wer ihr Opfer geworden ist hat sie kaum ge-
sehn, sie kommen, man hört das Kratzen ihrer Krallen knapp unter sich in 
der Erde, die ihr Element ist, und schon ist man verloren. Hier gilt auch 
nicht daß man in seinem Haus ist, vielmehr ist man in ihrem Haus. (578) 
The narrator’s sense of powerlessness and vulnerability is thus compounded by a 
gnawing suspicion that he is not truly at home in his burrow, but indeed rather in-
truding on another creature’s territory. The dichotomy between inside and outside 
which the narrator has worked so hard to maintain is thus undermined from within 
by indigenous creatures that render the narrator himself an outsider in this burrow 
which he has “durch Kratzen und Beißen, Stampfen und Stoßen dem widerspensti-
gen Boden abgewonnen” and which, he insists, is therefore his alone and could nev-
er belong to anyone else. It is practically an extension of his own body: “meine Burg 
die auf keine Weise jemandem andern angehören kann und die so sehr mein ist, 
daß ich hier letzten Endes ruhig von meinem Feind auch die tödliche Verwundung 
annehmen kann, denn mein Blut versickert hier in meinem Boden und geht nicht 




the possibility of dispossession, or worse: the realisation that one’s home—one’s own 
body—was never truly one’s own to begin with. 
In an essay written to mark the tenth anniversary of Kafka’s death, Walter 
Benjamin observed that a key component of Kafka’s poetics is the excavation of that 
which has been forgotten, and that this operation is inextricably linked to the figure 
of the animal, which are “Behältnisse des Vergessenen.” “So kann man verstehen,” 
he writes, “daß Kafka nicht müde wurde, den Tieren das Vergessene abzulauschen. 
Sie sind wohl nicht das Ziel; aber ohne sie geht es nicht” (“Kafka,” 430). It is hard to 
imagine a more succinct definition of zoopoetics than that: the animal serves as a 
necessary and unsubstitutible means to particular poetic ends. At the same time, an 
unavoidable effect of this excavation or auscultation is the re-animalisation of lan-
guage. The Western logocentric tradition has consistently sought to disembody lan-
guage, to transcend the physical, animal part of the human.6 Thus, one’s own, 
animal body is the “most forgotten Other” (“die vergessenste Fremde,” 431) of lan-
guage. It is for this same reason, writes Benjamin, that “Kafka den Husten, der aus 
seinem Innern brach, ‘das Tier’ genannt hat” (431). 
“Der Bau” can be read both as a representation of the human body and as a 
textual body, as an allegory of writing.7 These two readings are by no means mutually 
                                                   
6 See also Adriana Cavarero’s discussion of the logocentric tradition, which she reads as a history of 
the deliberate “devocalisation” of λόγος (33–41), whereby the voice (φωνή) came to be seen as nothing 
but a container for meaning, and not an instrument of expression in its own right. This is because 
while articulate speech (λόγος) defines man and sets him it apart from the other animals, the voice is 
not exclusive to humans. The voice thus always ‘speaks’ the body along with the λόγος, yoking it to the 
very animality that it tries to suppress (or, in Benjamin’s terms, to forget). On the figure of the animal 
voice in Kafka’s “Die Verwandlung,” see Driscoll “Tierstimme.” 




exclusive: the physicality of language is central to Kafka’s conception of writing and 
his own relationship to his texts.8 In the former interpretation, the “kaum hörbares 
Zischen” that destroys the animal narrator’s peace of mind is read as a textual echo 
of the sounds emanating from Kafka’s tubercular lungs.9 In the latter reading, the 
constant emphasis on the narrator’s hands (as well as his head) as the tools used to 
construct this labyrinthine network of tunnels refers metaphorically to the author’s 
hand constructing his text on the page.10 And certainly, the text itself invites just such 
a reading—the burrow started out as “ein kleines tolles Zickzackwerk von Gängen” 
which the animal narrator began to construct “halb spielerisch an diesem Eckchen” 
(586), just like the first few strokes of the pen in the top left-hand corner of the page, 
                                                                                                                                                      
work” (319). Similarly, Stanley Corngold asserts that “it is an allegorical burrow of writing” (Necessity, 
283). Gerhard Kurz provides a more exhaustive list of such interpretations of the text in his article 
“Das Rauschen der Stille” (156n7). 
8 Kafka’s oft-quoted declarations that “[Ich] bestehe aus Literatur” and “Der Roman bin ich, meine 
Geschichten sind ich” (KKAB2 15), for example, testify to his frequent desire to “merge with his writ-
ing” (Anderson Kafka’s Clothes, 35). An early indication that this transformation into language—what 
Walter Sokel described as “inlogozation” (74)—is conceived in animalistic terms, may be found in a 
diary entry from late August, 1911, in which Kafka writes “Ich lebe nur hie und da in einem kleinen 
Wort, in dessen Umlaut (oben ‘stößt’ [the word appears at the end of the previous entry]) ich z.B. auf 
einen Augenblick meinen unnützen Kopf verliere. Erster und letzter Buchstabe sind Anfang und En-
de meines fischartigen Gefühls” (KKAT 38). 
9 See, for example, Britta Maché: “If this mysterious noise heard in various parts of the burrow indeed 
represents the hissing sound accompanying the breathing of a person afflicted with tuberculosis of the 
larynx, then the burrow itself, the place in which this noise is being heard, must logically be seen as 
Kafka’s physique, including his pulmonary tract with lungs, various passageways and the air entrance-
exit of the mouth” (526–27). More recently, Tyler Whitney has productively read “Der Bau” in the con-
text of contemporary scientific studies of subjective sound and practices of auto-auscultation, reading 
the burrow not as a manifestation of the patient’s lungs but rather of the inner ear (141–96). 
10 Bettine Menke writes: “Das im Text verschwiegene, metaleptisch ausgesparte graphein stiftete den 
literalen Zusammenhang des Baus und des Textes, das heißt auch zwischen dem, was oder worüber 
das Tier erzählt, und dem, wie das Tier erzählt oder dem Erzählen selbst. Das Schreiben–Graben gibt 
also vor, daß Bestimmungen des Baus quasi-allegorisch als solche für den Text-Bau gelesen werden 




nearest the “surface.” Moreover, the burrow is presented as the narrator’s life’s 
work—the narrator regards these first few scribbles fondly as his “Erstlingswerk” 
(587)—which, in the context of the “Bau = Text” analogy, suggests that the text is not 
merely staging the process of its own production, but rather reflecting on Kafka’s en-
tire œuvre. And it is this œuvre, flawed though it may be, which the narrator seeks to 
protect from an outside threat. But what of the “enemy within,” who inhabits this 
subterranean structure and may in fact be its true owner? What is this animal that 
lives down there and threatens to undo everything the narrator has worked so hard to 
create? More importantly, if the burrow represents Kafka’s entire œuvre, has this an-
imal been there all along? 
With these questions in mind, I would like to turn to an earlier text, which is 
also in many ways uncannily reminiscent of Kafka’s “Mäusenacht” in Zürau—I say 
“uncannily” because it was written in 1914, fully three years before that experience. 
The story is told by an unnamed narrator who, seeking solitude, has taken a job as a 
railway station agent near Kalda, a remote town somewhere in the middle of the Rus-
sian Steppes. Following a series of abortive attempts at making himself self-sufficient 
in preparation for the coming winter, hampered equally by the barren environment 
and the local population, with whom he has a more or less overtly antagonistic rela-
tionship, the narrator reveals that the area is inhabited by a horde of enormous bur-
rowing rats which threaten to undermine the foundations of his lonely hut by the 
railway line by relentlessly clawing away at the walls at night. Finally, he develops an 
uncontrollable and debilitating cough, which the other railway workers refer to as 




ble environment. This condition is accompanied by a wild howling sound, the out-
ward manifestation of the narrator’s becoming-animal, which is intolerable to his 
ears, and which forces him to abandon his efforts at securing his hut from the bur-
rowing attacks of the giant rats. The story breaks off just as the narrator decides to 
return to civilization to seek medical assistance. 
This “Russian story,” otherwise known as “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn,” 
was written between mid-August and late November 1914, after Kafka and Felice 
Bauer had broken off their engagement for the first time—another eerie parallel to 
Kafka’s sojourn in Zürau, which marked the definitive end to that relationship. The 
fragment does not appear in most collections of Kafka’s short prose, but rather mere-
ly in his diaries, and has been largely ignored by Kafka scholarship.11 The few studies 
to deal with the text have generally read it in direct relation to elements of Kafka’s bi-
ography and especially as a means of shedding light on the larger project of Der 
Proceß, which Kafka was writing at the same time.12 Although the narrator’s battle 
                                                   
11 “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn”—the title is Kafka’s own (KKAT 715)—first appeared in print in 
1951 with the publication of Max Brod’s edition of Kafka’s diaries. The critical edition follows Max 
Brod’s lead on this point by reproducing the text only in the Tagebücher volume (549–53, 684–94). The 
Fischer Taschenbuch edition of Kafka’s Erzählungen, edited by Roger Hermes, likewise does not con-
tain the story, and the same is true of the Muir translation of Kafka’s Complete Stories. The only Eng-
lish translation is thus to be found in volume two of Kafka’s Diaries edited by Brod and translated by 
Martin Greenberg and Hannah Arendt. It is not clear why Brod opted not to publish the relatively long 
“Kaldabahn” fragment separately, but it is conceivable he suppressed it because of the overtly homoe-
rotic description of the relationship between the narrator and the inspector who visits him every 
month. On Brod’s heteronormative “censorship” of Kafka’s texts see Anderson “Homosexualität.” 
12 Peter-André Alt and Reiner Stach both mention the text briefly in their recent biographies of Kafka, 
the latter in reference to the fragmentary nature of the majority of Kafka’s writings (Stach 44, 496), 
the former in the context of Kafka’s uncle Josef Löwy, who was involved in the construction of a rail-
way in the Belgian Congo for nearly twelve years, and whose exploits are commonly held to have at 
least partly inspired the “Kaldabahn” story (Alt 28; cf. Northey 15–30). Hartmut Binder reads the nar-




with the local rat population has been mentioned in passing by several scholars, with 
very few exceptions, no one has yet addressed the story’s significance as a document 
of Kafka’s zoopoetics.13 In what follows, I aim to delve deeper into this enigmatic and 
little-read text in order to explore the ways in which the animal presence in this story 
may elucidate certain aspects of the relationship between animals and writing in 
Kafka’s works as a whole. Specifically, I will trace a trajectory from “Erinnerungen an 
die Kaldabahn” to “Der Bau,” exploring the ways in which the earlier text prefigures 
later forms of animality in Kafka’s zoopoetics. I will focus primarily on two key as-
pects, the first being what I refer to as the “animality of the text” itself, and the se-
cond being the problem of inhabiting or embodying the text as an animal. 
                                                                                                                                                      
(173), a view shared by Michael Müller, who furthermore posits a link to the final days of Leo Tolstoy, 
which had been prominently reported in the press four years previously (75–6). Müller’s is one of only 
two scholarly articles devoted explicitly to the “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn.” The other is by Bernd 
Neumann, who quite rightly takes issue with the preponderance of biographical readings of the story, 
but his subsequent attempt to interpret the Russian setting as an explicit reference to contemporary 
anxieties surrounding the fate of the region’s Jews in the wake of the outbreak of the First World War 
is spurious and far-fetched, and his insistence that “Kaldabahn” forms part of a trilogy of Russian sto-
ries (42)—the other two being Der Proceß and “In der Strafkolonie”—is plainly wrong and most likely 
based on a misreading of Kafka’s diary entry of 21 August 1914, in which Kafka complains of being 
“von allen drei Geschichten zurückgeworfen” before concluding that “Vielleicht ist es richtig, daß die 
russische Geschichte nur immer nach dem Proceß gearbeitet werden durfte” (KKAT 675)—a refer-
ence to “Kaldabahn,” certainly, but indisputably singular, and there is no apparent reason why Der 
Proceß (let alone “In der Strafkolonie”) should be considered a “Russian” story. 
13 Neither Müller nor Neumann pays more than the most cursory attention to the role of animality in 
the text. Karl-Heinz Fingerhut does devote several pages (69–74) to the story in his encyclopaedic sur-
vey of animals in Kafka’s works, but his approach is largely thematic, and his reading is problematic in 
places (see fn 33 below, for example). A number of other scholars mention the text in passing, in par-
ticular the episode with the rats, e.g. Elias Canetti (99), Cornelia Ortlieb (353–54), and Jacques 
Berchtold (62–8), who considers the text in his survey of the fear of rats in literature and film. In her 
“kleine Zoopoetik der Moderne” (204–5), Isolde Schiffermüller briefly constrasts the scene in which 
the narrator kills one of the rats to the image of the dying flies in Robert Musil’s “Fliegenpaper” (204–




Beyond the “uncanny” parallels between the text and Kafka’s experiences in 
Zürau—the rustic exile, the sense of being under siege by burrowing rodents, the 
debilitating lung condition, etc.—“Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn” also contains 
such a profusion of typically “Kafkaesque” topoi that it reads almost like an inventory 
of Kafka’s literary universe: the protagonist’s social alienation and his ambiguous re-
lationship to his superior; the absurdly futile enterprise of manning a train station on 
a railway line that leads nowhere; the seemingly decrepit old farmer whose powerful 
arms could have crushed a full-grown man; the almost total lack of privacy; the con-
stant threat of physical violence; the list goes on. In fact, “Erinnerungen an die Kal-
dabahn” is so thoroughly Kafkaesque thematically and linguistically (not to mention 
formally; its fragmentary nature only adds to the effect) that one is tempted to regard 
it almost as self-parody.14 I would like to propose that the animal presence in the text 
constitutes one of its most Kafkaesque features, specifically in the way it relates to the 
materiality of the text and the process of writing itself. 
                                                   
14 I am of course aware that it must appear almost comically redundant to insist that something writ-
ten by Kafka is “Kafkaesque.” Nevertheless, since the term Kafkaesque generally refers only to certain 
themes, situations or impressions that are deemed particularly characteristic of the “Kafka universe,” 
it seems reasonable to assume that even within the corpus of works produced by Franz Kafka, some 
will exhibit more Kafkaesque elements than others. In “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn,” it seems to 
me, there is an unusually high frequency of such elements, which can lead to the impression that 
Kafka is simply “having us on” here and writing in a deliberately Kafkaesque way. Although the text is 
undeniably self-ironic in places, in truth it is more likely that the story was a sort of testing ground for 
many of the elements we have since come to associate with Kafka’s literary universe and which he 




II. The Animality of the Text 
As Cornelia Ortlieb observes, Kafka’s texts are “von Tieren nicht nur gelegentlich be-
lebt, sondern außerordentlich dicht besiedelt” (339). They are literally crawling with 
animals. Indeed, perhaps more so than that of any other author of this period, Kaf-
ka’s entire œuvre is marked by a sustained engagement with animality. The animal 
presence in Kafka’s texts assumes many different forms and fulfils a variety of differ-
ent functions.15 In some cases, particularly in late stories such as “Der Bau,” “For-
schungen eines Hundes,” and “Josephine, die Sängerin oder das Volk der Mäuse,” 
the narrative voice is itself that of an animal speaking in the first person. Other texts, 
such as “Der Dorfschullehrer” (1914), “Ein junger ehrgeiziger Student” (1915), or 
“Das Synagogentier” (1922?), revolve around strange or exceptional animals that have 
attained a certain degree of fame or notoriety—a giant mole-like creature in a remote 
village; Karl Krall’s world famous Elberfeld horses that were reputed to be able to per-
form astounding feats of arithmetic; a strange greenish marten-like animal that in-
habits a dilapidated synagogue. Still others, most notably Die Verwandlung (1912) and 
“Ein Bericht für eine Akademie” (1917), describe a transformation from human to 
animal or vice-versa (or more precisely the aftermath of such a transformation). In 
most cases, as in the “Kaldabahn” text, “Der Bau,” and Die Verwandlung, the animal 
presence marks a disruption of the prevailing order, an uncanny intrusion of alterity 
that is at once unsettling and insurmountable, threatening to upend not just the pro-
                                                   




tagonists’ lives but also the narrative itself. It is this disruptive form of animality that 
I will be exploring in this chapter.16 
In the terms elaborated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their 
influential 1975 study on Kafka, animality serves primarily to deterritorialise estab-
lished discourses and power structures by transgressing or eradicating seemingly 
strictly defined boundaries and opening up new possibilities for dehierarchised sets 
of dynamic relations constantly interacting through contagions, allegiances, and be-
comings. If “becoming-animal” plays a prominent role in Kafka’s work, it is, they ar-
gue, because such becoming constitutes a “way out” or a “line of flight” out of the 
Oedipal family structure of domination and frustrated desire that Kafka is known for, 
and into which the biographical and psychoanalytic readings that dominated Kafka 
scholarship in the nineteen-fifties and sixties tended to want to reinscribe him.17 Crit-
ics of Deleuze and Guattari have pointed out the inherent paradox of choosing be-
coming-animal as an emblem of deterritorialisation when in reality animals tend to 
be highly territorial (cf. Baudrillard 139). Clearly, they are not talking about really ex-
                                                   
16 I will not be considering the majority of the animal-narrator texts (“Josefine,” “Forschungen eines 
Hundes,” etc.) because in theses texts the animal presence does not strictly speaking constitute a 
threat to the established order of the narrative. One might of course argue that a non-human narrative 
perspective is always inherently alienating because of its capacity to undermine or negate dominant 
humanist assumptions about language and agency, but this lies beyond the scope of the present chap-
ter. 
17 To cite just one particularly illustrative example: in a 1966 essay, Carol B. Bedwell draws a series of 
strict parallels between the short prose piece “Ein altes Blatt,” (1917, published 1919), and Kafka’s fa-
mous letter to his father (written, but never sent, in 1919, published posthumously in 1952), trans-
forming the former into little more than an encrypted version of the latter, before concluding that 
“this brief sketch represents an intensely personal outcry born of painful experience. The close paral-
lels with the Letter make it clear enough that we need seek no other interpretation” (47–48). Certainly, 
when faced with such statements, it becomes easier to see why Deleuze and Guattari are at such pains 




isting animals, any more than Bataille is when he casts animality as a state of radical-
ly undifferentiated immanence. ‘Animality’ and ‘animal’ here name the very process 
of deterritorialisation itself, where the figure of the animal poses a threat to estab-
lished orders and boundaries precisely because those orders and boundaries are con-
ceived as anthropo- and logocentric. 
The problem with Deleuze and Guattari’s reading lies not so much in this 
narrow definition of animality; it is that for them becoming-animal always serves as 
an escape route out of this Oedipal reality, and, crucially, that the “lines of flight” that 
such becomings open up appear to exist primarily for Franz Kafka himself, not the 
characters in his narratives, except insofar as they are read as thinly-veiled stand-ins 
for their author. And since all instances of animality serve as vehicles for such deter-
ritorialising, anti-Oedipal becomings, one animal is generally as good as any other. 
That is to say, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence on the importance of multi-
plicities and assemblages, their definition of becoming-animal makes it very difficult 
to account for or even acknowledge different types of animality within a text.18 As we 
will see, Kafka often aspires to a certain kind of becoming-animal, conceived as a 
symbiosis of writer and text, and this is a cornerstone of his zoopoetics. But there are 
other kinds of animal becomings which are highly involuntary and threatening. 
Whereas the former is primarily associated with horses and practices of animal train-
ing, the latter revolve around untameable, intractable animals, rats and mice and 
other Ungeziefer. Both involve a form of deterritorialisation, to be sure, but they have 
                                                   
18 Compare Rainer Nägele’s observation that “in Kafkas Tieren eine konstitutive Beziehung zu einem 




quite different valences within Kafka’s poetics—or rather, Kafka’s zoopoetics is in-
formed by the very tension between these two forms of animality in and of the text. 
The question of the animal penetrates to the very core of Kafka’s literary production. 
As noted above, his texts are inhabited by a vast array of animals, many of which ap-
pear to be far more “at home” there than the protagonists, who feel perennially iso-
lated and excluded from their surroundings, forever waiting to be allowed in, or 
under threat of being kicked out. But there is also a sense in which the text itself and 
the language in which it is written has become animal, and it is this, I would argue, 
that makes Kafka’s poetics a poetics of animality. 
Animetaphor 
It is striking how many of the animals in Kafka’s texts resist precise description. 
When certain scholars flatly refer to the narrator of “Der Bau” as a “badger,” for in-
stance, or attempt definitively to determine the species of “Ungeziefer” into which 
Gregor Samsa is transformed,19 they fail to acknowledge the fundamental indetermi-
nacy of these animals, which is quite deliberate, as underlined by Kafka’s express 
prohibition against depicting the creature on the cover of Die Verwandlung.20 But it is 
                                                   
19 The most famous example is surely Vladimir Nabokov’s triumphant (though no doubt at least semi-
ironic) discovery, based on the sparse anatomical information provided by the text, that Gregor would 
have been about three-feet long and most likely equipped with “flimsy little wings” that could have 
carried him “for miles and miles in a blundering flight.” “Curiously enough,” he adds, “Gregor the 
beetle never found out that he had wings under the hard covering of his back. (This is a very nice ob-
servation on my part to be treasured all your lives. Some Gregors, some Joes and Janes, do not know 
that they have wings.)” (259). 
20 In a letter to the Kurt Wolff Verlag dated 25 October 1915, Kafka implored his publisher not to place 
an illustration of the insect on the front cover of Die Verwandlung: “Das Insekt selbst kann nicht ge-




not only the animal protagonists of Kafka’s texts that are subject to such indetermi-
nacy: it also applies to animals as objects of observation and study, such as the giant 
mole of “Der Dorfschullehrer,” whose existence cannot be definitively proven, and 
which no one may actually even have seen—an irreducible ambiguity encapsulated 
in the title of the very work meant to demonstrate the existence to this extraordinary 
creature: “Ein Maulwurf, so groß, wie ihn noch niemand gesehen hat” (KKANI 199, 
emphasis added). 
Similarly, the strange marten-like animal in the synagogue (KKANII 405–11), 
which many claim to have seen and is apparently “oft sehr gut zu sehn” (405), never-
theless recedes into ineffability as soon as the narrator attempts to describe its physi-
cal characteristics in more detail: it has bluish-green fur, he writes, but no one has 
ever touched it and “es läßt sich also darüber nichts sagen, fast möchte man behaup-
ten, daß auch die wirkliche Farbe des Felles unbekannt ist” (406). The observable 
colour of the animal’s fur may in fact be a product of its environment, the narrator 
suggests, since it is the same colour as the crumbling plasterwork on the inside of 
the synagogue, and he assumes that its “true” colour is likely something else, some-
thing indeterminable. But we might equally read this as an indication that the animal 
is not only indistinguishable from its surroundings, but actually an inextricable part 
of them: just as the animal is snugly ensconced in the synagogue, so too is it thor-
oughly embedded in its history and the discourse surrounding it. The story of the 




temple, whose disruptions eventually become part of the ritual21—the apparent an-
tagonism between the locals and the animal is in fact a strange form of symbiosis. 
Attempts to drive the animal out form an intrinsic part of the story and can thus nev-
er succeed. In the distant past, such an attempt was supposedly made—the narrator 
is sceptical about the veracity of these accounts, however, opining that they are most 
likely “erfundene Geschichten” (KKANII 410). Various esteemed rabbis are said to 
have weighed in on the question whether, “vom religionsgesetzlichen Standpunkt,” 
such an animal can be tolerated in a house of God, and the majority recommended 
that the animal be driven out, “aber es war leicht von der Ferne zu dekretieren, in 
Wirklichkeit war es ja unmöglich, das Tier zu vertreiben” (411). This final sentence, 
which Kafka rewrote multiple times (KKANII App., 336–8), provides a hint as to the 
nature of the difficulty of expelling the animal: the internal rhyme between “dekre-
tieren” and “das Tier,” which appears from the third emendation onward, suggests 
that the animal is literally part of the words in which the decree is formulated. The 
animal is thus “always already” part of the very discourse that is set up to exclude it. 
Like the “Wesen der innern Erde” whom not even legends, let alone rational scien-
tific discourse, can describe, the “Synagogentier” and the other ineffable animals in 
Kafka’s texts resist description and encapsulation by language even as they exert an 
inescapable influence on the discourses that seek to circumscribe them. 
                                                   
21 I am referring, of course, to Kafka’s twentieth “Zürau Aphorism”: “Leoparden brechen in den Tem-
pel ein und saufen die Opferkrüge leer; das wiederholt sich immer wieder; schließlich kann man es 




They are, in other words, animetaphors: at once “inside” and “outside” lan-
guage, omnipresent and yet ungraspable. They are that which rational, logocentric 
discourse has sought to exclude or eradicate, to expel from its “house,” but has never 
truly succeeded. Language, in Heidegger’s famous formulation, “ist das Haus des 
Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch” (HGA 9: 313). This house is also tem-
ple, strictly demarcated space,22 a precinct: “Die Sprache ist der Bezirk (templum), 
d.h. das Haus des Seins” (HGA 5: 310). But, as Kafka repeatedly emphasises in his 
texts, this borough (Bezirk) may turn out to be a burrow, and although man may 
dwell there, it has other, non-human inhabitants as well, who may have been there 
before him, and regard him as nothing but “ein wüster Lump, der wohnen will ohne 
zu bauen” (KKANII 596). In the allegorically charged universe in which Kafka’s nar-
ratives unfold, everything appears to take on metaphorical significance but it can be 
difficult or impossible to pin down what that significance is exactly, especially when it 
comes to animals. In the case of the giant rats in the “Kaldabahn” text, as we shall 
see, their incessant burrowing quickly develops into a metaphor for literary produc-
tion, and this metaphorical association is underlined after the narrator literally “pins” 
a rat to the wall with his knife and examines it carefully and impassively. Yet in the 
context of the story, the rats’ “production” is inherently destructive, perceived by the 
narrator as a threat from outside which he must endeavour to put a stop to. As in 
“Der Bau,” the narrator is thus at pains to uphold the boundary he has established 
                                                   
22 C.T. Onions gives the etymology of temple as “L. templum space marked out by an augur for taking 
observations, broad open space, consecrated space, sanctuary, prob. rel. to Gr. témenos reserved or sa-
cred enclosure, f. base of témnein cut (cf. tmesis, tome).” Recall Serafino Gubbio’s practice of “mark-




between inside and outside, while the rats for their part labour tirelessly to under-
mine it. This too may be said to be characteristic of the function of animetaphor: it is 
something external to language but which is simultaneously at the very centre of lin-
guistic expression. As such, it also has the power to make language “other” and to 
dispossess its user of exclusive ownership. 
Horsemanship 
Kafka frequently refers to his texts in animalistic terms. More specifically, on several 
occasions he conceives of them as horses and of his task as a writer as that of a rider 
or trainer, who must try to make them bend to his will and steer them in the right 
direction. As Malcolm Pasley writes: “die Metapher ‘Pferd’ für ‘Erzählung’, bzw. ‘Rei-
ter’, ‘Pferdedressur’ usw. für ‘Erzähler’ [zieht] sich durch Kafkas ganzes Schaffen 
[hindurch]” (“Wie der Roman entstand,” 26). Pasley points to the “Elberfeld” frag-
ment (a.k.a. “Ein junger ehrgeiziger Student,” written ca. Dec. 1914–Jan. 1915), as a 
commentary on Kafka’s growing frustration with his lack of progress on his novel 
Der Proceß, and his misgivings about the new system of “dressage” he had been at-
tempting to bring to bear on his writing. In the story, a young, ambitious student 
plans to acquire a horse and train it according to his new method, with which “wahr-
scheinlich jede Starrköpfigkeit überwunden werden konnte” (KKANI 225). Because 
of his limited financial means, he plans to abandon his studies and give private les-
sons during the day in order to be able to devote his nights to the actual business of 




traction of the horse’s attention would do irreparable damage to his dressage.23 The 
best way to avoid distractions is to work at night: “Nur die Nacht ist die Zeit der ein-
dringenden Dressur” (KKANI 416). 
The parallels to Kafka’s own habit of writing at night are sufficiently clear—
more interesting is the conception of this nocturnal pedagogy (or rather, I suppose, 
hippogogy) not as a process of domestication, but rather of coaxing out and cultivat-
ing the wildness of the animal: 
Die Reizbarkeit, von der Mensch und Tier, wenn sie in der Nacht wachen 
und arbeiten, ergriffen werden, war in seinem Plan ausdrücklich verlangt. 
Er fürchtete nicht wie andere Sachverständige die Wildheit des Pferdes, er 
forderte sie vielmehr, ja er wollte sie erzeugen, zwar nicht durch die Peit-
sche aber durch das Reizmittel seiner unablässigen Anwesenheit und des 
unablässigen Unterrichts. (KKANI 227) 
This is probably as close to a definition of his zoopoetics as Kafka ever formulated. 
The most important aspect of the student’s plan is that it calls for exceptional recep-
tivity to stimuli on the part of the human as well as the animal. This is a reciprocal 
process—the young man is both a teacher and a student, after all, and he is only in-
terested in an “allgemeinen Fortschritt,” not the pitiful and embarrassing “einzelne 
Fortschritte” (227) that his rivals have been content to vaunt themselves with. 
The student’s interest in the Elberfeld horses is spurred by his conviction that, 
given the right method and sufficient patience, it will be possible to achieve some-
                                                   
23 On the significance of these recurring “Augenblicke der Unaufmerksamkeit” in Kafka, see Nägele 
“Auf der Suche.” The most prominent example is no doubt the fate of the Jäger Gracchus, whose tale is 
framed by dual lapses in attention: first the hunter’s own, when he is distracted from his wolf-hunt by 
a chamois and plunges to his death, and second by the helmsman of his death ship, who “verfehlte die 
Fahrt,” dooming Gracchus to sail the waters of the earth for eternity, trapped, like many of Kafka’s 




thing approaching true symbiosis of horse and rider, such as that expressed in 
“Wunsch, Indianer zu werden” (KKAD 32–33), where the horse’s head and neck 
gradually disappear along with the need for reins and spurs, until the horse and its 
rider become seamlessly merged in what Detlef Kremer calls a “kentaurische Ver-
schmelzung” (“Verschollen,” 247). The fact that this fusion of man and horse is 
achieved by purely linguistic means—the subtle, almost imperceptible transition 
from subjunctive to indicative—allows this image to serve as an emblem of an ideal 
form of writing, an ideal also gestured towards in the name of the protagonist of Kaf-
ka’s first unfinished novel, Der Verschollene: Karl Roßmann (literally: horse-man). 
Let us recall Walter Benjamin’s comment that Kafka’s animals “sind wohl 
nicht das Ziel; aber ohne sie geht es nicht” (“Kafka,” 430). Kafka’s poetics is a poetics 
of animality because in order to reach his goal, an animal is required. But what is the 
goal? A possible answer may be found in a short text entitled “Der Aufbruch” (1921), 
which presents an image of a rider embarking on such a zoopoetic journey: “Ich be-
fahl mein Pferd aus dem Stall zu holen. Der Diener verstand mich nicht. Ich ging 
selbst in den Stall, sattelte mein Pferd und bestieg es.” When the manservant asks 
him where he is going, the narrator replies: 
“nur weg von hier, nur weg von hier. Immerfort weg von hier, nur so kann 
ich mein Ziel erreichen.” “Du kennst also dein Ziel?”, fragte er. “Ja”, ant-
wortete ich, “ich sagte es doch: ‘Weg-von-hier’, das ist mein Ziel.” (KKANII 
374–75) 
The telos of this “wahrhaft ungeheuere Reise” is simply “away-from-here”—it is, if 
you will, an infinite “line of flight” with no possible destination or end point. Kafka’s 




matters, it “does not strive towards an end” and thus “cannot be completed” (qtd. in 
Corngold “Metamorphosis,” 92). A rider embarking on such a journey should not 
hope to reach the next village—the ride is all there is. 
Such zoopoetic experiments are not without risk, however, and for the most 
part the successful fusion of horse and rider, text and writer, proves unattainable—it 
is significant that the “kentaurische Verschmelzung” of “Wunsch, Indianer zu wer-
den” is presented as a dream or a fantasy. The “Elberfeld” text ends with a profession 
of the young student’s diffidence in his ability to deliver the total, unblinking concen-
tration that his method requires. A moment’s inattention is all it takes to derail the 
entire undertaking: “Ein Pferd stolperte, fiel auf die Vorderbeine nieder, der Reiter 
wurde abgeworfen” (KKANII 298). Sometimes such accidents seem to mark the be-
ginning of a new narrative, but these texts usually break off after a few sentences. 
“Der Aufbruch” is an exception in this regard, because its hero is lucky enough to 
find his horse and saddle it himself, despite the incompetence and incomprehension 
of his servants. But in most cases, either the rider is too weak to ride,24 or it is the 
wrong horse altogether,25 or else the horse has mysteriously died during the night,26 
as at the beginning of “Ein Landarzt,” forcing the protagonist to make use of two 
                                                   
24 “Ich wurde zu meinem Pferd geführt, ich war aber noch sehr schwach.” (KKANI 417) 
25 “Das ist nicht mein Pferd, sagte ich als mir der Knecht des Gasthofes am Morgen ein Pferd vorführ-
te” (417) 
26 “in den Pelz gepackt, die Instrumententasche in der Hand, stand ich reisefertig schon auf dem Ho-
fe; aber das Pferd fehlte, das Pferd. Mein eigenes Pferd war in der letzten Nacht, infolge der Überan-




demonic, unearthly steeds that he cannot control and leave him stranded in the fro-
zen winter landscape.27 
Brief images of difficult or failed animal training abound in Kafka’s writings, 
especially in the later notebooks. In the so-called “Konvolut 1920,” for instance, we 
find the story of the famous Dresseur Burson, who has been called upon to assess the 
“Dressurfähigkeit” of a tiger, which, having been recently fed, lazily looks around the 
“Dressurkäfig,” yawns and promptly falls asleep (KKANII 269), marking the end of 
the text. (This well-fed tiger is no doubt a cousin of the panther that supersedes the 
“Hungerkünstler” in his cage). More troubling is the strange kangaroo-like animal 
with the “viele Meter langen fuchsartigen Schweif,” which the narrator of a slightly 
later fragment says he would like to hold in his hand, but cannot because the animal 
won’t sit still and keeps its tail in constant motion. “Manchmal habe ich das Gefühl 
daß mich das Tier dressieren will” he writes: “was hätte es sonst für einen Zweck 
mir den Schwanz zu entziehn, wenn ich nach ihm greife, dann wieder ruhig zu war-
ten, bis es mich wieder verlockt und dann von neuem weiterzuspringen” (KKANII 
335). In this comical scene, the roles are reversed: instead of training the animal, it is 
the narrator who is being trained. The animal’s large bushy tail exhibits a certain 
similarity to a quill, and if the narrator could only manage to grasp it, he might be 
able to harness the wild animality of this creature and channel it into his own artistic 
                                                   
27 Isolde Schiffermüller views the texts published in the collection Ein Landarzt (1920), most of which 
were written in 1917, as records (“Protokolle”) of the nocturnal experiments announced in the “Elber-
feldheft.” And, to be sure, there is a conspicuous abundance of horses in the stories contained in that 
volume. “Es sind Erzählungen, die die Grenze der menschlichen Sprachordnung befragen und die 
Schwelle erkunden, an der sich die Stimme der Tiere von der Sprache der Signifikanten scheidet” 




project. At the same time, the narrator’s myopic focus on the animal’s tail hints at 
the phrase “das Pferd beim Schwanz aufzäumen,” suggesting that he may be putting 
the cart before the horse and that his whole approach is hopelessly misguided. The 
idealised, wished-for form of becoming-animal in Kafka’s texts invariably involves 
potentially tameable animals (horses, dogs, apes, tigers, fox-tailed kangaroos, etc.), 
and when the protagonists’ efforts at controlling or training these animals result in 
failure, the result is almost always comical. By contrast, the involuntary becomings-
animal, which involve intractable and abject animals (wolves, rats, insects), are terri-
fyingly successful. 
III. “Ein widerspenstiger Boden” 
As Malcolm Pasley has observed, throughout his work, Kafka “sets up effigies (or 
even caricatures) of himself, follows them with a greater or lesser degree of implicit 
irony through their fictive situations, and condemns them for the most part to de-
struction” (“Burrow,” 424–25). There is always a temptation to want to identify Kafka 
with his protagonists, but these ironic self-portraits reveal the danger of doing so. 
The magnificent Burson, the young ambitious student, and the countless other un-
named protagonists who try in vain to assert themselves in the face of the text and 
the animals that populate it, are not Kafka; their failures are not Kafka’s failures. And 
perhaps our sympathies should not lie with them. Let us return now to the “Kalda-





If “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn” has primarily been read biographically 
and/or allegorically as a self-reflexive meditation on Kafka’s life as a writer, it is be-
cause this text, like so many of Kafka’s writings, seems to invite just such an interpre-
tation. In the second half, the narrator’s antagonistic relationship to his surroundings 
and the indigenous fauna ultimately forces him to abandon his position with the 
railway company and return to civilization, at which point the text breaks off. In this, 
as in other aspects, the fate of the protagonist of the “Kaldabahn” fragment appears 
to mirror Kafka’s own experience while writing it. Michael Müller notes that the final 
sentence, describing the narrator’s decision to seek medical assistance in Kalda, is 
crossed out in the manuscript (KKAT App. 358), and concludes that Kafka deleted the 
sentence “weil es sich um das endgültige und definitive Eingeständnis gehandelt hät-
te, daß das Lebensexperiment gescheitert ist: es bleibt ihm nur die Flucht aus der 
Einöde heraus zurück zu den Menschen” (Müller “Wohin?” 82–3). Based on the 
ductus of these final lines, Müller surmises that Kafka’s Kalda “experiment” came to 
an end in November 1914, roughly three months after he had begun writing the story 
(76).28 Shortly thereafter, Kafka wrote in his diary that he could not go on writing, 
that he had reached his limit, “[u]nd wie irgendein gänzlich von Menschen losge-
                                                   
28 Here, again, the story appears to mirror the conditions under which it was written. Kafka began 
writing it in mid-August; as the narrator arrives in Kalda it is still summer and he frequently mentions 
the need to prepare for the coming winter. Kafka seems to have abandoned the story in mid-to-late-
November, roughly three months after it was begun; some three months after his arrival in Kalda, the 
narrator falls ill with his mysterious wolf’s cough and is forced to leave his post with the railway com-
pany. Despite these precise temporal markers, however, the chronology of the text frequently appears 
protracted or otherwise unreliable. The inspector, for instance, comes once a month to check the log-
books, which means that he can only have come two or three times before the narrator falls ill, and yet 
his visits are described in a way that implies a continuity and routine that can hardly have established 




trenntes Tier schaukele ich schon wieder den Hals und möchte versuchen für die 
Zwischenzeit wieder F zu bekommen” (KKAT 702). Müller thus interprets the narra-
tor’s self-imposed Russian exile as a metaphor for Kafka’s determination to isolate 
himself from the world following his break-up with Felice. 
But what of Kafka’s animal simile (“wie irgendein gänzlich von Menschen 
losgetrenntes Tier”)? We might take this to correspond to the narrator’s curious ill-
ness, which the locals know as “Wolfshusten,” and which spells the end of his “Le-
bensexperiment.” Thus, having become (like) an animal, Kafka abandons the story 
just as his narrator abandons his position at the railway when his own becoming-
animal begins to manifest itself. According to the “rules” elaborated by Deleuze and 
Guattari concerning the development of Kafka’s stories into novels, this is inevitable, 
for, as they write, “when a text deals essentially with a becoming-animal, it cannot be 
developed into a novel,” whereas “a text that can be the seed of a novel will be aban-
doned if Kafka imagines an animal escape that allows him to finish with it” (Kafka, 
38). In this case, then, it is the narrator’s becoming-wolf that constitutes an “animal 
escape” (for Kafka, that is) and thus marks the end of the story. But the narrator’s de-
cision to move to this remote place was already conceived as an escape from his eve-
ryday existence, for reasons “die nicht hierhergehören” (KKAT 549)—which means 
that this would effectively be an escape from an escape.29 Deleuze and Guattari do 
                                                   
29 We may note the parallel here (particularly in the context of Kafka’s failed engagement with Felice) 
with K.’s conversation with Pepi in Das Schloß, in which he admits to having neglected his fiancée 
Frieda, and that that is the most likely reason she left him: “Das ist leider wahr, ich habe sie vernach-
lässigt, aber das hatte besondere Gründe, die nicht hierher gehören; ich wäre glücklich, wenn sie zu mir 
zurückkäme, aber ich würde gleich wieder anfangen, sie zu vernachlässigen” (KKAS 480, emphasis 




not actually discuss the narrator’s “Wolfshusten” in their essay on Kafka, but rather 
only his encounter with the rats. “Kafka,” they write, “is fascinated by everything that 
is small” (37),30 but as his Zürau letters attest, this fascination is more akin to abject 
terror, and in any case the defining characteristic of the rats in the “Kaldabahn” story 
is their unusually large size. Furthermore, the progression from becoming-animal to 
becoming-molecular and imperceptible, which Deleuze and Guattari identify in the 
stories as a factor in the transition from animal to the machinic assemblage explored 
in the novels, is in fact reversed in “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn”: the rats at first 
appear as an undifferentiated mass of black dots advancing on the narrator’s hut, but 
he later stabs one of these rats with his knife and lifts it up to scrutinise it “in Au-
genhöhe” as an individual specimen. 
                                                                                                                                                      
solved issues of familial shame and guilt, which go unspoken but nevertheless continue to haunt the 
text. In Das Urteil, for instance, when Georg’s father accuses him of not telling the truth (about his 
friend in Russia? or about something else?), he adds: “Ich will nicht Dinge aufrühren, die nicht hierher 
gehören. Seit dem Tode unserer teueren Mutter sind gewisse unschöne Dinge vorgegangen” (KKAD 
52, emphasis added)—including, presumably, Georg’s engagement to Frieda Brandenfeld, (another 
Frieda, whose initials mirror those of Felice Bauer, a link Kafka himself emphasised). Similarly, in 
“Der Heizer” (the first chapter of Der Verschollene, written in late September 1912, just days after Das 
Urteil), Karl Roßmann’s uncle explains that he has been living apart from his European relatives for 
years “aus Gründen, die erstens nicht hierher gehören, und die zweitens zu erzählen mich wirklich zu 
sehr hernehmen würde” (KKAD 96, emphasis added). He says that he dreads the day when he may be 
forced to tell his nephew the reasons for his exile, because it will require him to speak frankly about 
Karl’s parents and their relatives. These reasons that ‘do not belong’ and ‘shall go unmentioned’ thus 
seem to pertain primarily to Oedipal relations, which through the rhetorical gesture of paralipsis are 
invoked through the very process of dismissing them and thus placed “under erasure.” If becoming-
animal serves as a “line of flight” out of such Oedipal structures of frustrated desire, then the need for 
a second, animal escape might be explained by the fact that in beginning with such a paraliptic ges-
ture, the text represents a failure to find a way out of the Gründe it seeks to leave behind. 




As the narrator explains, one of the reasons he decided to take this job as a 
railway station agent in the middle of the Russian steppe was the prospect of hunt-
ing: 
Man hatte mir gesagt, es sei eine außerordentlich wildreiche Gegend und 
ich hatte mir schon ein Gewehr gesichert, das ich mir, wenn ich einiges 
Geld erspart haben würde, nachschicken lassen wollte. Nun zeigte sich daß 
von jagdbarem Wild hier keine Spur war, nur Wölfe und Bären sollten hier 
vorkommen, in den ersten Monaten sah ich keine, und außerdem waren 
eigentümliche große Ratten hier, die ich gleich beobachten konnte, wie sie 
in Mengen wie vom Wind geweht über die Steppe liefen. Aber das Wild, auf 
das ich mich gefreut hatte gab es nicht. (688–9) 
The narrator’s ambition of becoming a hunter, of tracking and killing his own game, 
has to do with his desire to become “möglichst unabhängig von allen” (552), just as 
his plans to purchase a cow and cultivate a small vegetable patch. The lack of suitable 
game for the narrator to hunt is thus an additional blow to his bid for independence 
and self-sufficiency, and is instrumental in exacerbating his already fragile health. 
The shotgun he has procured is rendered superfluous, so he never sends for it, but 
even the tools he does have prove ineffectual in taming this wilderness. The narra-
tor’s efforts to till the soil also result in failure because “ich war zu schwach um die-
sen Boden zu bezwingen. Ein widerspenstiger Boden, der bis ins Frühjahr 
festgefroren war und selbst meiner neuen scharfen Hacke widerstand” (552). As a 
result of this strenuous and frustrating work, the narrator suffers “Ver-
zweiflungsanfälle” and takes to his bed in the cabin, not even emerging to greet the 
passing trains. 
“Widerspenstiger Boden” is also the phrase used by the animal narrator of 




row (KKANII 601). The narrator of the “Kaldabahn” fragment, however, is in every 
respect ill-equipped to undertake such domesticating measures, and is ultimately un-
able to carve out a liveable space for himself in these harsh surroundings. The land-
scape around his cabin is described as a featureless, frozen wasteland, stretching “in 
einer einzigen Fläche” in every direction “ohne die geringste Erhöhung” (552) as far 
as the eye can see. As always in Kafka, this flat, white expanse seems to indicate the 
blank page, upon which the author is vainly trying to make his mark.31 It is across 
this white expanse that the narrator observes the mass of black dots converging on 
the railway station—“Es waren ganze Gesellschaften, ganze Trupps” (686). At first 
he takes these apparitions for a mere optical illusion, caused by the distance separat-
ing him from his hut, but it later becomes clear that these are in fact the first sign of 
the hordes of giant indigenous rats mentioned later in the text. Here, they are de-
scribed in both social and militaristic terms, doubly opposed to the narrator both pas-
sively (he is solitary; they form a group or community) and actively (like a marauding 
army descending on his defenceless hut). Like the footprints of the small arctic dogs 
which the “Kübelreiter” follows across the “Weißgefrorene Eisfläche” (KKANI App., 
                                                   
31 Michael Müller presents physical evidence to support this reading: “Die ersten beiden Abschnitte 
des Kaldabahn-Textes sind mit einer offenbar schon stark abgenutzten Feder geschrieben […] im wei-
teren Verlauf der Niederschrift hat die Feder angefangen, sich zu spreizen, so daß Doppelkonturen 
entstanden. Im dritten Abschnitt hat Kafka dann die defekte Feder durch eine neue ersetzt” (80). The 
“neue scharfe Hacke” the narrator mentions shortly thereafter may thus be taken to allude to this new-
ly replaced writing instrument. 
Compare also this untitled fragment from the spring of 1922, where Kafka employs the same 
extended metaphor: “Ich wollte mich im Unterholz verstecken, mit der Hacke bahnte ich mir ein 
Stück Weges, dann verkroch ich mich und war geborgen” (KKANII 370). Jochen Thermann has traced 
the image of trailblazing in Kafka’s writings, with particular reference to Rotpeter’s search for an 
“Ausweg” and his use of the phrase “sich in die Büsche schlagen” as a metaphor for forging a new 




275; Kremer Erotik, 26–29), these black dots on a white background suggest letters or 
words on the page—words which, moreover, the narrator is unable to read or ade-
quately interpret. 
The next encounter with the rats occurs at much closer quarters. The narrator, 
still without a shotgun, resorts to defending himself and his food supplies from the 
rats with a long knife. Once, having stabbed one of these encroaching rats, he lifts it 
up on the end of his knife and pins it against the wall in order to observe its pathetic 
struggle for life, and, he insists, to get a clear, detailed look at these creatures. “Man 
sieht kleinere Tiere erst dann genau,” he says, “wenn man sie vor sich in Augenhöhe 
hat; wenn man sich zu ihnen zur Erde beugt und sie dort ansieht, bekommt man ei-
ne falsche unvollständige Vorstellung von ihnen” (689). The narrator’s objectifying 
gaze and quasi-scientific interest in documenting the physical features of this rat is 
made possible only through an act of casual violence and cruelty. His insistence on 
scrutinising the animal at eye-level is in no way geared toward establishing an equal 
or de-hierarchised basis for inter-specific encounter, but rather cements the pre-
existing power-dynamic inherent in the relationship between human subject and an-
imal object. 
And yet, the encounter also contains a specular moment of sorts, revealing, 
once the observer and the observed find themselves at eye-level with each other, a po-
tential avenue of identification and exchange which is then promptly abandoned, and 
things appear to go back to how they were before. But in fact something does pass 
between these two at this moment. There is a transference of agency, or at least an 




the course of the narrative from this point forward. “Das Auffallendste an diesen Rat-
ten,” the narrator writes, 
waren die Krallen, groß, ein wenig gehöhlt und am Ende doch zugespitzt, 
sie waren sehr zum Graben geeignet. Im letzten Krampf, in dem die Ratte 
vor mir an der Wand hieng, spannte sie dann die Krallen scheinbar gegen 
ihre lebendige Natur straff aus, sie waren einem Händchen ähnlich, das 
sich einem entgegenstreckt. (690) 
Here, again, a metaleptic substitution of digging or burrowing (graben) for writing 
(graphein)32 suggests itself through the description of this animal’s quill-like claws, 
even as, in its death throes, the rat becomes anthropomorphised, its claws coming to 
resemble a tiny human hand, reaching out imploringly to its fellow creature. This 
gesture occurs seemingly “against its nature.” The species fellowship fleetingly 
glimpsed at this extreme moment runs counter to the “natural” order of hostile rela-
tions, which, moreover, are predicated on the rats’ superior digging capability just as 
much as they are on the narrator’s casually violent acts of self-preservation. That is to 
say, the fact that the claws of these indigenous rats are uniquely suited to digging 
contrasts sharply with the narrator’s ineffectual attempts at tilling this foreign and 
intractable soil. Thus burrowing is quite literally in their nature, and, as the narrator 
                                                   
32 Various critics have explored this link, particularly with reference to Der Bau. In addition to the pas-
sage in Menke cited in footnote 10 above, see also Detlef Kremer: “Der Zusammenhang von ‘graben’ 
und ‘schreiben’ ist über das griechische ‘graphein’ etymologisch möglich, Schreiben ist ein Vorgang 
des Eingravierens. Kafka hat mit dieser etymologischen Referenz häufiger gespielt und sie bisweilen 
um Anspielungen erweitert” (Erotik, 151), and Hans-Jörg Bay: “Da es sich bei diesem Werk um eine 
Höhle handelt und sich das Bauen somit als Graben vollzieht, wird ein Verständnis von Schreiben 
(graphein) als Graben und Eingraben aufgerufen, zusätzlich überdeterminiert durch Andeutungen, 
die den Bau in der Entgegensetzung zur ‘Oberwelt’ und zum ‘Leben’ als eine Art Grab erscheinen 
lassen” (60). Cf. also Gerhard Kurz: “Schon der Bau als Ort in der Unterwelt ist ein ‘Grab’, das sich 




fast discovers, it takes the form of relentless and destructive nocturnal “attacks” on 
his hut and his livelihood. 
The narrator’s urge to counteract the “falsche unvollständige Vorstellung” of 
the animal reveals his desire to grasp the object in its entirety, from a rational, objec-
tive perspective. But it is in fact this perspective that is wrong: it is a mistake to think 
that one can ever know the object completely, least of all if one persists in thinking of 
it as entirely different from oneself. Thus when the narrator realises that the rat’s 
claws are like a human hand, it undermines the rational, anthropocentric perspec-
tive, establishing a metaphorical link (“einem Händchen ähnlich”) between man and 
animal. When the narrator pinned the rat to the wall, it became a specimen, an object 
of detached, rational observation. The act of lifting the animal up into “Augenhöhe” 
is tantamount to fixing the non-linguistic in language, constraining it to a strictly 
defined and immutable concept. “The animal dies at the moment it is thrust into 
contact with abstraction, with language” (Lippit Electric, 48). While pinned to the wall 
of the narrator’s hut, the dead, anthropomorphised rat suddenly becomes compre-
hensible at a human scale. But down below, “im Innern der Erde,” the digging con-
tinues. What is more, this subterranean murine activity is not only unavoidable; it is 
an indispensible part of the structure of the text—and, indeed, of language itself. 
In a short fragment from 1922, Kafka writes: “Der allerunterste Raum des 
Oceandampfers, der das ganze Schiff durchgeht, ist völlig leer, allerdings ist er kaum 
ein Meter hoch. Die Konstruktion des Schiffes verlangt diesen leeren Raum. Ganz 
leer ist er freilich nicht, er gehört den Ratten” (KKANII 421). This ocean-liner is a 




clear exactly why this hollow space is necessary. Presumably this pocket of air serves 
to stabilise the ship and keep it afloat. But it is a mistake to think of this space as 
empty simply because it is not suited to human occupancy. This space, unused and 
incompatible with human measurements, is nevertheless integral to the functioning 
of the superstructure. Any attempt to eliminate it would run the risk of scuttling the 
entire vessel. The goal, therefore, has to be to find a way of setting aside a space and 
thus integrating the unavoidable animal presence into the blueprints, lest the ship be 
overrun by these “unerwarteten, ungebetenen, unvermeidbaren” creatures, with their 
silent, determined, secret objectives. 
IV. Inhabiting the Text 
The narrator’s hut, we read, is actually more of a shed, left over from when the rail-
way was being built, consisting of a single room equipped with a bunk and a desk 
“für mögliche Schreibarbeiten” (550). He does not, however, appear to engage in any 
writing beyond the bookkeeping required of his job, with which the inspector who 
comes once a month automatically finds fault. But in any case this is a different kind 
of writing than the “graben” toward which the rats are so naturally predisposed, and 
the “gardening” which the narrator so abortively attempted. The ability to burrow 
through the frozen earth, rather than simply to build tracks across it, tracks which 
lead nowhere and serve no purpose but which must nevertheless be endlessly and 
rigorously maintained—that is the truly transformative writing to which Kafka and so 
many of his protagonists aspire. “Nur so kann geschrieben werden,” he had written 




einem solchen Zusammenhang, mit solcher vollständigen Öffnung des Leibes und 
der Seele” (KKAT 416). Kafka, like these rats, worked at night, but he rarely if ever 
achieved the kind of openness and coherence as he did that one night in late Sep-
tember 1912. This, like the “kentaurische Verschmelzung” described above, is the 
ideal form of writing. 
In early October 1917, about a month before his terrible “Mäusenacht,” Kafka 
wrote a letter to Max Brod from Zürau telling his friend that he had been reading but 
not writing, and nor did he have any desire to write, before concluding: “Könnte ich 
mich wie die Fledermaus durch Graben von Löchern retten, würde ich Löcher gra-
ben.” Clearly it is not as easy for Kafka to write literature as it is for the bat to dig 
holes, but both activities constitute an existential necessity, a “way out” (or, perhaps, 
a “line of flight”) to salvation. Even for the Russian rats, however, the compulsive 
burrowing represents hard, seemingly senseless work. “Es war ganz nutzlose Arbe-
it,” the narrator notes upon observing one of the rats feverishly clawing away at the 
wall from outside, 
denn um für sich ein genügend großes Loch zu graben, hätte sie tagelang 
arbeiten müssen und sie entfloh doch schon, sobald der Tag nur ein wenig 
sich aufhellte, trotzdem arbeitete sie, wie ein Arbeiter, der sein Ziel kennt. 
Und sie leistete gute Arbeit, es waren zwar unmerkliche Teilchen, die unter 
ihrem Graben aufflogen, aber ohne Ergebnis wurde die Kralle wohl niemals 
angesetzt. (690) 
In the interplay of affirmation and negation, or, in this instance, negation and re-
affirmation, this passage exemplifies the style of the text as a whole—a particularly 
Kafkaesque rhetorical gesture, which Gerhard Neumann famously called Kafka’s 




less, but gradually its persistence gives way to “gute Arbeit,” and finally it appears 
that the rat knows exactly what it is doing and that this work is proceeding at a steady, 
albeit glacially slow pace. This nocturnal diligence is reminiscent of both the “unauf-
hörlich tätiges Volk” in “Der Bau,” who spoil the animal narrator’s burrow with their 
burrowing while he is asleep, as well as the “geheimabsichtliche Erscheinen” of the 
mice in Zürau, who, Kafka fears, have dug their tunnels through every inch of the 
walls of his room. 
But there is a further significance to this description, which has to do with the 
conception of this persistent, seemingly fruitless, yet ultimately purposeful and re-
warding activity as the embodiment of a particular form of writing, indeed, as a par-
ticular way of inhabiting the text. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the 
narrator and the rats (or, more properly, the frozen landscape as a whole) may be 
seen as analogous to the relationship between the author and the text, which, in Kaf-
ka’s case, is frequently characterised in terms of domination or cultivation. Hence, 
until the writer succeeds in “breaking” the text, it remains recalcitrant (widerspenstig) 
and the relationship between him and the text will be antagonistic. But more than 
that, the text will actively seek to counteract the author’s incursions into this territory, 
just as the rats relentlessly seek to undermine the walls of the narrator’s hut. He, in 
turn, stuffs the holes with straw and tow, and kills whatever rats he comes across. 
The constant oscillation between the rats’ burrowing and the narrator’s reparations 
mirrors the ebb and flow of negation and re-affirmation that characterises the lan-
guage of the text itself. In a sense, the text, embodied in the pack of black rats that 




heimabsichtlich), with undoing whatever progress the writer has made to bend it to 
his own wishes. At the same time, however, it is important to note that this burrow-
ing is in itself an act of creation, but one whose purpose is inscrutable to the narrator 
and which must hence be at odds with his own aims and desires. 
In “Der Bau,” the narrator has learnt how to construct his own burrow within 
this stubborn ground, and although his fellow inhabitants have not ceased their furi-
ous industry, the structural damage wrought by these smaller creatures is 
significantly less serious and the narrator is more easily able to accommodate their 
additions and alterations into his plan. He is inside the text in a way the narrator of 
the “Kaldabahn” story could never be: although the deletion of the final sentence to a 
certain extent leaves him stranded there, unable to return to civilisation, the narrative 
perspective announced in the first sentence—“es ist nun schon viele Jahre her” 
(549)—assures the reader that the narrator lived to tell the tale.33 But even in the bur-
row there are lingering doubts about the relationship between the narrator and the 
ground of the text. He has learnt to live with the little animals that create connecting 
tunnels between those he himself has chosen to construct, and although they may 
alter the overall structure of the burrow, they nevertheless form part of it and can be 
incorporated into his plan. The more serious threat, as we saw earlier, lies in the 
mythical and obscure “Wesen der innern Erde” who have the capacity to expropriate 
this textual construct and evict the narrator from it entirely—suddenly it is no longer 
                                                   
33 The abrupt end of the story has led Karl-Heinz Fingerhut to conclude that “Der von Krankheit ge-
schwächte Jäger wird vermutlich zum Schluß von den unheimlichen Ratten umgebracht” (Tierfiguren, 




his burrow which the other, smaller creatures are spoiling, but rather their burrow, 
which the narrator has been illegally occupying. Once the polarities of ownership and 
intrusion, inside and outside have been reversed in this way, there is no hope of es-
cape, let alone of regaining one’s control: “man hört das Kratzen ihrer Krallen knapp 
unter sich in der Erde, die ihr Element ist, und schon ist man verloren” (KKANII 
578). 
We see something of this already in “Erinnerungen an die Kaldabahn,” par-
ticularly in the giant rats and their relentless attacks. They too appear to be “in their 
element”; their claws are uniquely suited to burrowing, and they seem intent on de-
stroying the narrator’s hut. Awakened by the sound of clawing one night, the narra-
tor goes outside in order to get a look at the rat trying to get in. As he describes it, the 
animal’s snout and front paws are so thoroughly wedged into the hole it is excavating 
that “[m]an hätte glauben können, jemand halte in der Hütte die Krallen fest und 
wolle das ganze Tier hineinziehen” (691). This scene anticipates a future reversal as 
the narrator goes outside in order to inspect the progress of the rat toward the inside. 
At the moment, it is still only halfway there, and he easily dispatches it with a well-
aimed kick. Yet the rats’ incursions into his domestic space (such as it is), seen from 
a different perspective, at the rats’ eye-level perhaps, might easily be reinterpreted as 
an attempt to repair the damage caused by the narrator’s (and the railway company’s) 





For the time being, the narrator’s hut is still standing, and with it the distinction be-
tween inside and outside that makes his life possible in this inhospitable climate. But 
soon—a mere three months after his arrival—these boundaries are rendered effec-
tively meaningless as the narrator’s body falls victim to an incursion from the sur-
rounding landscape in the form of a serious illness accompanied by a violent cough. 
When the train crew hear this cough, they refer to it as Wolfshusten. “Seitdem begann 
ich das Heulen aus dem Husten herauszuhören. Ich saß auf dem Bänkchen vor der 
Hütte und begrüßte heulend den Zug, heulend begleitete ich seine Abfahrt” (693). It 
is striking how the narrator only begins to notice the howling once his condition has 
been given an animal name. That is to say, the inarticulate sounds which the narrator 
is now compelled to utter are seemingly called forth through language. The condition 
is thus linguistically determined, and is, on some fundamental level, brought about 
by contact with a specific type of language embodied by the surrounding landscape. 
If you will pardon the expression, this is a textually transmitted disease. 
At the same time, this quasi-lycanthropic transformation represents the next 
stage in the process that began with the anthropomorphisation of the rat’s claw into a 
tiny hand. The transference of human and animal attributes, which the narrator re-
sisted at the time, now becomes unavoidable. Having failed to begin “writing like a 
rat,” he now instead begins howling like a wolf and is forced to stop trying to defend 
his hut from the rats. All he can do is kneel on his bunk with his head buried in an-




mersed in markers of animality. Covering his face may muffle the sound, but it does 
not provide an escape from the animal which now resides within his own body. The 
wolf is the “gänzlich von Menschen losgetrenntes Tier” par excellence. As such, then, 
far from marking the failure of his “Lebensexperiment,” this metamorphosis ulti-
mately represents its logical conclusion: the narrator had sought a way to live as far 
away from other people as possible, in becoming like a wolf, he has become alienated 
even from himself. There is nothing left to do but to return to civilisation; the story 
must end here. The unmistakable assonance of the names “Kalda” and “Kafka”—
another example of what Malcolm Pasley long ago called Kafka’s “semi-private 
games”—means that in abandoning his solitary exile and returning to Kalda, he is, in 
effect, returning to himself. 
We have already seen how Kafka considers his texts in animalistic terms, 
where the ultimate goal was to effectuate a centauric fusion of the rider/writer with 
the horse/text. The “Wolfshusten” cannot be said to represent this form of idealised 
symbiosis any more than the narrator’s exhortation to examine small animals at eye-
level can. Throughout the narrative, he has sought to fend off the indigenous animals 
and establish his autonomy in this textual landscape; his illness puts a definitive end 
to such ambitions and he must admit defeat. Unable to defend his hut from the rats, 
it is only a matter of time before its walls collapse entirely, leaving nothing to sepa-
rate him from the rest of the landscape. Worse, even his body is not his own, having 
been taken over by an animal presence which compels him to vocalise in a non-




In this, his fate mirrors that of Gregor Samsa (another assonant cryptogram 
of the author’s name), whose transformation into an “ungeheueres Ungeziefer” is 
likewise marked by the transformation of his voice into an animal voice, which nei-
ther his family nor the Prokurist can understand. At first, Gregor’s voice is still “un-
verkennbar seine frühere […], in die sich aber, wie von unten her, ein nicht zu 
unterdrückendes, schmerzliches Piepsen mischte” (KKAD 119). This indomitable 
squeaking or chirping sound comes up ‘from below’ to disrupt the semantic integrity 
of the spoken word, rendering his speech incomprehensible: “[ein Piepsen], das die 
Worte förmlich nur im ersten Augenblick in ihrer Deutlichkeit beließ, um sie im 
Nachklang derart zu zerstören, daß man nicht wußte, ob man recht gehört hatte” 
(119). This disruptive noise is the animal part of speech, the physical, a-semantic 
“grain” of the voice, which the λόγος has tried so hard to suppress. It belongs to a 
whole series of inarticulate noises in Kafka’s writings, which includes Josefine’s 
“Pfeifen,” the unsettling “Zischen” in the burrow, and the “Heulen” of the wolf’s 
cough.34 
One of the most striking examples is the inarticulate “Schrei der Dohle” of the 
invading nomads in “Ein altes Blatt.” Like the “Russia” of the “Kaldabahn” story, the 
“China” of this old manuscript serves as a vague geographical space of writing, where 
                                                   
34 Gerhard Kurz lists several others, noting that “[d]as Rauschen oder verwandte, im Vergleich zum 
Wort unbestimmte, unartikulierte Lautphänomene bilden in Kafkas Werk einen auffallenden Motiv-
komplex. […] Zu diesem Motivkomplex gehört auch das Dröhnen des Gerichts in ‘Fürsprecher’, das 
Rauschen im Erzählfragment ‘Der Quälgeist’ und im Dramenfragment ‘Der Gruftwächter’, das Pfei-
fen von Josefine in ‘Josefine, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse’, das Rascheln in ‘Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters’, der Schrei der Dohlen in ‘Ein altes Blatt’, das Piepsen in Gregors Stimme in ‘Die Ver-




the efforts at constructing the Great Wall, like the doomed Kalda railway, are under-
mined by incompetence on the part of the builders and threatened by a wild, indomi-
table indigenous population. Like the rats, these nomadic “Nordvölker” have easily 
penetrated the fragmentary and hopelessly ineffectual defences designed to keep 
them at bay; indeed, they seem to have a clearer idea of the layout and the progress in 
building the wall than the ones building it (KKANI 339). Now these nomads have oc-
cupied the imperial capital, disrupting the lives of the people who live there, taking 
whatever they want. “Sprechen kann man mit den Nomaden nicht,” says the narra-
tor: 
Unsere Sprache kennen sie nicht, ja sie haben kaum eine eigene. Unter ei-
nander verständigen sie sich ähnlich wie Dohlen. Immer wieder hört man 
diesen Schrei der Dohlen. Unsere Lebensweise, unsere Einrichtungen sind 
ihnen ebenso unbegreiflich wie gleichgültig. Infolgedessen zeigen sie sich 
auch gegen jede Zeichensprache ablehnend. (KKANI 359) 
The nomads reject any and all forms of signification, rendering all communication 
with them impossible. Their jackdaw cries are an example of the inarticulate, pre-
linguistic voice of nature (cf. Vogl 247). But while the nomads seem to be able to un-
derstand each other (sich verständigen), their unimpeded presence in the capital is 
viewed as a fundamental misunderstanding. The fate of the fatherland now rests in 
the hands of the merchants and craftsmen, says the narrator, who identifies himself 
as a cobbler, but they are not up to the task: “Ein Mißverständnis ist es, und wir gehn 
daran zugrunde” (KKANI 361). The destructive influence of this inarticulate non-
language on the surrounding narrative is indicated by an editorial note, which fol-




publication. It presents “Ein altes Blatt” as a translation of some pages from an old 
Chinese manuscript, which is irremediably fragmented. The remainder of the text is 
missing, its absence represented by two gaping angle brackets “⟨         ⟩” followed by 
the explanation: “Hier folgen noch einige Seiten, die aber allzu beschädigt sind, als 
daß ihnen etwas bestimmtes entnommen werden könnte” (KKANI 361). Like the 
“Piepsen” that creeps into Gregor’s voice “from below,” this “Schrei der Dohle,” once 
it has penetrated to the centre of the symbolic order, the imperial capital, causes the 
system of signification itself to collapse, leaving nothing but a fatal misunderstand-
ing. The rest is silence. 
This “Schrei der Dohle” famously also forms part of Kafka’s semi-private 
games, in that kavka means “jackdaw” in Czech; hence, “Ein altes Blatt” is a “transla-
tion” in more ways than one.35 Like “Samsa” and “Kalda” before it, the jackdaw cry 
serves as an oblique reference to the name Kafka, and to the animality and alterity of 
the self. Nothing is more alien and forgotten than one’s own body—it is, in Benja-
min’s phrase, “die vergessenste Fremde” (“Kafka,” 431). This is because the λόγος 
has always sought to disavow the animal body, to escape from it entirely. But inhabit-
                                                   
35 Werner Hamacher has explored the far-reaching implications of this “translation” of Kafka’s proper 
name into this deterritorialising nomadic language: “the nomads whose incursion into the Chinese 
metropolis is recounted in ‘An Old Manuscript’ are also ‘onomads’ of Kafka’s name. Although they do 
not carry his name, they act under his law and under the law of the name, the name of the law. For 
nomads are the bearers of the name ‘name.’ As nomeus, the nomad stands under the nomos, the law of 
the name, onoma, and the law as a taking nemein. […] Whenever the name is translated—whether it is 
the name ‘name’ or the name ‘Kafka’—the jackdaw cry of the nomads interrupts the ordered world of 
intentions and expropriates the proper name, which is supposed to name and preserve the most prop-
er thing; it makes the proper into an inevitable and unassailable foreigner, and displaces the borders 





ing the text also means embodying writing, reconnecting it to the physical, animal 
presence, which, moreover, carries with it all sorts of ancillary noises and parasites—
it is, in fact, a multiplicity. 
What is this animal presence in language, this “enemy within,” other than 
animetaphor? Traditionally, language has been seen as a house built and inhabited 
by humans, while animals have resolutely been kept outside its walls. Yet upholding 
this boundary requires constant vigilance, since the animals are forever finding a way 
in, in the shape of metaphors, analogies, figures of speech. Once in, they take up res-
idence, leaving a trace that is at once external and constitutive, alien and fundamen-
tal. The animetaphor thus constantly threatens to deterritorialise human language 
even as it opens it up to new forms of expression. Kafka’s zoopoetics in particular re-
lies on granting access to the animal, on allowing it to construct its own meanings 
within the network of human language, but there is an inherent risk involved in this 
process. The lingering threat that one day you will wake up from unsettling dreams 





[T]he question of the animal is raised in and by philosophy for 
us […], but it is also a question put to us—individuals and 
disciplines—by animals, with increasing urgency as their 
disappearance from modern life and extinction from the planet 





In an effort to explain the absence of becomings-animal in Kafka’s novels, Deleuze 
and Guattari invite us to imagine Der Proceß and Das Schloß as dealing with “the bu-
reaucratic world of ants” and “the Castle of the termites,” respectively. Instantly, the 
air of indeterminacy and polysemy that characterises the animal presence in the sto-
ries would have given way to an allegory of human relations: “Had he written about 
the justice of the ants or the castle of the termites, the whole realm of metaphors, re-
alist or symbolist, would have returned” (Kafka, 38). Certainly, by and large, the new 
sorts of animal narratives that emerge after 1900 and which I have been tracking in 
this dissertation seem to work best in “small” literary forms: in short stories, sketch-
es, and what Andreas Huyssen has termed “modernist miniatures.” This is especially 
clear when a short, polyvalent animal text is transplanted into a larger framework, as 
is the case with Robert Musil’s “Fliegenpapier” (Nachlaß, 11–13), which has a close 
equivalent in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (131). As Isolde Schiffermüller has argued, 
the shorter, “miniature” form allows for a greater degree of ambiguity and open-
endedness, whereas when imbedded in the longer form of the novel the image inevi-




In der kleinen Prosaskizze aber bleibt seine Bedeutung unbestimmt und of-
fen: die Gebärdensprache der kleinen Form spielt sich auf einer bedeu-
tungsresistenten Schwelle von Sprache und Stummheit ab, an der 
Menschliches und Nicht-Menschliches, Leben und Tod ihre begrifflichen 
Grenzen überschreiten und prozeßhaft ineinander übergehen. (Schiffer-
müller “Zoopoetik,” 201) 
We might venture the hypothesis that the novel, as the paradigmatically humanist 
genre, is essentially anthropometric, and therefore necessarily translates all non-
human presences and relations into metaphors for human experience. This, too, is 
one of the primary implications of viewing the animal as the “first metaphor”: in re-
garding the animal, and the nonhuman generally, as metaphorical, we assimilate the 
other into a symbolic order of our own making, forcing the contingent and threaten-
ingly alien into a coherent shape that has meaning for us. 
As Paul Sheehan has noted, in a gloss on Frank Kermode’s definition of nar-
rative as “an organization that humanizes time by giving it form”: “Narrative […] is 
human-shaped” (Sheehan Modernism, 9, original italics). “Put simply,” he continues, 
“we [humans] tell stories about ourselves to give our lives meaning and purpose, and 
about our kind to maintain the crucial human/inhuman distinction. This is a twofold 
process: the mere existence of narrative suggests difference, a separation from nature 
(which does not, needless to say, manifest narrative order); and the kinds of narra-
tives that are produced have supported that separation” (9–10). The larger and more 
intricately structured the narrative, in other words, the better equipped is it to absorb 
and assimilate contingency, alterity, and the “other expression” of animetaphors. We 




dissertation,1 where the symbolically overdetermined Kosmograph tiger succeeds in 
disrupting the diegetic structure of the novel in an explosion of contingency, but is 
quickly re-assimilated into the narrative through the process of mechanical reproduc-
tion. 
The anthropometric nature of humanism is also reflected in the academic dis-
course on modernism and modernity. As a rule, the canonical texts of European lit-
erary modernism do not engage centrally with the question of the animal, or have, at 
the very least, not generally been read with this question in mind. Quite often it 
seems to have been wilfully suppressed or “explained away” by scholars with a single-
minded determination to read everything as a comment on the human condition, 
from which, moreover, animals are categorically excluded as sentimental and inap-
propriate for the serious study of great literature. Nor is this by any means limited to 
modernist literary studies. As the art historian Steve Baker notes with regard to mod-
ernist art history as a whole, “the animal comes to be least visible in the discourses 
which regard themselves as the most serious” (21). Even Franz Marc, who, as we saw 
in the introduction, was a great proponent of the “Animalisierung der Kunst,” even-
tually embraced abstraction as an expression of “unsre höchst bewußte, thatenheiße 
Erwiderung und Überwindung des sentimentalen Geistes” (Marc 210, original italics). 
From an art-historical standpoint, Baker writes, 
there was no modern animal, no ‘modernist’ animal. Between nineteenth-
century animal symbolism, with its reasonably secure hold on meaning, 
                                                   
1 With the exception of Rilke’s Malte Laurids Brigge, of course, but that was not the primary focus of 
the chapter on Rilke. It is striking that neither of these novels employs an omniscient narrator, and 




and the postmodern animal images whose ambiguity or irony or sheer 
brute presence serves to resist or to displace fixed meanings, lies modern-
ism at its most arid. (20) 
Baker is careful to specify that his hypothesis is “essentially art-historical in its em-
phases,” but there is some truth to this claim with regard to literary “high” modern-
ism as well, especially as enshrined in the epoch-making novels of Musil, Proust, and 
Joyce. Even when, as in the case of Musil’s Nachlaß zu Lebzeiten, these authors fun-
nelled some of their literary genius to the depiction of animals, such works have 
tended to be considered of incomparably lesser significance. Virginia Woolf herself 
dismissed her novel Flush, an imaginary biography of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s 
eponymous cocker spaniel, as “a silly book” and “a waste of time” (Diary 29 April 
1933, qtd. in Caughie 47). It is also striking that insofar as the radical or “true” mod-
ernists engage in zoopoetics at all, the animals in their texts are far more convention-
al, and far more securely anchored to human structures of meaning, than those in 
the works by the “last Romantics” such as D. H. Lawrence, Rilke, or Hofmannsthal. 
To be sure, the four authors considered in this dissertation also have a secure place 
in the modernist literary canon, but it is nevertheless notable that in pursuing these 
authors’ zoopoetics, I have for the most part been led to focus on more obscure texts, 
and even there I have generally had to argue against the canonical interpretations, 
which almost invariably downplay the significance of the literal or metaphorical ani-
mals in these texts, and read them allegorically as referring exclusively to some as-
pect of the human. 
The modern animal, Baker concludes, “is thus the nineteenth-century animal 




While this disappearance is unquestionably a trait of “high” modernism, it is also at-
tributable in equal measure to disciplinary structures of knowing and canon-
formation that have regarded the question of the animal as fundamentally unserious. 
In recent years, however, this has begun to change, as the large-scale disappearance 
of animals from the real world—the fact that here, too, they have been made to disap-
pear through human action—has come to be regarded as a serious problem demand-
ing our attention. As I have shown in this dissertation, there is in fact a conspicuous 
abundance of animals in the literature around 1900, and this profusion of animality 
was in large part brought about by a crisis of anthropocentrism. Now, a century later, 
we are, I would argue, in the midst of another, far greater crisis. As we enter the “an-
thropocene,” the first geological era to be defined in terms of the impact of human 
beings on the planet, it may seem as though the ἄνθρωπος has finally reclaimed the 
centre, but at the same time it is becoming impossible to justify the traditional hu-
manist view of man as fundamentally separate from nature. 
Such structures of human exceptionalism and isolationism continue to haunt 
debates surrounding literary and linguistic approaches to the nonhuman other. Re-
cently, the widespread interdiction against anthropomorphism, for example, on the 
basis that it imputes human forms of agency and subjectivity upon animals—that it 
is, in effect, a form of the “pathetic fallacy”—has come under fire by scholars who 
point out that the charge of anthropomorphism is in itself based on an Enlighten-




ince of the rational human subject.2 Consider, for example, Daniel C. Dennett’s 
memorable critique of Thomas Nagel’s famous question, “What Is It Like to Be a 
Bat?” which Dennett considers to be hopelessly anthropomorphic and hence falla-
cious because it begs the question of whether to be a bat is “to be the sort of thing it 
is like something to be” (703). While I am only too happy to accept that the question 
of what it is like to be a bat (or any Other, for that matter, nonhuman or otherwise) 
may be fundamentally unanswerable, I fail to see why the logical conclusion should 
then be to assume that being a bat is not like anything. Beyond the allegation of an-
thropomorphism, I wonder if the problem doesn’t ultimately lie in the metaphorical 
structure of the question: in order to be able to say that it is “like” something to be a 
bat, one must not only ascribe some form of subjective experience to a nonhuman 
other, one must also consider it possible to encapsulate or at least approximate the 
nature of that other in language. 
It is striking that whilst anthropomorphism is now taken seriously by many 
scholars, there has so far been no comparable rehabilitation of metaphor, which still 
seems to carry the stigma of anthropocentrism, and to entail the circumscription of 
the animal within a human symbolic order that does violence to the absolute alterity 
                                                   
2 The conspicuous absence of animals within discourses that consider themselves ‘serious’ is closely 
linked to the injunction against anthropomorphism as inherently ‘unscientific’. As Tom Tyler ob-
serves, “It has tended to be those intent on what [George Henry] Lewes called ‘scientific seriousness’ 
who have most objected to anthropomorphic language in the discussion of animals” (Ciferae 53). The 
very notion of anthropomorphism, as Tyler notes, makes no sense outside an anthropocentric frame 
of reference that identifies certain traits or faculties as essentially and principally human, as demon-
strated by the simple fact that there are no analogous ‘morphisms’ for other species: in Tyler’s exam-
ple, we do not think of dolphins as “chiropteromorphic” even though they too use echolocation, a trait 
originally identified only in bats (Ciferae 60). Lorraine Daston provides an enlightening history of an-




of the nonhuman Other. But if it is possible—necessary, even—to re-examine the 
underlying assumptions that cause the pervasive uneasiness surrounding anthropo-
morphism, why should metaphor be any different, unless we wish to cling to the ab-
solute alterity of the animal other, despite the essentially Cartesian, dualistic 
conception of the human that such a view must inadvertently support? As I have en-
deavoured to show, the animal is not “outside the text,” either literally or figuratively. 
Certainly, Nagel’s question, just as Franz Marc’s before it, is guilty of what Bataille 
called “the poetic fallacy of animality.” As such, it might be deemed insufficiently 
rigorous by certain analytic philosophers, and inherently naïve and sentimental by 
certain literary scholars. But as I have argued, such questions are worth asking and 
worth taking seriously as fundamentally poetic questions. The question of language 
is, at a very basic level, synonymous with the question of the animal, and that is why, 
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